¹ In 1778, the Surat Council flatly stated that the shroffs had become the richest people in town. See FRS 14 December 1778. Some ten years later, Dr Hove, a Polish scientist who visited Surat in 1787 and 1788, noticed that the Hindus were ‘the first and richest merchants’ in the city.Google Scholar See ‘Tours for Scientific and Economic Research…by Dr Hove’, in Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, no. XVI–New Series (Bombay, 1885), p. 176.Google Scholar

² For my own contribution see ‘In the Deep Blue Sea: Surat and its Merchant Class during the Dyarchic Era (1759–1800)’Google Scholar, in The Indian Economic and Social History Review XIX, 3 and 4 (1982), pp. 287–8, 292.Google ScholarFor Lakshmi Subramanian's see ‘Capital and Crowd in a Declining Asian Port City: The Anglo-Bania Order and the Surat Riots of 1795’Google Scholar, in Modern Asian Studies 19, 2 (1985)Google Scholar, and ‘Banias and the British: The Role of Indigenous Credit in the Process of Imperial Expansion in Western India in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century’, in Modern Asian Studies 21, 3 (1987).Google Scholar

³ Torri, M., ‘Surat During the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century: What Kind of Social Order?’, in Modern Asian Studies 21, 4 (1987).There I argue that the indigenous society in Surat cannot be considered torn along communal lines and that many of Dr Subramanian's statements, including some which are crucially important to the credibility of her model, are based on selective quotations or outright misquotations of the relevant sources.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ This was what the Bombay shroffs themselves claimed in 1786, when they declared them to be ‘only the servants of the shroffs at Surat’. Public Prs, 9 November 1786 (IOR, P/342/6, p. 276).Google Scholar

⁵ That, in Surat, even small amounts of money were lent for interest by both Indians and Europeans is shown by a reading of the proceedings of the Bombay Mayor's Court. See, e.g., the cause of the creditors of the late Frederick, Dorrien, in Mayor's Court, 28 May 1781 (IOR, P/417/39, pp. 266–358).Google Scholar

⁶ A significant example of this trend is the career of the great banker Arjunji Nathji Trivedi, discussed below.Google Scholar

⁷ Public Prs, 26 October 1770 (Consultation and letter from Mr Tayler); Mayor's Court, Letter from Elisabeth Price of 15 April 1774 (IOR, P/417/31, p. 818);Google ScholarIbid., Jane Boucard contra Jane Stratton, 22 May 1776 (IOR, P/417/34, p. 391).

⁸ Niebhur, Caster, when in Surat (1764), mused on the different social customs setting Indian Muslims apart from Turkish and Egyptian Muslims. In so doing, he recalled that Muslim Indians ‘mettent de l'argent à interêt (give money for interest)’.Google ScholarNiebhur, C., Voyage en Arabie et en d'autres Pays circonvoisins, tome second (Amsterdam: S. J. Balde and Utretch: Barthelemy Wild, 1780), p. 51.Google ScholarHowever, Saleh, Chellabi, the Muslim merchant prince and shipowner, stated in 1772 that taking interest ‘was prohibited among the Moors’ (IOR, P/417/27, p. 251). As a matter of fact, only religious strictures can explain why the role of the Muslim Suratis–and other Indian Muslims–was so limited in the banking field. In Surat, the examples of Muslims active as bankers or money-lenders are few and far between. The most relevant case is that of one of the main Mughal nobles, the Bakshi, who routinely lent substantial sums of money at interest, both in Surat and in the countryside. FRS, 29 August 1795 (IOR, G/36/73, p. 397). Another case worth noticing, in spite of his above-mentioned statement, is that of Saleh Chellabi. He lent money to Muncherji Cursetji, a wealthy Parsi merchant who acted as broker of the Dutch Company in Surat. On another occasion, Chellabi bought a Es 10,000 bill of exchange, payable in Basra, from a Haji Karim Ali, a Muslim merchant residing in Bombay. Public Prs, 16 October 1796 (A list of debts due to Govindram [and] Muncherjee: IOR, P/342/25, p. 2,896) and Mayor's Court, John Griffith Administrator…[contra] Sallia Chillebi, 18 March 1772. However, my own impression is that these and other banking activities by Chellabi were motivated less by a desire of short-term economic gains than by a policy aiming at upholding his ābrū, namely his social prestige and economic credit. Besides Chellabi, I have discovered a Bairam Khan, who was a principal merchant who, sometimes, discounted bills of exchange worth huge sums. However, my suspicion is that he was a Parsi. Parsis had sometimes Mughal titles and, in the FRS, there appears a Danjishaw Bairam Khan who, no doubt, was a Parsi and, I assume, Bairam Khan's son. For an example of a Surati Muslim active in the bills of exchange business see FRS, 27 July 1782. For examples of Muslims active in that trade at Bombay and in Bengal, and working in partnership with Surat Armenians and Jews see IOR, G/36/76, pp. 734–5, and FRS, 9 April 1798.Google Scholar

⁹ Quoted in fn. 2.Google Scholar

¹⁰ FRS, 5 July 1790 (IOR, G/36/68, p. 314).Google Scholar

¹¹ FRS, 2 August 1790 (Documentation presented by John, Spencer and his letter of 31 July 1790); FRS, 6 August 1790 (Abstract of Bengal raw silk and piece goods imported at Phoorza).Google Scholar

¹² Very possibly, the reason for the superiority on the part of the Hindus vis-à-vis the Armenians was that the latter were such a tiny minority. According to M. J. Seth's estimate, in the 1780s the Armenian community in Surat totalled some 3 or 4 hundred souls. Seth, Mesrob Jacob, Armenians in India (New Delhi: Oxford and I B H, 1983Google Scholar; first published by the author in 1914), p. 253. At the same time, the Hindu community, even at the most conservative estimate, must have neared the 100,000 souls. For examples of Armenian merchants discounting the ‘Hon'ble Company's bills, see FRS, 21 November 1772, 30 April 1782, 23 January 1783, 25 May 1785.Google Scholar

¹³ FRS, Report by Hope, James and George Hamilton of 18 April 1743 (IOR, G/36/27, p. 158).Google Scholar

¹⁴ FRS, 3 December 1746, 5 March 1748.Google Scholar

¹⁵ IOR, E/4/462, Letter from Bombay to the Court of Directors, 20 November 1760, para. 234.Google Scholar

¹⁶ FRS, 12 October 1787.Google Scholar

¹⁷ FRS, 5 July 1790 (The humble information of Turwady Arzoonjee Nathjee …).Google Scholar

¹⁸ The other merchants were a Hindu, Tapidas Laldas, and five Armenians, i.e. Owen John Jacob, Macartiz Maliknas, Gaspar Joanes, Phanoes Agabob and Avatik Seth. FRS, 2 August 1790 (Letter from John Spencer of 31 July 1790).Google Scholar

¹⁹ PR XVII, p. 309. The mokauts were taxes levied by the Surat Durbar on various items of trade.Google Scholar

²⁰ The quotation is from the Petition of 1795, p. 431. On the bullion imports from the Near East to Surat see: Public Prs, 27 December 1761 (LfS), 15 August 1762 (LfS), 19 July 1770 (LfS), 15 September 1773 (LfS), and Mayor's Court, Stephen Pitt contra Mulna Fakaruddin, 10 July 1775.Google Scholar

²¹ E.g., Public Prs, 15 August 1762 (LfS of 7 August) and 15 September 1773 (LfS of 8 September). For further examples of the fact that the Surat merchants and shroffs' ability to discount bills of exchange was a function of the positive turnover of their trade, see FRS, 15 March 1750; Public Prs, 9 December 1759 (LfS of 5 December), 24 June 1761, 27 December 1761 (LfS of 21 December), 19 December 1773; FRS, 4 February 1788.Google Scholar

²² Public Prs, 15 December 1773 (LfS of 8 December).Google Scholar

²³ See fn. 8.Google Scholar

²⁴ On this last point see Petition of 1795, pp. 430, 435.Google Scholar

²⁵ For a discussion of the pluralistic character of the indigenous society in Surat see my ‘Surat During the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century’, pp. 705–9.Google Scholar

²⁶ FRS, 1759–1800, passim (the indications relating to the bills of exchange are plentiful and can be easily retrieved by making use of the alphabetical index at the end of most volumes).Google Scholar

²⁷ This statement is based on a set of 328 names of shipowners, merchants, brokers and nakhudas residing in Surat and active on the Surat–Middle East route during the years 1759 to 1800. The names have been put together by perusing the English records for the relevant years. Some 68% of the names belong to Surat Muslims and Arabs (at least one of the latter was a Maronite Christian). Only 17% of the 328 names belong to Hindus, whereas the balance is made up by Parsis, Armenians, Jews and one Portuguese. Most of the major shipowners trading to the ‘Gulphs’ were Muslims and none Hindu (although there were Hindu shipowners). A full discussion of the ethnic composition of the Surat merchant class is be given in my ‘Ethnicity and Trade in Surat during the Dual Government Era (1759–1800)’Google Scholar, in The Indian Economic and Social History Review 27, 4 (1990).Google Scholar

²⁸ See above and fn. 11.Google Scholar

²⁹ For example, the certificate of 1764, which became the official justification for the English monopoly on the trade to the Near East, and which was bound to damage the five indigenous shipowners, all of them Muslims, who had previously controlled that trade, was signed by a large majority of Muslims (47 out of 58). See FRS, 11 June 1796 (Extract of a letter from the Chief and Council at Surat… dated the 28th February 1764, and…certificate… [under] the Cazee's seal, 27th February 1764).Google Scholar

³⁰ FRS, 1 September 1772.Google Scholar

³¹ Torri, ‘In the Deep Blue Sea’, pp. 271–5.Google Scholar

³² Anquetil de Briancourt's memoirs, although useful, must be handled with caution. Its author was extremely biased against the English–which is natural enough, given the story of his relationship with them. Moreover, he was a singularly unintelligent and gullible person.Google Scholar

³³ In 1773, Chellabi, Saleh owned at least ships and his brother Ibrahim at least one. Public Prs, 28 February, 24 March, 12 May, 20 August and 8 September 1773. In 1774, Dadabhai Manockji, a Parsi, together with his partner Eddul Dada, another Parsi, owned at least two ships. Public Prs, 26 April 1774; Mayor's Court, Elisabeth Price contra Dadabhoi Monackjee, 6 February 1775. In the years 1771/1772, Danjishaw Manjishaw, another Parsi, owned at least seven ships, including a botella who had been taken by the Portuguese. Public Prs, 17 December 1771, 11, 17, 23 and 29 May 1772 (Dunjeeshaw's petition). In the early 1770s, Mulla Fakharuddin owned at least two ships. Mayor's Court, Daniel Draper…contra Mulna Fakaruddeen, 4 March 1773. It is important to stress that the English records are very unsatisfactory as far as Indian shipping is concerned. Therefore, the above data must be considered as an under-representation of the actual situation.Google Scholar

³⁴ This comes out quite clearly from a reading of Mayor's, Court, Daniel Draper…contra Mulna Fakaruddeen, 4 March 1773 which includes an extensive description of the actual working of the English monopoly on the trade to the Near East.Google Scholar

³⁵ On the decline of the trade to the Near East see FRS, 29 March 1777. It is a fact that all the big shipowning merchants active on the Near East route in the 1770s were either in trouble or ruined by the end of the 1770s or the beginning of the 1780s. This is true even in the case of William Andrew Price, who died insolvent in 1774. The exceptions to this rule were Thomas Hodges, among the English, and the Chellabis, among the Suratis. The case for the decline of shipping is less clear-cut. Certainly, after 1775 fewer indications relating to Indian-owned ships are available in the English records. However, one has the distinct impression that this decrease might be the result of a change in the way in which English writers took down their data. According to Parsons, who visited Surat in 1777, Gujaratu ships were then still very numerous.Google ScholarAbraham, Parsons, Travels in Asia and Africa (London, 1808), p. 261, quoted in Torn, ‘In the Deep Blue Sea’, p. 278. I used to be skeptical of Parsons's glowing description of Gujarati shipping. Now, after a much more extensive reading of the sources, I am inclined to accept his evaluation. Still, the castastrophic storms of 1775 and 1882, capped by a less well known one in 1883, brought about the loss of several ships.Google ScholarHatalkar, V. G. (ed.), French Records, vol. I (Bombay: State Board for Literature and Culture, 1978), p. 8Google Scholar; FRS, 23 and 24 April 1782; Seth, Armenians in India, pp. 249–50.Google Scholar

³⁶ On the storms, see fn. 35. On the plague which, in 1773, ‘almost depopulated’ Basra, see Orme O.V. 152, p. 112 (FRS, 16 October 1773).Google Scholar On the unsettled political conditions prevailing in the Near East see Lorimer, J. G., Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia (India: Government Printing, 1915), vol. I, part 1, pp. 163–7Google Scholar, and Hakima, Abu Ahmad Mustafa, History of Eastern Arabia 1750–1800 (Beirut: Khayats, 1965).Google Scholar

³⁷ On the Sidis and the English giving armed escort in coastal waters to departing ships headed for the ‘Gulphs’, see FRS, 12 and 19 April 1757, and 28 March 1760. The English organized regular convoys plying between Surat and Bombay, and Surat and the Northern ports of Gujarat which appear to have been less an effective defence against pirates than a pretext in order to extract legal and illegal convoy duties from the merchants. E.g., Public Prs, 21 December 1772 (Letter from Lieutenant Thistleton); ‘Tours…by Dr Hove’, pp. 177–8; FRS, 12, 18 March and 4, 9 April 1800.Google Scholar

³⁸ FRS, 12 March 1799 (Letter from Bombay of 8 March).Google Scholar

³⁹ In the whole dual government period (1759–1800), two cases appear to have been particularly catastrophic. The first was the capture of Saleh Chellabi's ship ‘Merry’ by the Count d'Estaing in 1759. The ‘Merry’ had a cargo worth the truly enormous sum of 8 lakhs of rupees. Although the ship was eventually returned, her cargo was not.Google ScholarAnquetil, Duperron, Zend Avesta, Ouvrage de Zoroastre, vol. I, tome 1: Discours préliminaire (Paris: N. M. Tilliard, 1771), pp. CCCXLVI–CCCXLVIIIGoogle Scholar; Orme, O.V. 131, p. 59 (FRS, 19 January 1762); FRS, 5 July 1793 (M. Bruix's letter to the Bombay Government). The second case was the capture of the ‘Shah Allum’ in the 1798/99 season, which caused ‘ruinous losses’ to the Surat merchants. FRS, 25 March 1799 (Petition by the merchants trading to Mocha, Judah and Bussora). For other examples of hardly less catastrophic losses caused to the Surat merchants operating on the Surat–Bengal and Surat–Far East routes by European and, sometimes, Maratha privateers, see Seth, Armenians in India, pp. 249–52.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ For the silk trade from Bengal in the years 1730/1731 to 1788/1789, see FRS, 2 August 1790. For the higher estimate of the value of the trade to the Near East, see Ewer's, Walter report of 1979 in IOR: Home Miscellaneous 438, p. 49. Ewer claimed that ‘the exports and imports to and from the Gulphs amount to about L 300.000 Stg. annually’, which would translate into 24,00,000 Bombay rupees and a somewhat higher sum in Surat rupees, The lower estimate is based on the indication given by a Surat accountant, Edward Galley, in 1800, that the 2% extra-tax on the trade to the ‘Gulphs’ yielded a yearly profit of Rs 36,738 (Edward Galley's report dated 17 June 1800, in PR XVII, pp. 274–5). This means that the total yearly value of the trade to the ‘Gulphs’ was Rs 18,36,900. As, in the preceeding years, the working of the Surat custom houses was such that a part of the goods went under-taxed, Galley's estimate could well be an under-evaluation. On the Surat custom houses see M. Torri, ‘Social Groups and the Redistribution of Commercial Wealth’Google Scholar, in Studies in History, I, 1, n.s. (1985).Google Scholar

⁴¹ FRS, 5 July 1790 (IOR, G/36/68, p. 314).Google Scholar

⁴² FRS, 2 August 1790 (Spencer's, John letter, 31 July 1790).Google Scholar

⁴³ This is borne out by the figures related to the silk trade from Bengal in FRS, 2 August 1790 (Abstract [of the] importation of Bengal raw silk and piece goods since 1765), and 7 August 1790 (Letter from the Phoorza Master).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See fn. 17.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ FRS, 21 September 1791 (Letter from the Revenue Department, Bombay, 17 December).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ FRS, 11 March 1795 (Letter to Bombay) and 14 March 1795 (Consultation).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ FRS, 1 November 1798 (Letter from Bombay, 26 October) and 13 December 1798 (Chief's memorandum).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Bengal Public Proceedings, 22 September 1790 (Minute of the Mint Master, 22 June). I owe this reference to Anand Yang, whom I want to thank.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See fn. 43.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ In 1777, a group of senior Bombay officers drew up a list of their colleagues who had engaged in trade in the previous 22 years. They concluded that only a tiny minority had acquired a fortune, many more ‘had died positive bankrupts’, and others still ‘Were about square with the world or possessed of very little more than to defray their burial charges’. Public Prs, 8 October 1777 (Letter from several of the Senior Merchants at the Presidency).Google Scholar

⁵¹ Public Prs, 2 February 1770. For a similar case, see FRS, 23 March 1795.Google Scholar

⁵² Public Prs, 26 October 1770 (Consultation).Google Scholar

⁵³ Pamela, Nightingale, Trade and Empire in Western India 1784–1806 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 14.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Public Prs, 8 and 9 November 1786.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ See above and reference in fn. 10, passim.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Public Prs, 25 May 1770 (Consultation) and 16 June 1770 (LfS).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ FRS, 23 September 1790 (IOR, G/36/68, p. 493).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Subramanian, ‘Capital and Crowd’, p. 206. She grounds her claim on the Petition of 1795, which she indicates as ‘petition of Lackmandas Jagannathdas, Seth of the Banias, and Warnasidas Jaidas, Seth of Shroffs for themselves and all Mahajans, dated 22 August 1795’ (emphasis added). For the correct heading and closing of the petition see the key to the abbreviations used in the footnotes. I have personally collated the Petition in the copy of the FRS kept at the IOR with the petitions minuted in the copies of the 1795 FRS available at the Maharashtra Archives (Elphinstone College, Bombay). The text of the various copies is identical and the only differences in the heads and closings of the petitions are minor changes in the spelling of the names of the two signatories. The Elphinstone copies of the 1795 petition are in volumes number 32, 114A and 687. In the Petition–itself a document some 14 pages long including a detailed analysis of the Hindu community in Surat–there is not even a hint about the existence of any guild or corporation, professional or otherwise. It is worth recalling that the term ‘Mahajan’, literally meaning ‘great person’, was already in use in the eighteenth century in order to define people acting as traders and moneylenders. E.g.Google Scholar, Dilbagh, Singh, ‘The Role of the Mahajans in the Rural Economy in Eastern Rajasthan During the 18th Century’, in Social Scientist 2, 10 (1974).Google ScholarIn the FRS covering the period 1740 to 1800, the term makes its appearance in the 1790s, in petitions written by Indians, and is employed by people who appear to be substantial merchant-bankers in order to define themselves. The Petition of 1795 is a case in point, as it appears to have been signed by two substantial merchant-bankers who claimed to speak on behalf of the other (Hindu) merchant-bankers and shroffs and other Hindu citizens. This interpretation of the term ‘Mahazen’ as meaning ‘merchant-banker’ nicely fits in the only case when it appears in the body of the Petition of 1795. In a passage alluding to the imposition, in 1759, of the so-called war tax, it is stated that ‘the principal merchants with the mahazens and shroffs of the city…did settle with the Nabob that the English should collect I p.c. on all trade which passed at phoorza and khooskee’ (namely the two Mughal custom houses). IOR, G/36/73, p. 426.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ At the end of the eighteenth century, Mahajans in the meaning of organizations did exist in Surat, but they were social organizations, in charge of events such as social dinners, and without any political or economic role. This and other related topics will be discussed at some length in a paper on the Mahajans in Surat during the precolonial and colonial period authored by Douglas Haynes and myself.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Saletore, B. A., ‘Forgotten Gujarati Brahman Banker (18th Century)’, in Indian Historical Records Commission, Vol. XXX, part 1 (Hyderabad, 02 1954), p. 158.Google Scholar

⁶² Ibid., pp. 158–9.

⁶³ On Gopal Das's family see Kamala, Prasad Mishra, ‘The Role of the Banaras Bankers in the Economy of Eighteenth Century Upper India’, in Sabyasachi, Bhattacharya (ed.), Essays in Modern Indian Economic History (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1987), pp. 63–s4, 72.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Public Prs, 20 September 1768 (LfS of 17 September).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ FRS, 9 May 1797.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ FRS, 5 January 1784 (Consultation).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Saletore, ‘Forgotten Gujarati Brahman Banker’, p. 157.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ FRS, 5 January 1784 (Consultation).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ FRS, 8 May 1786 (Letter to Bombay).Google Scholar

⁷⁰ This was capped by the fact that, that season, the returns of trade from Bengal, Basra and China had been disappointing. FRS, 21 February 1788 (Consultation).Google Scholar

⁷¹ Petition of 1795, p. 432.Google Scholar

⁷² The Choutea of the Peshwa—namely the Maratha officer in charge of receiving the share of the Surat revenues accruing to his master—claimed to have deposited Rs 2,25,000 with Adit Ram, the main sufferer of the 1795 riots. FRS, 29 August 1795 (IOR, G/36/73, p. 396). The English doubted the truth of the Choutea's assertion, which was only to be expected, as they had been requested to refund that sum, allegedly plundered by the mob. However, the fact that the Choutea made his claim is a good enough indication that the habit of keeping money deposited with the shroffs was not unusual even among people of his rank and power.Google Scholar

⁷³ Petition of 1795, pp. 432–3.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Mayor's, Court, Letter from Elisabeth Price, Surat 15 April 1774 (IOR, P/417/31, pp. 818–19.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Mayor's, Court, Jane Boucard contra Jane Stratton, 27 May 1776 (IOR, P/417/34, pp. 391ff.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Public Prs, 26 October 1770 (IOR, P/341/33, p. 523).Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Petition of 1795, pp. 433–4.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 433.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 435.

⁸⁰ FRS, 12 and 13 October 1778.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Public Prs, 29 October 1778. Mulla's debt, originally contracted with a Hindu shroff, had been bought by a Parsi, Rastamjishaw Manjishaw, Danjishaw's brother.Google Scholar

⁸² E.g. FRS, 4 May 1788, 1 July and 3 December 1796.Google Scholar

⁸³ The term ābrū conveys the meaning of both social reputation and economic credit. See Haynes, Douglas E., ‘From Tribute to Philanthropy: The Politics of Gift Giving in a Western Indian City’, in The Journal of Asian Studies 46, 2 (05 1987), p. 342.CrossRefGoogle ScholarThe three Chiefs who honoured Trivedi's weddings were Rawson, Hart Boddam (1776–1783), John Griffith (1787–1795) and Daniel Seton (1796–1800). See FRS, 16 February 1798 (Circular note to the Council) and 18 February 1798.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ FRS, 19 January 1798 (Letter to Bombay).Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Neil, Rabitoy, ‘Sovereignty, Profits and Social Change’, PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1972, pp. 173–80, quoted in Haynes, ‘From Tribute to Philantropy’, p. 349.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Rabitoy, ‘Sovereignty’, p. 181, quoted in Haynes, ‘From Tribute to Philantropy’, p. 349, fn. 9.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ FRS, 28 April 1799 (Letter from Bombay of 23 April 1799: IOR, G/36/78, pp. 294–5; the definition of the authors of the petition as ‘principal natives’ is at p. 294). On the whole episode see also FRS, 1 April 1798, and 5, 8, 11, 24 April and 5 May 1799.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ FRS, 5 May 1799 (Letter and account from the Collector).Google Scholar

⁸⁹ E.g., Nightingale, Trade and Empire, passim.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ As the Indian merchants were called by the English. See, e.g., IOR, G/36/119, pp. 111, 114 (Information respecting Surat communicated by Mr —— 1775).Google Scholar

⁹¹ My impression is that the brief chiefship of William Gamul Farmer in 1795 marks the turning point.Google Scholar

⁹² The main political goal pursued by the British merchants operating along the West Coast and elsewhere in India was to get rid of any obstacle to their economic activities in the sub-continent. One main hindrance to their design was represented by the monopolistic economic privileges of the East India Company. British merchants returning from India–and unable to buy their way into the Court of Directors–joined hands with the majority sector of the British bourgeoisie which was, in turn, becoming increasingly impatient with the economic privileges of the ‘Hon'ble Company’. The result was the ‘Charter Act’ of 1813, which abolished the Company monopoly on the trade to India.Google Scholar

⁹³ On this last point see Torri, ‘Surat During the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century’, pp. 707–8. For the insight that, in pre-colonial India, castes did not represent an element of supra-local solidarityGoogle Scholar, see Ray, Rajat K., ‘Political Change in British India’, in The Indian Economic and Social History Review XIV, 4 (1977).Google Scholar

⁹⁴ This comes out quite convincingly in the Petition of 1795, pp. 430, 434–5.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ It was only as late as the beginning of the present century that Indian big merchants and substantial moneylenders–often in conjunction with other privileged elements of Indian society, such as big landlords–started to coalesce in horizontal formations. Their organizers and speakers were, as a rule, members of the Westernized élite. On this see Torri, M., ‘“Westernized Middle Class”, Intellectuals and Society in Late Colonial India’, in Economic and Political Weekly, 27 January 1990.Google Scholar