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Cutpoint-Adjusted Interest Group Ratings

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Michael C. Herron
Michael C. Herron*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Scott Hall, 601 University Place, Evanston, IL 60208-1006. e-mail: m-herron@northwestern.edu
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Abstract

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While it is very common for Congressional researchers to use interest group ratings as measures of legislator policy preferences, this paper argues that the manner in which such ratings are calculated implies that they may poorly approximate the underlying legislator preferences on which they are based. In light of this, the paper develops a technique designed to adjust interest group ratings so that they more closely correlate with legislator preferences. It argues based on Monte Carlo simulations that the technique produces adjusted ratings that improve on unadjusted ratings, and it applies the adjustment technique to historical ratings published by the Americans for Democratic Action.

Type
Research Article
Information
Political Analysis , Volume 8 , Issue 4 , 18 July 2000 , pp. 346 - 366
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by the Society for Political Methodology 

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