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A Novel Exercise for Teaching the Philosophy of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Gary Hardcastle  and
Matthew H. Slater
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Abstract

We describe a simple, flexible exercise that can be implemented in the philosophy of science classroom: students are asked to determine the contents of a closed container without opening it. This exercise has revealed itself as a useful platform from which to examine a wide range of issues in the philosophy of science and may, we suggest, even help us think about improving the public understanding of science.

Information

Type
General Philosophy of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 81 , Issue 5 , December 2014 , pp. 1184 - 1196
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

We thank the participants of our PSA 2012 Symposium and an anonymous referee for this journal for comments.

References

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