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Forging Model/World Relations: Relevance and Reliability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Abstract

The relation between models and the world is mediated by experimental procedures generating data that are used as evidence to evaluate the model. Data can serve as empirical evidence, for or against, only if they result from reliable experimental procedures. The aim of this article is to discuss the role of relevance judgments in the evaluation of reliability and to clarify the conditions under which reliability can be a strictly empirical matter. It is argued that reliability is a strictly empirical issue only in the restricted case in which the claim under test/investigation is about a data-generating procedure.

Type
Fictions, Models and Representation
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

The author wishes to acknowledge support for this research by National Science Foundation grant SES-1026183.

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