Philip Kitcher has recently proposed a form of ‘cosmopolitan secularism’ which he suggests could enable the members of a future secular society to continue to access and benefit from the moral and existential resources of the world's religions. I criticize this proposal by appeal to contemporary work on the role of emotion and practice in religious commitment. Using the work of John Cottingham and Mark Wynn, two objections are offered to the cosmopolitan secularists' claim that the moral resources of a religion could be both preserved by and employed within a secular society whose members lack emotional commitment to and practical engagement with the religions in question. I conclude that, pace Kitcher, cosmopolitan secularism cannot fulfil its promise to preserve the moral resources of religion in the absence of genuine religious traditions and communities.

Substitution and satisfaction theories of the atonement connect suffering or punishment to the possibility of forgiveness. I argue that even the most sophisticated versions of these theories cannot explain why the atonement was necessary. Instead, I suggest that the meaning of the atonement is in establishing the authority of God. God's authority, on this view, is analogous to the authority of a parent or friend. Christ's experience changed God to make him more like his children, and thereby to share a relationship of authority with them. On this proposal, the atonement is an act of divine humility.

Call the claim, common to many in the Christian intellectual tradition, that Christ, in virtue of his created human intellect, had certain, infallible, exhaustive foreknowledge the Foreknowledge Thesis. Now consider what I will call the Conditional: if the Foreknowledge Thesis is true, then Christ's created human will was not free. In so far as many, perhaps all, of the people who affirm the Foreknowledge Thesis also wish to affirm the freedom of Christ's human will, the truth of the Conditional would be most unwelcome to them. I consider an argument in support of the Conditional; I argue that it is not successful.

Philosophers have paid almost no attention to the baptismal rite. This is puzzling not only because the rite is central to the Christian life but also because the rite itself is very puzzling, making audacious claims about what its performance accomplishes. According to one of these audacious claims, by the performance of the rite the one baptized is transformed, enjoying states such as purification, sanctification, regeneration, and illumination – what I call the regenerate states. But how could this be so? And isn't there good empirical evidence that the imposition of the regenerate states on the one baptized is not accomplished in the vast majority of cases? In this article, I consider an ancient and audacious version of the baptismal rite, namely, that used by Eastern Orthodox Christians. I propose a model for understanding this rite – what I call the process-interpretation – which I believe comes close to being satisfactory, since it implies that the imposition of the regenerate states is not nearly as perplexing as it might seem at first glance.

The article argues that evils perpetrated in the name of God (‘religious evils') generate a special version of the problem of evil, and a concomitant evidential argument, that cannot be solved by any of the current defences and theodicies. The article draws on historical examples to clarify the concept of religious evil, it shows that religious evil is a candidate defeater of theism, and it claims that the resulting evidential argument cannot be defused by defences and theodicies currently on offer. The last section outlines a solution.

After identifying contrasting formulations of the practical postulates of reason in Kant's second critique, I analyse the context of each formulation, showing both how the postulate of the ‘possibility’ of God is consistent with Kant's understanding of a significant transition arising from practical needs as well as how the postulate of the existence of God can be seen as a ‘practical belief’ acting out a ‘hope’. My goal is to re-examine Kant's view of the relation between the practical and theoretical employments of reason in order to distinguish clearly between what Kant sees as required of the moral believer as opposed to permitted.

According to Alvin Plantinga there is no good reason to think that there is anything unacceptable about religious belief even if the believer cannot present evidence or arguments in support of her beliefs. One important challenge to this claim is the ‘Great Pumpkin’ objection. This objection is that Plantinga's arguments could be used to defend very strange beliefs such as belief in the Great Pumpkin. I describe this objection in more detail and then offer a solution to the problem by considering how the historical and social environment might provide favouring evidence for Christian beliefs.

This article re-examines the applicability of Kant's dependency thesis to Aquinas’ cosmological proofs for the existence of God. The first part of the article provides a summary of Kant's dependency thesis, followed by a review of a defence of Aquinas by J. William Forgie. The second part of the article explains some of the logical apparatus upon which Aquinas’ argument hinges – specifically his understanding of the a priori/a posteriori distinction. I conclude by calling attention to certain distinct metaphysical assumptions within Kant's and Aquinas’ respective logical apparatus that would have to be addressed prior to the more specific question of whether Kant's critique of the cosmological argument is applicable to Aquinas.

This article discusses the ceremonial laws in Judaism as a language of religion and assesses their role within human self-formation (Bildung). Moses Mendelssohn's groundbreaking account on the function of ritual offers both a solution and a threat to this issue: on the one hand the capacity to perform and understand rituals can be seen as a form of self-liberation. At the same time, the general openness to interpretation makes this conception vulnerable to the destructive force of idolatry. With the aid of Ernst Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, this article offers a solution to this problem by showing how ritual functions as a dialogue between the members of a community; a dialogue that carries a distinctively ethical outreach.

William Lane Craig's defence of the kalam cosmological argument rests heavily on two philosophical arguments against a past-eternal universe. In this article I take issue with one of these arguments, what I call the ‘Hilbert's Hotel Argument’ – namely, that the metaphysical absurdity of an actually infinite number of things existing precludes the possibility of a beginningless past. After explaining this argument, I proceed to raise some initial doubts. After setting those aside, I show that the argument is ineffective against proponents of presentism. The remainder of the article considers and rejects possible replies on Craig's behalf.

In his article, ‘Heartbreak at Hilbert's Hotel’, Landon Hedrick argues that the ‘Hilbert's Hotel Argument’ (HHA) proposed by William Lane Craig is ineffective against proponents of presentism, who include Craig himself. I show that there is no heartbreak if the Hotel and persons are constructed and generated in a certain way: there exists a ‘hotel room builder’ and a ‘customer generator’, they have been building hotel rooms and generating customers at regular time intervals as long as time exists, and the hotel rooms and customers have continued existing after they have been built and generated respectively.

Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) are notoriously puzzling. One puzzle has to do with truth-making: we wonder how any CCFs could be true prior to the existence of all creatures. Another, less addressed puzzle has to do with truth-explaining: what antecedent conditions or facts might explain a given CCF? The usual answer to the ‘explanation’ question is that true CCFs are brute: nothing explains them. We motivate an alternative answer by arguing that there can be an explanation of CCFs if there can be an explanation of free actions. Our argument reveals that theoretical frameworks, such as Molinism, that make use of CCFs do not automatically carry an explanatory cost.

We reconstruct Hegel's implicit version of the ontological argument in the light of his anti-representationalist idealist metaphysics. For Hegel, the ontological argument had been a peculiarly modern form of argument for the existence of God, presupposing a ‘representationalist’ account of the mind and its concepts. As such, it was susceptible to Kant's famous refutation, but Kant himself had provided a model for an alternative conception of concept, one developed by Fichte with his notion of the I=I. We reconstruct an Hegelian version of the ontological argument by considering the possibility of a Fichtean version, and then subjecting it to a critique based on Hegel's critical appropriation of Fichte's I=I.

John Bishop and Andrei Buckareff have discussed in this journal Bishop's conception of faith, which he has later included in his Believing by Faith (2007). One key question concerned the possibility of believing on inconclusive evidence. Bishop suggested that beliefs may have non-evidential, passional causes that can sustain belief even if what is believed lacks adequate evidential support. Buckareff took a critical stance towards Bishop's claim. In this article I shall expand and defend Buckareff's central claims against Bishop's answer to the criticism as well as his revised view in Believing by Faith. My aim is to show that while beliefs may at times be caused by passional factors, it is doubtful that such beliefs could be sustained in full awareness. In general, I will argue that conscious non-evidential believing is not possible.

Split brains that result in two simultaneous streams of consciousness cut off from each other are wrongly held to be grounds for doubting the existence of the divinely created soul. The mistake is based on two related errors: first, a failure to appreciate the soul's dependence upon neurological functioning; second, a fallacious belief that if the soul is simple, i.e. without parts, then there must be a unity to its thought, all of its thoughts being potentially accessible to reflection or even unreflective causal interactions. But a soul theorist can allow neurological events to keep some conscious thoughts unavailable to others.

In this article I reply to Jon Robson's objections to my argument that God does not contain any possible worlds. I had argued that ugly possible worlds clearly compromise God's beauty. Robson argues that I failed to show that possible worlds can be subject to aesthetic evaluation, and that even if they were it could be the case that ugliness might contribute to God's overall beauty. In reply I try to show that possible worlds are aesthetically evaluable by arguing that possible worlds are maximally rich representations of possible events. I further argue that nothing in God's being can be aesthetically non-evaluable since God must be maximal beauty – a beauteous maximality which needs no ugliness. Finally I show in what sense Christ's heavenly scars can be beautiful.

In this article, I examine the compatibility thesis, according to which the assumptions and results of cognitive (and other bio-psychological) theories of religion are compatible with the theistic world-view. In particular, I analyse the conception of world-view neutrality concerning scientific theories of religion. I also investigate the nature of pro-theistic argumentation; one aspect of this is the role that various forms of naturalism have in theistic compatibility claims. I point out that the version of theism guiding the argumentation of the proponents of the compatibility thesis is seldom explicated. A commitment to classical theism is problematic because of the ultimate metaphysical separation of God and the world. Instead, I support the compatibility view with a notion of God construed as the structuring cause of the world.

In the debate over the theology of the soul's origin, there have traditionally been three broad views on origins. These include creationism, traducianism, and Origen's pre-existence view. In the recent philosophy of religion and mind literature, William Hasker posits an alternative view of origins called emergent substance dualism. As a contribution to this discussion, I put forward one novel option as a via media between simple creationism and Hasker's emergent substance dualism, wherein it has relevant overlapping features found in the two contrary positions. I suggest that this view is a variation of creationism like emergentism where the material part (i.e. the brain) has some positive causal role in the soul's coming to be as a discrete effect of one divine cause. I argue that emergent creationism (as I call it) is a viable option deserving the attention of philosophers and theologians.