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The Darker Side of Social Networks in Transforming Economies: Corrupt Exchange in Chinese Guanxi and Russian Blat/Svyazi

  • Päivi Karhunen (a1), Riitta Kosonen (a1), Daniel J. McCarthy (a2) and Sheila M. Puffer (a2)
Abstract

This article addresses corruption as a negative practice displaying the ‘darker side’ of social capital in Chinese guanxi and Russian blat/svyazi networks. It presents a conceptual framework integrating several research streams to establish a conceptual linkage between social network characteristics and three forms of corruption between business persons and public officials: cronyism, bribery, and extortion. We argue that the forms of corruption in a society are determined by the nature of social network ties and their underlying morality, with particularistic and general trust being key factors. Our framework depicts networks as three concentric circles representing three types of corruption resulting from their corresponding types of reciprocity: open, closed, and negative. We then apply the framework to the practice of guanxi in China and blat/svyazi in Russia. We propose that different network characteristics and different forms of corruption may help explain what we label the ‘China-Russia paradox’ of why corruption and high economic growth have co-existed in China, at least in the short term, but less so in Russia. We conclude with ethical and legal implications for doing business in those two transforming economies and offer suggestions for future research.

中国的“关系”网络和俄罗斯的Blat/Svyazi 网络都展现出社会资本的黑暗面, 本文讨论这种消极实践导致的腐败。本文提出一个概念框架, 基于对几个研究领域的整合, 我们建立起社会网络特征和三种形式的商人–公务人员腐败 (任用亲信、贿赂和勒索) 之间的联系。我们认为, 一个社会的腐败形式是由社会网络联系及其背后的道德观所决定的, 其中特殊信任和普遍信任是关键的因素。我们的框架将网络描述为三个同心圆, 代表导致三类腐败的互惠类型:开放的、封闭的和消极的。随后我们运用这个框架解释中国的“关系”和俄罗斯的blat/svyazi的运作。我们认为, 不同的网络特点和不同形式的腐败有助于解释所谓的“中国–俄罗斯悖论”, 即为什么在中国腐败和经济高速增长至少在短期内同时存在, 而俄罗斯却很少出现。我们的结论对于在这两个转型经济体里从事商业具有伦理和法律的意义, 同时我们也对于未来的研究提供若干建议。

यह शोध पत्र चीनी गुआंची व रुसी ब्लैट/स्वायाजी में सामाजिक पूंजी के बुरे आयामों को प्रस्तुत कर भ्रष्टाचार को एक नकारात्मक परिपाटी के तौर पर दर्शाता है. इसमें कई शोध धाराओं को समग्र करते हुए सामाजिक संजालों के अभिलक्षणों तथा भ्रष्टाचार के तीन प्रकारों (अंतरंगतावाद, घूसखोरी व उगाहना) के बीच वैचारिक सम्बन्ध दिखाते हुए एक संकल्पनात्मक तंत्र प्रस्तुत किया गया है. हमारा यह मत है की एक समाज में भ्रष्टाचार का स्वरूप उसके सामाजिक संजालों व उनमें निहित नैतिकता से निर्धारित होता है जिसमें अनन्य व सामान्य विश्वास अहम तत्व हैं. हमारा तंत्र तीन संकेंद्रित वृत्तों के माध्यम से तीन प्रकार की परस्परता (मुक्त, अवरुद्ध व नकारात्मक) से जनित तीन प्रकार के भ्रष्टाचार को दर्शाता है. इसके आगे हमने इस तंत्र को चीनी गुआंची व रुसी ब्लैट/स्वायाजी के ऊपर लागू किया. हमने यह प्रस्ताव किया है की अल्पावधि में भिन्न संजालिय लक्षण चीन लेकिन सीमित हद तक रूस में भ्रष्टाचार व तीव्र आर्थिक विकास के सह-अस्तित्व के 'चीनी-रुसी विरोधाभास को समझा सकते हैं. हम इन परिवर्तनरत अर्थव्यवस्थाओं में व्यापार करने के नीतिगत व वैधानिक निहितार्थों की चर्चा करते हुए भावी शोधों के लिए सुझाव देते हैं.

SUMÁRIO:

Este artigo aborda a corrupção como uma prática negativa mostrando o “lado mais escuro” do capital social nas redes chinesa guanxi e russa blat/svyazi. Ele apresenta um modelo conceitual que integra várias correntes de pesquisa para estabelecer uma ligação conceitual entre as características de redes sociais e três formas de corrupção entre pessoas de negócios e funcionários públicos: favoritismo, suborno e extorsão. Argumentamos que as formas de corrupção em uma sociedade são determinadas pela natureza dos laços de rede social e sua subjacente moralidade, com a confiança particularista e geral sendo fatores-chave. Nosso modelo descreve as redes como três círculos concêntricos representando três tipos de corrupção resultantes de seus correspondentes tipos de reciprocidade: aberta, fechada e negativa. Em seguida, aplicamos a estrutura para a prática de guanxi na China e blat/svyazi na Rússia. Propomos que diferentes características de rede e diferentes formas de corrupção podem ajudar a explicar o que chamamos de “paradoxo China-Rússia” de porque a corrupção e alto crescimento econômico coexistiram na China, pelo menos a curto prazo, mas menos na Rússia. Concluímos com implicações éticas e legais para fazer negócios nessas duas economias transformadoras e oferecer sugestões para pesquisas futuras.

АННОТАЦИЯ:

В этой статье рассматривается коррупция как отрицательное явление, которое демонстрирует «темную сторону» социального капитала в случае китайских отношений guanxi и русских отношений blat/svyazi. В данной работе представлена ​​концептуальная модель, которая объединяет несколько направлений исследований для того, чтобы установить, каким образом концептуально взаимосвязаны характеристики социальной сети и три формы коррупции между деловыми людьми и государственными должностными лицами: кумовство, взяточничество и вымогательство. Мы утверждаем, что формы коррупции в обществе определяются характером социальных связей, а также их основополагающей моральностью, при этом личное и общее доверие являются ключевыми факторами. Наша модель изображает социальные связи в виде трех концентрических окружностей, которые представляют собой три формы коррупции как результат соответствующего типа взаимности: открытого, закрытого и отрицательного. Далее, мы применяем данную модель на практике в случае guanxi в Китае, а также в случае blat/svyazi в России. Мы предполагаем, что различные характеристики социальных связей и разные формы коррупции могут объяснять то, что мы называем «китайско-российский парадокс», а именно то, почему коррупция и высокий экономический рост сосуществуют в Китае, по крайней мере, в краткосрочной перспективе, тогда как в России это происходит гораздо в меньшей степени. В заключение, мы делаем некоторые этические и правовые выводы для ведения бизнеса в этих двух странах с переходной экономикой, а также предлагаем ряд направлений для будущих исследований.

RESUMEN:

Este artículo aborda la corrupción como una práctica negativa que muestra “el lado más oscuro” del capital social en el guanxi chino y las redes blat/svyazi rusas. Presenta un marco conceptual integrando varias corrientes de investigación para establecer un vínculo conceptual entre las características de red social y tres formas de corrupción entre las personas de negocio y los funcionarios públicos: amiguismo, soborno, y extorsión. Argumentamos que las formas de corrupción en una sociedad están determinados por la naturaleza de los lazos de redes sociales y su moralidad subyacente, siendo la confianza particularista y general los factores clave. Nuestro marco describe las redes como tres círculos concéntricos representando tres tipos de corrupción que resultan de sus tipos correspondiente de reciprocidad: abierta, cerrada, y negativa. Luego aplicamos el marco a la practica de guanxi en China guanxi y de blat/svyazi en Rusia. Proponemos que las diferentes características de red y las diferentes formas de corrupción puede ayudar a explicar lo que denominamos “la paradoja China-Rusia” de cómo la corrupción y el alto crecimiento económico han coexistido en China, al menos en el corto y plazo, pero menos en Rusia. Concluimos con implicaciones éticas y legales para hacer negocios en esas dos economías en transformación y ofrecemos sugerencias para futuras investigaciones.

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Corresponding author
Corresponding author: Päivi Karhunen (paivi.karhunen@aalto.fi)
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