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The Power Politics of Regime Complexity: Human Rights Trade Conditionality in Europe

  • Emilie M. Hafner-Burton (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592709090057
  • Published online: 01 February 2009
Abstract

This article argues that international regime complexity has shaped Europe's politics of human rights trade conditionality by creating opportunities for various types of “forum shopping,” and, consequently, that some of the most significant politics of human rights enforcement have occurred in an entirely separate issue area—trade—which are being worked out partly during lawmaking and partly during implementation. The presence of nested and overlapping institutions creates incentives for rival political actors—whether states, institutions, or policymakers—to (1) forum shop for more power, (2) advantage themselves in the context of a parallel or overlapping regime, and (3) invoke institutions á la carte to govern a specific issue but not others. Each tactic creates competition between institutions and actors for authority over the rules, setting hurdles for IO performance. Even so, (4) regime complexity can make enforcement of rules that are impossible to implement in one area possible in another area.

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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

Lorand Bartels . 2005. Human Rights Conditionality in the EU's International Agreements. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Emilie M. Hafner-Burton , and Kiyoteru Tsutsui . 2005. Human rights in a globalizing world: The paradox of empty promises. American Journal of Sociology 110 (5): 1373–411.

Oona A. Hathaway 2002. Do human rights treaties make a difference? The Yale Law Journal 111: 19352042.

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Perspectives on Politics
  • ISSN: 1537-5927
  • EISSN: 1541-0986
  • URL: /core/journals/perspectives-on-politics
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