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Popular Constitutionalism and Fisher's Dialogues

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 June 2013

Bruce Peabody*
Affiliation:
Fairleigh Dickinson University

Extract

As other contributors to this symposium have noted, Louis Fisher has played a major role in shaping debates in such diverse policy battlegrounds as federal budgeting, war powers, and the use of legislative and presidential vetoes. Fisher is also widely (and fairly) credited with spurring interest in “constitutional dialogues”—the “process in which all three branches” along with “the states and the general public” offer separate, competing, and sometimes complementary visions of the Constitution and the values it embodies (Fisher 1988, 3).

Type
Symposium: Law and (Disciplinary) Order: A Dialogue about Louis Fisher, Constitutionalism, and Political Science
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2013 

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