1. Buckareff Andrei A. and Plug Allen ‘Escaping hell: divine motivation and the problem of hell’, Religious Studies, 41 (2005), 39–54.
2. An additional note on B: we allow that it might be psychologically challenging for some agents to accept God's offer if their characters have settled into a position where they will not accept God's grace. However, according to escapism, God never gives up on any individual. See n. 21 in ‘Escaping hell’ for further clarification on this point.
3. What follows is a brief summary of our theory of hell as outlined on 40–42 of ‘Escaping hell’.
4. For a compelling recent argument against a retributive view of hell on which God eternally punishes persons for their sins, see Kershnar Stephen ‘The injustice of hell’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 58 (2005), 103–123.
5. Jones Russell E. ‘Escapism and luck’, Religious Studies, 43 (2007), 206–216.
6. Swan Kyle ‘Hell and divine reasons for action’, Religious Studies, 45 (2009), 51–61.
7. See Zagzebski Linda ‘Religious luck’, Faith and Philosophy, 11 (1994), 397–413, especially 397. See also Williams Bernard ‘Moral luck’, Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 50 (1976), 115–135; Nagel Thomas ‘Moral luck’, Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 50 (1976), 137–151; and Feinberg Joel ‘Problematic responsibility in law and morals’, The Philosophical Review, 71 (1962), 340–351.
8. By ‘grace’ we mean the unmerited favour of God.
9. Jones ‘Escapism and luck’, 209.
11. Stephen Kershnar helped us clarify what may be unjust about such a luck scenario.
12. See Jones ‘Escapism and luck’, 210–211. Jones introduces two types of accounts. It seems to us, however, that the cases introduce a distinction without a real difference between types of cases.
13. Second-chance views that only allow for a limited period of time for those in hell to accept the gift of salvation will, however, have a problem here.
14. We owe this objection to Stephen Kershnar.
15. Jones ‘Escapism and luck’, 211–212.
16. It is worth noting that if it is a problem for our version of escapism, it seems to be no less of a problem for sophisticated universalism.
17. An analogy to set theory might help here. Two infinite sets may be of the same size even when one is a proper subset of the other. For example, the set of all natural numbers and the set of all even numbers are the same size (cardinality) even though the second set is a proper subset of the first. Here the benefits received by the two individuals are both infinite and both appear to be of the same cardinality and so of the same size. Perhaps the main lesson here is that infinity is odd and counter-intuitive.
18. Jones ‘Escapism and luck’, 211.
19. In the section of the paper where he addresses the second scenario, Jones refers to the ‘bad of hell’ twice (see ibid.).
20. Jones ‘Escapism and luck’, 211–212.
21. Swan ‘Hell and divine reasons for action’, 51.
22. Swan also objects to our characterization of the commitments entailed by retributivism. We will not be taking up his remarks, however interesting they are, due to time and space constraints. Suffice it to say that Swan's remarks on retributivism are quite provocative and, if he is right, could be a proper part of a project of offering a defence of a more tenable version of retributivism than has been offered to date.
23. Buckareff and Plug ‘Escaping hell’, 48.
26. Swan ‘Hell and divine reasons for action’, 55.
27. Buckareff and Plug ‘Escaping hell’, 45.
28. Swan ‘Hell and divine reasons for action’, 57.
31. Buckareff and Plug ‘Escaping hell’, 48.
32. Swan ‘Hell and divine reasons for action’, 60.
35. The order of the authors' names does not imply priority of authorship. We wish to thank the Editor, Russell Jones, Stephen Kershnar, Kyle Swan, and Michael Murray for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.