1 I have said more about these matters elsewhere. See Nawar, T., ‘Knowledge and True Belief at Theaetetus 201a–c’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy21 (2013), 1052–1070.
2 For recent discussion, see Duncombe, M., ‘Irreflexivity and Aristotle's Syllogismos’, The Philosophical Quarterly64 (2014), 434–452.
3 Deductive inferences, the thought goes, are not ampliative but, at best, merely explicative. They offer us knowledge which we already had under a different mode of our presentation but do not straightforwardly lead us to know new things. This, the thought goes, renders logic less than useful; hence, the ‘scandal of deduction’.
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