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Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Science

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Epistemological Foundations for a Materialist Theory of the Mind

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

D. M. Armstrong
D. M. Armstrong*
Affiliation:
Sydney University
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Abstract

A philosophy might take its general inspiration from (1) commonsense; (2) careful observation; (3) philosophical argumentation; (4) the sciences; (5) “higher” sources of illumination. It is argued in this paper that it is bedrock commonsense, and the sciences, which are the most reliable foundations for a philosophy. This result is applied to the discussion and defense of a materialist theory of the mind.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 40 , Issue 2 , June 1973 , pp. 178 - 193
Copyright
Copyright © 1973 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

[1] Armstrong, D. M. A Materialist Theory of the Mind. New York: Humanities Press, 1968.Google Scholar
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[6] Kneale, W. C. “Critical Notice of A Materialist Theory of the Mind.” Mind 78 (1969).Google Scholar
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[9] Moore, G. E. “A Defence of Common Sense.” in Contemporary British Philosophy. (Second Series). Edited by Muirhead, J. H. New York: Macmillan, 1925.Google Scholar
[10] Place, U. T. “Is Consciousness a Brain Process ?” British Journal of Psychology 47 (1956).10.1111/j.2044-8295.1956.tb00560.xCrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
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[12] Rorty, R. “Incorrigibility as the Mark of the Mental.” Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970).10.2307/2024002CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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[14] Smart, J. J. C. Philosophy and Scientific Realism. New York: Humanities Press, 1963.Google Scholar
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