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Infinitely Long Afterlives and the Doomsday Argument

  • John Leslie (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0031819108000867
  • Published online: 01 October 2008
Abstract
Abstract

A recent book of mine defends three distinct varieties of immortality. One of them is an infinitely lengthy afterlife; however, any hopes of it might seem destroyed by something like Brandon Carter's ‘doomsday argument’ against viewing ourselves as extremely early humans. The apparent difficulty might be overcome in two ways. First, if the world is non-deterministic then anything on the lines of the doomsday argument may prove unable to deliver a strongly pessimistic conclusion. Secondly, anything on those lines may break down when an infinite sequence of experiences is in question.

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J. Leslie , ‘The doomsday argument’, The Mathematical Intelligencer 14, No. 2 (Spring 1992), 4851

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Philosophy
  • ISSN: 0031-8191
  • EISSN: 1469-817X
  • URL: /core/journals/philosophy
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