1 The article originally appeared in Philosophy 37 (1935), 27–39. All quotations are from Prichard, H.A., Moral Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
2 From here on this style of reference indicates the pages in Prichard, op. cit.
3 While Prichard does not explicitly connect psychological hedonism to any one ethical doctrine, the drift of the argument is plain to see already at the beginning (102). The connection is made in the discussion of Plato and Butler in the article ‘Duty and Interest’, reprinted in Moral Writings.
4 See Austin, J.L., ‘Agathon and eudaimonia in the Ethics of Aristotle’, in Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
5 See e.g. Hurka, T., ‘Underivative Duty: Prichard on Moral Obligation’, Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2010), 111–134, Nussbaum, M., ‘Mill between Aristotle and Bentham’, Dædalus 133 (2004), 60–68, and Taylor, C.C.W., ‘Review of Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays’, Philosophical Review 78 (1969), 402–405. ‘Prichard seems too insignificant a target for Austin's big guns’, says Taylor. I hope to show that, with proper equipment, the sizes should measure differently.
8 I put aside a Nietzsche-inspired interpretation which would name aesthetic value as the common reason for the good man's preferences in both cases.
9 See Kraut, R., ‘How to Justify Ehical Propositions: Aristotle's Method’, in The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (Blackwell, 2006) for more details on the shared assumptions of Aristotle's audience.
10 See Broadie, S., Ethics with Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
11 See Friedman, M., ‘Explanation and Scientific Understanding’, Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974), 5–19.
12 See Burge, T., Foundations of Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007) for a related discussion and the distinction between lexical and translational meaning.
13 See Carnap, R., Logical Foundations of Probability (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950).
14 See Unger, P.K., Identity, Consciousness, and Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) for this terminological use.
15 Some commentators place it at the forefront of Aristotle's rejection of hedonism. See Annas, J., ‘Aristotle on Pleasure and Goodness’, in Rorty, A. Oksenberg (ed.), Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (University of California Press, 1980).
16 See Kraut, R., Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton University Press, 1989) for an anti-hedonist interpretation of good-for-me.
17 I am grateful to Harry Lesser, Yasemin Topac, and the audience at the University of Tel Aviv for useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.