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Dependency Equilibria

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Wolfgang Spohn
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Abstract

This paper introduces a new equilibrium concept for normal form games called dependency equilibrium; it is defined, exemplified, and compared with Nash and correlated equilibria in Sections 2–4. Its philosophical motive is to rationalize cooperation in the one shot prisoners’ dilemma. A brief discussion of its meaningfulness in Section 5 concludes the paper.

Type
Decision and Game Theory
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 74 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2006 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers. Edited by Cristina Bicchieri and Jason Alexander , December 2007 , pp. 775 - 789
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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