1 Oxford: Blackwell (2007).
2 See, for instance, Bohm, D. and Hiley, B.J., The Undivided Universe (London: Routledge, 1993).
3 For the Platonic creation story and the pantheism to which it can lead, see Immortality Defended (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007) or these other writings of mine: ‘Our Place in the Cosmos’, Philosophy 75 No. 291 (January 2000), 5–24; ‘The Divine Mind’, pp. 73–89 of Philosophy, the Good, the True and the Beautiful, A. O'Hear (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Infinite Minds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001). That there's no logical absurdity in the idea that ethical (or, to use a philosopher's term, ‘axiological’) requirements are themselves responsible for the existence of something, perhaps a divine mind or perhaps a universe, has been accepted by leading philosophers and theologians of modern times: for instance A.C. Ewing, Hans Küng, J.L. Mackie, Nicholas Rescher, Derek Parfit, John Polkinghorne and Keith Ward.
4 London: Routledge (1989). For the doomsday argument, see p. 214.
5 Among the earliest of the papers are ‘Is the end of the world nigh?’, Philosophical Quarterly 40, No. 158 (January 1990), 65–72; ‘Time and the anthropic principle’, Mind 101, No. 403 (July 1992), 521–540; and ‘Testing the doomsday argument’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 11, No. 1 (1994), 31–44. In The End of the World: the Science and Ethics of Human Extinction (London: Routledge, 1996) see particularly 187–264, plus the Preface to the paperback edition of 1998; in Immortality Defended see 13–14.
6 Leslie, J., ‘The doomsday argument’, The Mathematical Intelligencer 14, No. 2 (Spring 1992), 48–51.
7 For this Shooting Room case, see pp. 235–236 and 251–256 of The End of the World, and also xvii–xviii of the Preface to the paperback edition.
8 See his ‘Scientific and Philosophical Challenges to Theism’, forthcoming in Melville Y. Stewart, (ed.), Science and Religion in Dialogue (Oxford: Blackwell).