Despite being contradictory to the World Trade Organisation's (WTO) core objective of freer trade, its rules permits execution of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) provided certain conditions are complied with. WTO mechanism to oversee compliance of these conditions on PTAs is continuously evolving from somewhat tentative approach of earlier General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Panels to more willingness of active judicial interpretation by WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). This article critically analyses the WTO provisions on PTAs taking into account the reports of GATT panels and WTO. It also sheds light on WTO member states views on controversial and hazy issues of the GATT/WTO jurisprudence on PTAs. The article in its concluding part suggests several recommendations designed to ensure greater compliance of the PTAs with rules of the WTO.

This article studies the effects of invoking international necessity, to see whether it can be reconciled with an aspiring international rule of law. Any field of application in theory possible, the doctrine is here applied to uses of force, illustrated by humanitarian interventions, actions against international terrorism and the 2004 Construction of a Wall case. Relationships between circumstances precluding wrongfulness and the grounds for treaty termination is examined in light of international practice, studying necessity's impact on the stability of treaty regimes. The author concludes that international tribunals when applying necessity generally heed the rule of law, the stability of treaties and the elevation of overriding norms.

Necessity, if successfully invoked, is not perceived to alter substantive obligations. It cannot create a right to assume would-be illegal behaviour. As a result, necessity need not threaten international legal regime building, but may serve as a safety valve, allowing states to remain faithful to general norms, from which they are allowed to deviate only temporarily. In this manner, necessity can even contribute to the rule of law, thanks to its limited scope, constitutionalising emergency powers and subordinating them to pacta sunt servanda.

The year 2009 marks the entry into force of the first two EC regulations on choice of law: one on torts and other non-contractual obligations (‘Rome II’), and one on contracts (‘Rome I’). In both regulations, the need for uniform choice-of-law rules is explained, generally, in the preamble. In ‘Rome II’, various recitals specify the purposes some particular rules are meant to achieve. Apart from ambiguous statements on ‘the need to do justice in individual cases’ and the intention ‘to ensure a reasonable balance between the interests of the parties’, there are various references to the objectives of substantive law, said to be reflected in specific conflicts rules. As will be shown in this article, the ‘Rome II’ preamble promises much more than its rules can possibly deliver. Not only do most of the arguments in support of uniform conflicts rules turn out to be spurious, the policies underlying specific provisions have been translated into connecting factors that are mostly incapable of fulfilling the purposes they are meant to achieve. Since most provisions are focused on the principle of the closest connection they are obviously not inspired by the function of substantive law, nor do they allow a choice of the law best suited to the objective the rule is supposed to promote.

This article deals with the recent Al-Jedda House of Lords judgment from the point of view of public international law. Mr Al-Jedda unsuccessfully sought a remedy under the Human Rights Act against his prolonged internment without charge or trial in a British prison in Iraq. The article provides an in depth analysis of the opinions delivered by their Lordships. It advances some criticism of the line of reasoning adopted. Despite reaching the right result, the distinguishing arguments employed by the House to eschew the controversial Behrami case by the European Court of Human Rights seem unconvincing. Secondly, the decision that Article 5 ECHR was ‘qualified and/or displaced’ was an inherently ambiguous one. It left too many questions open as to the law applicable to Mr Al-Jedda's internment, some of which this article seeks to clarify.

The liberal political thought has shaped views on normativity in international law by insisting on rule neutrality and determinacy through the sources doctrine and the idea of a clear-cut normative threshold. The present debate over the normative quality of diplomatic assurances poses an extraordinary challenge to these ideals. Moreover, any attempt to qualify the assurances as soft law further illustrates the manipulation of normativity-talk through the narratives of normative expansion and communitarisation. Ultimately, the liberal project cannot fulfill its promises, leaving international lawyers disenchanted.

This article examines the proposal that, in order to overcome the comparative law problem of diverse national positions in relation to corporate criminal liability, a scheme involving administrative or civil liability should be adopted if corporations are to be included in the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. It is argued that, despite the obvious practical appeal of such a solution, a criminal liability scheme should be preferred as perpetrators of international crimes – both natural and legal – should be subject to the full expressive and stigmatising capacities of the criminal law. However, recent international developments in corporate liability suggest a possible middle ground that may provide an acceptable solution to a majority of states.

United Nations human rights treaties dealing with specific concerns contain provisions in terms of obligations for states, rather than individual rights. This has consequences for the assessment by treaty monitoring bodies of the level of compliance by States Parties. While human rights norms generally impose obligations on states, the opposite is not always the case; not all obligations in human rights treaties contain corresponding rights for individuals. While the ILC Articles on State responsibility address the establishment of state responsibility in contentious procedures established by the regional human rights conventions; they do not take into account other monitoring procedures that exist, in particular under United Nations human rights treaties. These instruments create different mandates for treaty monitoring bodies, under which they can and do examine treaty implementation in much more general terms than would be possible under the contentious procedure. The individual complaint procedure under some of the treaties, the inquiry procedure and the reporting procedure offer possibilities to assess whether states' non-compliance with treaty obligations. This article examines these possibilities in the light of the ILC Articles on state responsibility.

The ongoing maritime operations against piracy off the coast of Somalia have not only put naval enforcement against piracy at sea in the spotlight, but also the legal aftermath of what to do with pirates after their capture. While warships at sea within the current legal framework of UNCLOS and the UN Security Council amplifications specifically adopted for the case of Somalia can effectively perform their tasks, the question of what to do with the pirate suspects is still not satisfactorily resolved. As a consequence, attacks against merchant vessels and international trade run the risk of being ‘consequence free’, in which the perpetrators are not being held accountable. Participating nations are confronted with the fact that military operations against piracy, which is essentially a criminal offence, need a comprehensive approach to ensure accountability. To counter this criminal activity at sea nations try to strengthen the judicial infrastructure through national prosecution or transfer suspects for prosecution in the Horn of Africa region. As these options are not considered to be enough, and hampered by other non-legal factors, some nations call for an international court as a possible long term solution.

Without rules on maritime delimitation in marine spaces where the jurisdiction of coastal states overlaps, the legal uses of these spaces cannot be enjoyed effectively. In this sense, the international law of maritime delimitation is of central importance. There is no doubt that international courts and tribunals play an important role in developing the international law of maritime delimitation. Hence it is important to analyze the development of case law in this field. This article examines the maritime delimitation between Romania and Ukraine in the Black Sea before the International Court of Justice. After reviewing the delimitation process in the Romania/Ukraine case, this article will address three principal issues: methodology of maritime delimitations, baseline issues and questions concerning the disproportionality test.

This article focuses on the role and contribution of the International Court of Justice to developing and interpreting the right of peoples to self-determination. The most relevant cases decided by the Court so far, and briefly noted here, broadly fall within the decolonization context, save for the ongoing advisory proceedings in the Kosovo case. This simple taxonomy is based on a wide separation of the Court's case law in two main categories, namely decolonization and secession. The analysis of the place of secession under current international law serves to put into perspective the inquiry into whether any of the main principles applicable to the decolonization process, as elaborated by the Court, continue to be valid in the case of secession of a part of a state from an existing independent state. The article ends with a number of concluding remarks on the contribution of the Court to clarifying the right of peoples to self-determination as part of the corpus of international human rights law.

The Brussels I Regulation No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (hereinafter referred to as the Brussels I Regulation) establishes a judicial area in Europe with uniform rules on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments. The Brussels I Regulation is now in force in all EU Member States, including Denmark. On 1 July 2007 a separate Agreement between the European Union and Denmark came into force, in which the Brussels I Regulation is declared applicable in the relationship between Denmark and the other Member States. Bulgaria and Rumania joined the European Union on 1 January 2007 and became bound by the Brussels I Regulation as part of the acquis communautaire.

Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia in February 2008 has proven to be a controversial action. Although recognised by a not insignificant number of states, the opposition of a greater number reflects the uncertainty over the legality of an entity's secession from its parent state within international law. The present article considers three ways in which international lawyers might choose to respond to Kosovo. Firstly, it seeks to assess whether the norm of self-determination affords grounds upon which Kosovo's secession might be justified. It will be shown that the scope of self-determination, as a norm which evolved in response to post-War pressures for decolonisation, is insufficiently clear and certain to apply to the case of Kosovo. Secondly, the case for broadening any right of secession afforded by international law so as to apply to cases such as Kosovo is considered. However, it will be shown that to take such an approach would open a pandora's box and risk legitimising serious fragmentation of the international states system. Finally, the possibility of treating Kosovo as a unique and exceptional situation is considered. However, it will be concluded that it is difficult to establish any genuinely unique and exceptional characteristics applicable to Kosovo.