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Locke and the Mind-Body Problem: An Interpretation of his Agnosticism

  • Han-Kyul Kim (a1)

From the Lockean point of view, the mind-body problem is conceived as a problem created by us. It is an error to think there is a problem with mind and body, an error of confusing nominality with reality. I argue that Locke's agnosticism should be understood as a warning not to confuse our human point of view with what really is. From this perspective, the mind-body problem is a nominal problem, not a real one. It appears to us as a problem, but is not really so. But what makes it appear to us as a problem? This is Locke's starting point for solving the mind-body problem.

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Colin McGinn , ‘A Note on the Essence of Natural Kinds’, Analysis 35 (1975), pp. 177–83

Michael Ayers , ‘Locke versus Aristotle on Natural Kinds’, Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981), pp. 247–71

Philip Hanson , ‘McGinn's Cognitive Closure’, Dialogue 32 (1993), p. 585, footnote 3

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  • ISSN: 0031-8191
  • EISSN: 1469-817X
  • URL: /core/journals/philosophy
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