Skip to main content
    • Aa
    • Aa

Moral Conflicts and Moral Awareness

  • Chris Bessemans (a1)

By making use of Aurel Kolnai's ethical writings I want to offer a more adequate understanding of moral conflicts and moral dilemmas. Insisting on Kolnai's phenomenological method, in particular, focussing on the agent's moral awareness (or conscience) and his deliberation, results in an understanding of moral conflicts as moments of moral choice rather than anomalies of moral theory. In this way, I argue that one can account for Bernard Williams's phenomenological description of moral conflicts without having to accept his anti-realist conclusions. Moreover, this approach indicates the adequacy of ordinary moral reasoning for decision-making and action guidance. Lastly and importantly, the essay illustrates the relevance of Kolnai's writings to contemporary moral philosophy.

Corresponding author
Linked references
Hide All

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

Samuel Guttenplan , ‘Moral realism and moral dilemmas’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 80 (1979–1980), 6180.

Aurel Kolnai , ‘The thematic primacy of moral Evil’, The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 6, 22 (Jan., 1956), 2742.

Peter Winch , ‘The universalizability of moral judgements’. First printed in: The Monist (1965)

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

  • ISSN: 0031-8191
  • EISSN: 1469-817X
  • URL: /core/journals/philosophy
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *


Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 2
Total number of PDF views: 27 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 143 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 21st September 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.