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  • Cited by 5
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Baril, Anne 2013. The Role of Welfare in Eudaimonism. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 51, Issue. 4, p. 511.

    Holland, Stephen 2012. Furthering the sceptical case against virtue ethics in nursing ethics. Nursing Philosophy, Vol. 13, Issue. 4, p. 266.

    Huang, Yong 2011. Can virtue be taught and how? Confucius on the paradox of moral education. Journal of Moral Education, Vol. 40, Issue. 2, p. 141.

    Franks, Benjamin 2010. Anarchism and Moral Philosophy.

    Pihlström, Sami and DePaul, Michael 2010. Toward a Pragmatically Naturalist Metaphysics of the Fact-Value Entanglement. Journal of Philosophical Research, Vol. 35, p. 323.


The Self-Centredness Objection to Virtue Ethics


Aristotelian virtue ethics is often charged with counseling a self-centred approach to the moral life. Reviewing some influential responses made by defenders of virtue ethics, I argue that none of them goes far enough. I begin my own response by evaluating two common targets of the objection, Aristotle and Aquinas, and based on my findings sketch the outlines of a clearly non-self-centred version of virtue ethics, according to which the ‘center’ is instead located in the agent’s right relation to others and ultimately to the Good. I conclude that while some species of virtue ethics may be self-centred, the objection cannot be used to indict the whole genus.

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  • ISSN: 0031-8191
  • EISSN: 1469-817X
  • URL: /core/journals/philosophy
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