Recent acts of terrorism have ranged from the dissemination of anthrax spores to intentional contamination of food to the release of chemical weapons to suicide attacks using explosives. The prediction of such events is difficult, if not impossible. The recent attacks that have generated massive numbers of injured and dead may signal the crossing of a new threshold from multi-casualty events to the use of weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, the medical and healthcare infrastructure must be able to prevent and treat illness and injury resulting from such events. Thus, a first step in improving the preparation for and responses to such events must include a sustained commitment to training physicians, nurses, identification specialists, pathologists, and other first responders. The rapid spread of SARS gives reason to believe that the distribution of such agents has potential advantages over the use of other weapons. Investments in the public health and healthcare systems provide the best defense against terrorism.

The purpose of this editorial is to explore the relationship between the new global emphasis on terrorism and the developing academic and practical fields of disaster management. It includes an appraisal of the place of terrorism among the various forms of disaster, a consideration of its relationship to risk assessment and its place in the practical handling of risks and incidents, and some reflections on the role of the private sector in security management. The influence on the current attitude toward managing the terrorism threat by the evolution of the disaster management field is considered and some of the problems with defining scenarios for counter-terrorism planning also are discussed.

Throughout the globe, healthcare providers are increasingly challenged with the specter of terrorism and the fallout from weapons of mass destruction. Preparing for and responding to such manmade emergencies, however, threatens the ethical underpinnings of routine, individualized, patient-centered, emergency healthcare. The exigency of a critical incident can instantly transform resource rich environs, to those of austerity. Healthcare workers, who only moments earlier may have been seeing two to three patients per hour, are instantly thrust into a sea of casualties and more basic lifeboat issues of quarantine, system overload and the thornier determinations of who will be given every chance to live and who will be allowed to die. Beyond the tribulations of triage, surge capacity, and the allocation of scarce resources, terrorism creates a parallel need for a host of virtues not commonly required in daily medical practice, including prudence, courage, justice, stewardship, vigilance, resilience, and charity. As a polyvalent counterpoint to the vices of apathy, cowardice, profligacy, recklessness, inflexibility, and narcissism, the virtues empower providers at all levels to vertically integrate principles of safety, public health, utility, and medical ethics at the micro, meso, and macro levels. Over time, virtuous behavior can be modeled, mentored, practiced, and institutionalized to become one of our more useful vaccines against the threat of terrorism in the new millennium.

Before the sarin incidents in Tokyo and Matsumoto, the Aum Shinrikyo (now Aleph) had tried to conduct bioterrorism with botulinum toxin and Bacillus anthracis. Followers of the Aum could not overcome technical difficulties inherent in developing biological weapons, and the perpetrators had not been prosecuted for their failed attempts of bioterrorism. But the Aum's biological attack revealed several shortcomings in the Japanese law that regulated biological weapons. Since the missile experiment of North Korea conducted in 1998, the Japanese government has come to consider the threat posed by biological weapons more seriously. In 2001, after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the series of anthrax letter scares in the United States of America, the Japanese government established its Five Basic Principles for Chemical and Biological Weapons Terrorism and several measures were taken at the central and local levels. Activities of the Aum have been monitored by the Public Security Investigation Agency and the National Police Agency under the Anti-Aum Law since 2000.

Sweden has a long tradition in planning for disaster situations in which the National Board of Health and Welfare has a key responsibilty within the health sector. One important part of this disaster preparedness is education and training. Since 11 September 2001, much focus has been placed on the acts of terrorism with special reference to the effects of the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear/radiological (CBNR) agents. In the health sector, the preparedness for such situations is much the same as for other castastrophic events. The National Board of Health and Welfare of Sweden is a national authority under the government, and one of its responsibilities is planning and the provision of supplies for health and medical services, environmental health, and social services in case of war or crises. “Joint Central Disaster Committees” in each County Council/Region in the country are responsible for overseeing major incident planning for their respective counties/regions. The “Disaster Committee” is responsible for ensuring that: (1) plans are established and revised; (2) all personnel involved in planning receive adequate information and training; (3) equipment and supplies are available; and (4) maintenance arrangements are in place.

Sweden adopts a “Total Defense” strategy, which means that it places a high value in preparing for peacetime and wartime major incidents. The Swedish Emergency Management Agency coordinates the civilian Total Defense strategy, and provides funding to the relevant responsible authority to this end. The National Board of Health and Welfare takes responsibility in this process. In this area, the main activities of the National Board of Health and Welfare are: (1) the establishment of national guidelines and supervision of standards in emergency and disaster medicine, social welfare, public health, and prevention of infectious diseases; (2) the introduction of new principles, standards, and equipment; (3) the conducting education and training programmes; and (4) the provision of financial support. The budget for National Board of Health and Welfare in this area is approximately 160 million SEK (US$18 million). The National Board of Health and Welfare also provides funding to the County Councils/Regions for the training of healthcare professionals in disaster medicine and crises management by arranging (and financing) courses primarily for teachers and by providing financial support to the County Councils/Regions for providing their own educational and training programmes. The National Board of Health and Welfare provides funding of approximately 20 million SEK (US$2.4 million) to the County Councils/Regions for this training of healthcare professionals in disaster medicine and crises.

During the last decade, Japan has experienced the largest burden of chemical terrorism-related events in the world, including the: (1) 1994 Matsumoto sarin attack; (2) 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attack; (3) 1998 Wakayama arsenic incident; (4) 1998 Niigata sodium-azide incident; and (5) 1998 Nagano cyanide incident. Two other intentional cyanide releases in To kyo subway and railway station restrooms were thwarted in 1995. These events spurred Japan to improve the following components of its chemical disaster-response system: (1) scene demarcation; (2) emergency medical care; (3) mass decontamination; (4) personal protective equipment; (5) chemical detection; (6) information-sharing and coordination; and (7) education and training. Further advances occurred as result of potential chemical terrorist threats to the 2000 Kyushu-Okinawa G8 Summit, which Japan hosted. Today, Japan has an integrated system of chemical disaster response that involves local fire and police services, local emergency medical services (EMS), local hospitals, Japanese Self-Defense Forces, and the Japanese Poison Information Center.

The events of 11 September 2001 became the catalyst for many to shift their disaster preparedness efforts towards mass-casualty incidents. Emergency responders, healthcare workers, emergency managers, and public health officials worldwide are being tasked to improve their readiness by acquiring equipment, providing training and implementing policy, especially in the area of mass-casualty decontamination. Accomplishing each of these tasks requires good information, which is lacking. Management of the incident scene and the approach to victim care varies throughout the world and is based more on dogma than scientific data. In order to plan effectively for and to manage a chemical, mass-casualty event, we must critically assess the criteria upon which we base our response.

This paper reviews current standards surrounding the response to a release of hazardous materials that results in massive numbers of exposed human survivors. In addition, a significant effort is made to prepare an international perspective on this response.

Preparations for the 24-hour threat of exposure of a community to hazardous material are a community responsibility for first-responders and the hospital. Preparations for a mass-casualty event related to a terrorist attack are a governmental responsibility. Reshaping response protocols and decontamination needs on the differences between vapor and liquid chemical threats can enable local responders to effectively manage a chemical attack resulting in mass casualties. Ensuring that hospitals have adequate resources and training to mount an effective decontamination response in a rapid manner is essential.

The use of chemical warfare agents against civilians and unprotected troops in international conflicts or by terrorists against civilians is considered to be a real threat, particularly following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 against the World Trade Center in New York and against the Pentagon in Washington, DC. Over the past 10 years, terrorists have been planning to use or have used chemical warfare agents on several occasions around the world, and the attacks in 2001 illustrate their willingness to use any means of warfare to cause death and destruction among civilians. In spite of new international treaties with strong verification measures and with an aim to prohibit and prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction, nevertheless, some countries and terrorist groups have been able to develop, produce, and use such weapons, particularly nerve agents, in domestic terrorist attacks or during warfare in international conflicts. This article reviews current medical therapy for nerve-agent intoxication and discusses possible future improvement of medical therapies.

Present medical counter-measures against nerve agents are not sufficiently effective particularly in protecting the brain. Therefore, new and more effective countermeasures must be developed to enable better medical treatment of civilians and military personnel following exposure to nerve agents. Therefore, it is important with an enhanced effort by all countries, to improve and increase research in medical countermeasures, in the development of protective equipment, and in carrying out regular training of medical and emergency personnel as well as of military nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) units. Only then will nations be able to reduce the risk from and prevent the use of such weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

In the wake of 11 September 2001, many public health agencies are reassessing their institutional capabilities and procedures to respond to mass-casualty incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. Prior to the fall of 2001, planning by the public health and other sectors addressed more conventional or naturally occurring events such as earthquakes, hurricanes, tornados, and chemical spills, although attacks with weapons of mass destruction were a growing concern. While the nature of natural versus intentional events differs, the management and coordination of response activities to them follows the same incident command system.

A major lesson learned during the response operations to the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York City was the value of disaster planning, conducting exercises, and developing relationships among the various response agencies. Although New York City's physical Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at 7 World Trade Center was destroyed in the attack, the medical and health response community was able to react effectively to the possibility of mass casualties as well as to the more usual needs. This was enabled by the pre-existing relationships that had been developed between city, state, federal, and non-governmental agencies while planning and exercising for such events and their aftermaths.

This article reviews the implications of mass-casualty, terrorist bombings for emergency department (ED) and hospital emergency responses. Several practical issues are considered, including the performance of a preliminary needs assessment, the mobilization of human and material resources, the use of personal protective equipment, the organization and performance of triage, the management of explosion-specific injuries, the organization of patient flow through the ED, and the efficient determination of patient disposition. As long as terrorists use explosions to achieve their goals, mass-casualty, terrorist bombings remain a required focus for hospital emergency planning and preparedness.

Penetrating cardiac injuries commonly occur secondary to gunshot or stab wounds. This is a report an unusual case of a patient who sustained a penetrating cardiac injury due to a nail from a terrorism-related, nail-bomb explosion. Associated problems included pericardial tamponade, penetrating cardiac injuries, acute, traumatic, myocardial infarction, and a penetrating lung injury. Prompt diagnosis and aggressive surgical intervention resulted in full recovery of the patient.

Residents of a community who are intentionally exposed to a hazardous biological, chemical, or radiological agent (including medical first-responders and other civil defense personnel who live in that community) will exhibit a spectrum of psychological reactions that will impact the management of the incident. These reactions will range from a variety of behaviors of normal people under abnormal circumstances that either will help or hinder efforts to contain the threatening agent, deliver medical care, and reduce the morbidity, mortality, and costs associated with the disaster, to the development of new, or exacerbation of preexisting, mental disorders.

Anticipating the decisions that people will make and actions they will take as the crisis develops is hindered by the limited number of previous disasters that bear crucial similarities to a terrorist attack with a weapon of mass destruction. Such actions, therefore, could serve as models to predict community reactions. One result of a study that attempted to fill in these gaps suggested that medical first-responders and their spouses/significant others may require separately crafted information and advice to reduce the potential for disharmony within the family that could affect job performance during the crisis.

For those persons who exhibit emotional lability or cognitive deficits, evaluation of their psychiatric signs and symptoms may be more difficult than imagined, especially with exposure to nerve agents. Appreciation of these difficulties, and possession of the skill to sort through them, will be required of those assigned to triage stations. The allocation and utilization of mental health resources as the incident unfolds will be the responsibility of local consequence managers; these managers should be aware of the results of a recently-held workshop that attempted to reach consensus among experts in disaster mental health, based on the peer-reviewed literature, on the efficacy and safety of various approaches to early psychological interventions for victims of mass trauma and disasters.

Thus, psychological factors are likely to be significant in the management of a terrorist incident that involves an agent of mass destruction. Emergency medical workers with managerial responsibilities, whether limited in scope or community-wide, should be aware of these factors, and should train to handle them through effective risk communication as part of their planning and preparation.

Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are defined as operationally quantifiable management tools that provide a means for measuring effectiveness, outcome, and performance. No clear MOEs exist for determining success or failure of the management of a bioterrorism response. This is especially critical because management requires a multi-agency and multi-disciplinary decision-making and evaluation process. It is suggested that the minimum MOEs required to operationally measure outcome must contain a measuring response capacity for: (1) real-time public health surveillance system; (2) full coverage health information system; (3) capacity to measure variance across management timelines; (4) demonstrated decline in mortality and morbidity; (5) control of transmission rates of communicable agents; and (6) resource distribution across the entire population.