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Proof, Knowledge, and Scepticism: Essays in Ancient Philosophy III By Jonathan BarnesOxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 720, £85, HB ISBN: 9780199577538

  • Tamer Nawar
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1 I have said more about these matters elsewhere. See Nawar, T., ‘Knowledge and True Belief at Theaetetus 201a–c’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (2013), 10521070.

2 For recent discussion, see Duncombe, M., ‘Irreflexivity and Aristotle's Syllogismos’, The Philosophical Quarterly 64 (2014), 434452.

3 Deductive inferences, the thought goes, are not ampliative but, at best, merely explicative. They offer us knowledge which we already had under a different mode of our presentation but do not straightforwardly lead us to know new things. This, the thought goes, renders logic less than useful; hence, the ‘scandal of deduction’.

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