The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) resulted in thousands of deaths and injuries. Research on previous bombings and explosions has shown that head injuries, including traumatic brain injuries (TBIs), are among the most common injuries.

The objective of this study was to identify diagnosed and undiagnosed (undetected) TBIs among persons hospitalized in New York City following the 11 September 2001 WTC attacks.

The medical records of persons admitted to 36 hospitals in New York City with injuries or illnesses related to the WTC attacks were abstracted for signs and symptoms of TBIs. Diagnosed TBIs were identified using the International Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification diagnosis codes. Undiagnosed TBIs were identified by an adjudication team of TBI experts that reviewed the abstracted medical record information. Persons with an undiagnosed TBI were contacted and informed of the diagnosis of potential undetected injury.

A total of 282 records were abstracted. Fourteen cases of diagnosed TBIs and 21 cases of undiagnosed TBIs were identified for a total of 35 TBI cases (12% of all of the abstracted records). The leading cause of TBI was being hit by falling debris (22 cases). One-third of the TBIs (13 cases) occurred among rescue workers.More than three years after the event, four out of six persons (66.67%) with an undiagnosed TBI who were contacted reported they currently were experiencing symptoms consistent with a TBI.

Not all of the TBIs among hospitalized survivors of the WTC attacks were diagnosed at the time of acute injury care. Some persons with undiagnosed TBIs reported problems that may have resulted from these TBIs three years after the event. For hospitalized survivors of mass-casualty incidents, additional in-hospital, clinical surveys could help improve pre-discharge TBI diagnosis and provide the opportunity to link patients to appropriate outpatient services. The use and adequacy of head protection for rescue workers deserves re-evaluation.

In 2001, the Israeli government announced the construction of the West Bank barrier. The stated purpose of construction to prevent attacks by Palestinians on Israeli citizens. In a subsequent advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice decided the wall would block access to health care and education, and was “contrary to international law”.

The Barrier, with its limited number of gates, has been criticized by humanitarian agencies for limiting access of Palestinians to employment, health care, and education, but was defended by the Israeli government as an important security measure.

A survey of key informants was conducted in May 2004 at 78 health facilities and 121 schools in the northern West Bank districts of Jenin, Qalqilya, and Tulkarem, in order to assess the impact of the Barrier on access and use of health and educational services.

The Barrier negatively affected access to education and health care, in terms of statistically significant increases in distance and travel time to schools and health facilities. In several areas, service utilization, assessed by weekly visits to health facilities and student enrollment, was affected by barrier construction, although these findings were not statistically significant. A significant decrease in staff attendance was observed at health facilities and schools.

The Barrier may have long-term effects on access and utilization of health and educational services among Palestinians in the northern West Bank.

This paper is a report on an exercise designed to reveal the extent of belief in the common myths about disasters held by members of four groups of students from the University of Massachusetts and three groups of trainee emergency workers from Italy.

A questionnaire was administered in which students and trainees were asked to agree or disagree with 19 statements about disasters. These statements were based on common misconceptions about disasters and are at least statements untenable in statistical terms, if not downright wrong. In each case, a Likert scale was used to assess the strength of the students' and trainees' agreement or disagreement with the statements.

The results suggest that some of the misconceptions (for example, that panic and looting are widespread reactions to disaster) were strongly held, whereas others (for instance, that disasters cannot be managed) were less well-rooted. Despite years of refutation by experts, all groups firmly believed that dead bodies constitute a health hazard if they are not disposed of quickly. Attitudes to the proposition that technology offers a solution to the disaster problem were equivocal.

Though the results of the study by no means were homogeneous, students and emergency workers, on either side of the Atlantic, bring many of the same misconceptions that the mass media continually propagates. These beliefs represent a serious challenge for the instructor who wants to ensure that disasters and emergencies are not misconstrued.

Due to the fact that most high-rise structures (i.e., >75 feet high, or eight to ten stories) are constructed with extensive and redundant fire safety features, current fire safety procedures typically only involve limited evacuation during minor to moderate fire emergencies. Therefore, full-scale evacuation of high-rise buildings is highly unusual and consequently, little is known about how readily and rapidly high-rise structures can be evacuated fully. Factors that either facilitate or inhibit the evacuation process remain under-studied.

This paper presents results from the qualitative phase of the World Trade Center Evacuation Study, a three-year, five-phase study designed to improve our understanding of the individual, organizational, and environmental factors that helped or hindered evacuation from the World Trade Center (WTC) Towers 1 and 2, on 11 September 2001.

Qualitative data from semi-structured, in-depth interviews and focus groups involving WTC evacuees were collected and analyzed.

On the individual level, factors that affected evacuation included perception of risk (formed largely by sensory cues), preparedness training, degree of familiarity with the building, physical condition, health status, and footwear. Individual behavior also was affected by group behavior and leadership. At the organizational level, evacuation was affected by worksite preparedness planning, including the training and education of building occupants, and risk communication. The environmental conditions affecting evacuation included smoke, flames, debris, general condition and degree of crowdedness on staircases, and communication infrastructure systems (e.g., public address, landline, cellular and fire warden's telephones).

Various factors at the individual, organizational, and environmental levels were identified that affected evacuation. Interventions that address the barriers to evacuation may improve the full-scale evacuation of other high-rise buildings under extreme conditions. Further studies should focus on the development and evaluation of targeted interventions, including model emergency preparedness planning for high-rise occupancies.

While several population-based studies have documented behavioral health disturbances following terrorist attacks, a number of mental health service utilization analyses present conflicting conclusions.

The purpose of this study was to determine if mental health service utilization increased following a terrorist attack by assessing changes in psychoactive drug prescription rates.

The rate of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) prescriptions was measured among New York State Medicaid enrollees before and after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The association between geographic proximity to the events and changes in the rate of SSRI prescriptions around 11 September 2001 was assessed.

From September to December 2001, among individuals residing within three miles of the World Trade Center site, there was an 18.2% increase in the SSRI prescription rate compared to the previous eight-month period (p = 0.0011). While there was a 9.3% increase for non-New York City residents, this change was not statistically significant (p = 0.74).

There was a quantifiable increase in the dispensing of psychoactive drugs following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and this effect varied by geographic proximity to the events. These findings build on the growing body of knowledge on the pervasive effects of disasters and terrorist events for population health, and demonstrate the need to include mental and behavioral health as key components of surge capacity and public health response to mass traumas.