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Punishing the violators? Arms embargoes and economic sanctions as tools of norm enforcement

  • Jennifer L. Erickson (a1)

Abstract

The persistence and strength of international norms are thought to depend partly on the willingness of actors to punish their violation, but norm enforcement is often inconsistent. This article investigates states’ use of economic sanctions in order to gain insight into the role of metanorms (norms about enforcing norms) in international politics and explain this inconsistency. The quantitative analyses examine patterns of economic sanctions and arms embargo practices across different security norms and reveal two central findings. First, international metanorms may accommodate important interstate relationships. Although severe human rights abuse, conflict, nuclear weapons development, and support for terrorist organisations tend to attract sanctions, they are infrequent in comparison with norm violations. Valued relationships between senders and targets seem to be an accepted limit to the pursuit of costly norm enforcement. Second, norm violations nevertheless remain rare, suggesting that factors other than the prospect of material punishment may encourage compliance. Indeed, by preserving interstate relationships, international metanorms may facilitate the engagement needed for socialisation and social pressures as alternative compliance mechanisms.

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*Corresponding author. Email: jennifer.erickson.2@bc.edu

References

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1 See, for example, Axelrod, Robert, ‘An evolutionary approach to norms’, American Political Science Review, 80:4 (1986), pp. 1095–111; Donno, Daniela, ‘Who is punished? Regional intergovernmental organizations and the enforcement of democratic norms’, International Organization, 64:4 (2010), pp. 593625; Kim, Hunjoon and Sikkink, Kathryn, ‘Explaining the deterrence effect of human rights prosecutions for transitional countries’, International Studies Quarterly, 54:4 (2010), pp. 939–63; Klotz, Audie, ‘Norms and sanctions: Lessons from the socialization of South Africa’, Review of International Studies, 22:2 (1996), pp. 173–90; Legro, Jeffrey W., ‘Which norms matter? Revisiting the “failure” of internationalism’, International Organization, 51:1 (1997), pp. 3164; Nadelmann, Ethan A., ‘Global prohibition regimes: the evolution of norms in international society’, International Organization, 44:4 (1990), pp. 479526; Panke, Diana and Petersohn, Ulrich, ‘Why international norms disappear sometimes’, European Journal of International Relations, 18:4 (2012), pp. 719–42; Percy, Sarah V., ‘Mercenaries: Strong norm, weak law’, International Organization, 61:2 (2007), pp. 367–97.

2 I use ‘economic sanctions’ and ‘sanctions’ interchangeably throughout the article. For ‘social sanctions’ (defined later), I use that label. ‘Material sanctions’ refer to material punishments in general, including economic sanctions and military intervention.

3 See, for example, Downs, George W. and Rocke, David M., Optimal Imperfection? Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn, ‘International norm dynamics and political change’, International Organization, 52:4 (1998), pp. 887917; Friman, H. Richard (ed.), The Politics of Leverage in International Relations: Name, Shame, and Sanction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Kelley, Judith G. and Simmons, Beth A., ‘Politics by number: Indicators as social pressure in international relations’, American Journal of Political Science, 59:1 (2015), pp. 5570; Nossal, Kim Richard, ‘International sanctions as international punishment’, International Organization, 4:2 (1989), pp. 301–22.

4 On the uses of sanctions, see Giumelli, Francesco, Coercing, Constraining, Signalling: Explaining UN and EU Sanctions after the Cold War (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2011).

5 Katzenstein, Peter J., ‘Introduction: Alternative perspectives on national security’, in Katzenstein, P. J. (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 132 (p. 5).

6 Chayes, Abram and Chayes, Antonia Handler, ‘On compliance’, International Organization, 47:2 (1993), pp. 175205; Shannon, Vaughn P., ‘Norms are what states make of them: the political psychology of norm violation’, International Studies Quarterly, 44:2 (2000), pp. 293316.

7 DeMeritt, Jacqueline H. R., ‘International organizations and government killing: Does naming and shaming save lives?’, International Interactions, 38:5 (2012), pp. 597621; de Nevers, Renee, ‘Imposing international norms: Great powers and norm enforcement’, International Studies Review, 9:1 (2007), pp. 5380; Goodman, Ryan and Jinks, Derek, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights through International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Kim and Sikkink, ‘Explaining the deterrence effect of human rights prosecutions’; Klotz, ‘Norms and sanctions’; Sandholtz, Wayne, ‘Dynamics of international norm change: Rules against wartime plunder’, European Journal of International Relations, 14:1 (2008), pp. 101–31.

8 DeMeritt, ‘International organizations and government killing’; Goertz, Gary and Diehl, Paul F., ‘Toward a theory of international norms: Some conceptual and measurement issues’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36:4 (1992), pp. 634–64; Kim and Sikkink, ‘Explaining the deterrence effect of human rights prosecutions’; Thompson, Alexander, ‘The rational enforcement of international law: Solving the sanctioners’ dilemma’, International Theory, 1:2 (2009), pp. 307–21.

9 Johnston, Alastair Iain, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

10 Panke and Petersohn, ‘Why international norms disappear sometimes’. Of course, some norms may be violated regularly without dying, even if violations are not consistently punished. For example, despite norms to the contrary, civilians are frequently targeted in war. Similarly, norms against torture are well codified, yet many states continue to practice it.

11 Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch and Jennifer M. Dixon, ‘Norm Strength and the Norm Life Cycle’, unpublished manuscript (2018); Panke and Petersohn, ‘Why international norms disappear sometimes’; Percy, ‘Mercenaries’; Sandholtz, ‘Dynamics of international norm change’.

12 Axelrod, ‘An evolutionary approach to norms’; Donno, ‘Who is punished?’; Thompson, ‘The rational enforcement of international law’.

13 Vennesson, Pascal, ‘War under transnational surveillance: Framing ambiguity and the politics of shame’, Review of International Studies, 40:1 (2014), pp. 2551.

14 Donno, ‘Who is punished?’.

15 Nadelmann, ‘Global prohibition regimes’.

16 On metanorms, see Axelrod, ‘An evolutionary approach to norms’; Stone, Alec, ‘What is a supranational constitution? An essay in International Relations theory’, Review of Politics, 56:3 (1994), pp. 441–74; Drezner, Daniel W., ‘The power and peril of international regime complexity’, Perspectives on Politics, 7:1 (2009), pp. 6570; Reus-Smit, Christian, ‘The constitutional structure of international society and the nature of fundamental institutions’, International Organization, 51:4 (1997), pp. 555–89.

17 Axelrod, ‘An evolutionary approach to norms’.

18 Thompson, ‘The rational enforcement of international law’.

19 Axelrod, ‘An evolutionary approach to norms’; Horne, Christine, ‘Explaining norm enforcement’, Rationality and Society, 19:2 (2007), pp. 139–70.

20 Horne, ‘Explaining norm enforcement’; Thompson, ‘The rational enforcement of international law’.

21 Human rights clauses in trade agreements, which allow countries to suspend trade privileges in response to partners’ poor human rights, are one exception. While still subject to selective use, some research suggests they can be effective. See, for example, Hafner-Burton, Emilie, Forced to Be Good: Why Trade Agreements Boost Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).

22 Nevertheless, threats of US sanctions for violating non-proliferation norms reduced cases in which there is a need to punish violations. Miller, Nicholas L., ‘The secret success of nonproliferation sanctions’, International Organization, 68:4 (2014), pp. 913–44.

23 Klotz, ‘Norms and sanctions’, p. 177.

24 Other tools, like international prosecutions, are available for only select formally institutionalised norms.

25 Johnston, Social States.

26 Similarly, consumer and other types of boycotts are non-state social sanctions designed to isolate, shame, and/or censure businesses or organisations (often connected to government policies, as in South Africa or Israel) and may also affect their bottom lines.

27 See Friman (ed.), The Politics of Leverage in International Relations for an overview.

28 Meernik, James, Aloisi, Rosa, Sowell, Marsha, and Nichols, Angela, ‘The impact of human rights organizations on naming and shaming campaigns’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 65:2 (2012), pp. 233–56 (p. 233). See also Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., ‘Sticks and stones: Naming and shaming and the human rights enforcement problem’, International Organization, 62:4 (2008), pp. 689716; Lebovic, James H. and Voeten, Erik, ‘The politics of shame: the condemnation of country human rights practices in the UNCHR’, International Studies Quarterly, 50:4 (2006), pp. 861–88; Murdie, Amanda M. and Davis, David R., ‘Shaming and blaming: Using events data to assess the impact of human rights INGOs’, International Studies Quarterly, 56:1 (2012), pp. 116.

29 DeMeritt, ‘International organizations and government killing’; Hafner-Burton, ‘Sticks and stones’; Johnston, Social States; Kelley and Simmons, ‘Politics by number’; Murdie and Davis, ‘Shaming and blaming’.

30 De Nevers, ‘Imposing international norms’.

31 Peterson, Timothy M. and Drury, A. Cooper, ‘Sanctioning violence: the effect of third-party economic coercion on militarized conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55:4 (2011), pp. 580605.

32 Certainly, the costs of long-term comprehensive economic sanctions can add up, even if they initially appeared to be lower-cost than military action (whose costs, if also extended, tend to dwarf other tools).

33 Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Schott, Jeffrey J., Elliott, Kimberly Ann, and Oegg, Barbara, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (3rd edn, Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007), p. 3.

34 Heupel, Monika, Hisrchmann, Gisla, and Zürn, Michael, ‘International organisations and human rights: What direct authority needs for its legitimation’, Review of International Studies, 44:2 (2017), pp. 343–66; Kranz, Kathrin, ‘European Union arms embargoes: the relationship between institutional design and norms’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29:3 (2016), pp. 970–96.

35 Targeted states unsurprisingly tend to contest sanctions legitimacy in specific cases, and calls to end ‘unilateral coercive measures’ more generally have grown in recent years.

36 Drezner, Daniel W., The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Nielsen, Richard A., ‘Rewarding human rights: Selective aid sanctions against repressive states’, International Studies Quarterly, 57:4 (2013), pp. 791803.

37 See, for example, Cox, Dan G. and Drury, A. Cooper, ‘Democratic sanctions: Connecting the democratic peace and economic sanctions’, Journal of Peace Research, 43:6 (2006), pp. 709–22; Murdie, Amanda and Peksen, Dursun, ‘The impact of human rights INGO activities on economic sanctions’, Review of International Organizations, 8:1 (2013), pp. 3353.

38 On human rights norms, see Donnelly, Jack, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (2nd edn, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). On norms of war, see Legro, ‘Which norms matter?’; Zacher, Mark W., ‘The territorial integrity norm: International boundaries and the use of force’, International Organization, 55:2 (2001), pp. 215–50. On nuclear non-proliferation norms, see Rublee, Maria Rost, Nonproliferaiton Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009). On support for terrorism as a characteristic of modern rogue states, see Caprioli, Mary and Trumbore, Peter F., ‘Rhetoric versus reality: Rogue states in interstate conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49:5 (2005), pp. 770–91.

39 Cox and Drury, ‘Democratic sanctions’; Joakim Kreutz, ‘Hard Measures by a Soft Sower? Sanctions Policy of the European Union 1981–2004’, Bonn International Center for Conversion, Paper 45 (2005).

40 Merlingen, Michael, Mudde, Cas, and Sedelmeier, Ulrich, ‘The right and the righteous? European norms, domestic politics, and sanctions against Austria’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39:1 (2001), pp. 5977.

41 Horne, ‘Explaining norm enforcement’.

42 Hufbauer et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, p. 160.

43 Germany issued a few brief arms embargoes to Turkey over human rights violations in the 1990s in response to domestic political pressure.

44 Mercer, Jonathan, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 45.

45 Charron, Andrea, UN Sanctions and Conflict: Responding to Peace and Security Threats (New York: Routledge, 2011); Cortright, David and Lopez, George A., Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).

46 See below for information on data.

47 Of course, arms embargoes cannot control (and may increase markets for) illicit arms supplies.

48 T. Clifton Morgan, Navin A. Bapat, and Yoshiharu Kobayashi, Threat and Imposition of Sanctions Data 4.0 (2013)

49 Erickson, Jennifer L., ‘Stopping the legal flow of weapons: Compliance with arms embargoes, 1981–2004’, Journal of Peace Research, 50:2 (2013), pp. 159–74. For studies of UN arms embargoes, see Charron, UN Sanctions and Conflict; Fruchart, Damien, Holtom, Paul, Wezeman, Siemon T., Strandow, Daniel, and Wallensteen, Peter, United Nations Arms Embargoes: Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behaviour (Solna/Uppsala: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute/Uppsala University, 2007); Moore, Matthew, ‘Arming the embargoed: a supply-side understanding of arms embargo violations’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54:4 (2010), pp. 124. For EU arms embargoes, see Kreutz, ‘Hard Measures by a Soft Sower?’. For UN, EU, and US arms embargoes, see Brzoska, Michael, ‘Measuring the effectiveness of arms embargoes’, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 14:2 (2008), pp. 134.

50 Sending states are among the top thirty small and major conventional arms exporters, according to Small Arms Survey and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czech Republic (Czechoslovakia), France, (West) Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Israel, Italy, Russia (USSR), South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. For more on sources and coding for the Arms Embargo Dataset, see Erickson, ‘Stopping the legal flow of weapons’.

51 Kadera, Kelly M. and Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, ‘Manna from Heaven or forbidden fruit? The (ab)use of control variables in research on international conflict’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 22:4 (2005), pp. 273–5.

52 Achen, Christopher, ‘Let's put garbage-can regressions and garbage-can probits where they belong’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 22:4 (2005), pp. 327–39; Ray, James Lee, ‘Explaining interstate conflict and war: What should be controlled for?’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 20:1 (2003), pp. 131.

53 Gibney, Mark and Dalton, Matthew, ‘The political terror scale’, Policy Studies and Developing Nations, 4 (1996), pp. 7384.

54 Most human rights data, including PTS, focus on physical integrity rights from these sources. While historically DOS reports may be biased against left-wing governments and Amnesty's in favour of them, there is ‘absolutely no reason to believe that the vast majority of the differences between the reports are systematic’. Poe, Steven C., Carey, Sabine C., and Vazquez, Tanya C., ‘How are these pictures different? A quantitative comparison of the US State Department and Amnesty International Human Rights Reports, 1976–1995’, Human Rights Quarterly, 23 (2001), pp. 650–77 (p. 670). The correlation between Amnesty and DOS PTS scores after 1989 is 0.821.

55 Murdie and Peksen, ‘The impact of human rights INGO activities’.

56 Jay Ulfelder and Benjamin Valentino, ‘Assessing Risks of State-Sponsored Mass Killing’, unpublished report of the Political Instability Task Force (2008), p. 2.

57 Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Wallensteen, Peter, Eriksson, Mikael, Sollenberg, Margareta, and Strand, Håvard, ‘Armed conflict, 1946–2001: a new dataset’, version 4–2007, Journal of Peace Research, 39:5 (2002), pp. 615–37.

58 Singh, Sonali and Way, Christopher R., ‘The correlates of nuclear proliferation: a quantitative test’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48:6 (2004), pp. 859–85.

59 Byman, Daniel, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 10.

60 Caprioli and Trumbore, ‘Rhetoric versus reality’.

61 This applies Byman's Deadly Connections approach beyond the Middle East. The correlation between the DOS list and the expanded list is .703. TOP is available at: {http://www.start.umd.edu} accessed November 2012.

62 Twelve counterterrorism conventions were open for accession between 1981 and 2010. See {http://treaties.un.org} accessed November 2012.

63 United Nations Statistics Division, National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, available at: {http://unstats.un.org} accessed 1 May 2006 and updated in 2012.

64 Fearon, James D. and Laitin, David, ‘Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war’, American Political Science Review, 97:1 (2003), pp. 7590; Li, Quan and Schaub, Drew, ‘Economic globalization and transnational terrorism: a pooled time-series analysis’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48:2 (2004), pp. 230–58.

65 Singh and Way, ‘The correlates of nuclear proliferation’.

66 Neha Khanna and Duane Chapman, ‘Guns for Oil? Conventional Weapons Trade in the Post-Cold War Era’, Economics Department Working Paper 0509 (Binghamton: Binghamton University, 2005).

67 Gerring, John, Thacker, Strom C., and Moreno, Carola, ‘Centripetal democratic governance: a theory and global inquiry’, American Political Science Review, 99:4 (2005), pp. 567–81.

68 Katherine Barbieri, Omar Keshk, and Brian Pollins, Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 2.01 (2008).

69 Oneil, John and Russett, Bruce, ‘Assessing the liberal peace with alternative specifications: Trade still reduces conflict’, Journal of Peace Research, 36:4 (1999), pp. 423–42.

70 Singh and Way, ‘The correlates of nuclear proliferation’.

71 Dyad-years in which there is record of small or major conventional arms exports from an exporting state to a potential target are coded 1; years with no record of any arms transfer are coded 0. Coding based on Erickson, Jennifer L., Dangerous Trade: Arms Exports, Human Rights, and International Reputation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).

72 Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox.

73 Singh and Way, ‘The correlates of nuclear proliferation’; Leeds, Brett Ashley, ‘Do alliances deter aggression? The influence of military alliances on the initiation of militarized interstate disputes’, American Journal of Political Science, 47:3 (2003), pp. 427–39.

74 Douglas M. Gibler, International Military Alliances, 1648–2008 (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009). I use dataset v4, corrected to include NATO members admitted in the 2004 and 2009 rounds of enlargement.

75 Slaughter, Anne-Marie, ‘International law in a world of liberal states’, European Journal of International Law, 6:1 (1995), pp. 139.

76 Marshall, Monty G. and Jaggers, Keith, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2004 (College Park: University of Maryland, 2005).

77 Michael Bailey, Anton Strezhnev, and Erik Voeten, Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data (25 September 2013), available at Dataverse, accessed 26 May 2015.

78 Byman, Deadly Connections.

79 Krain, Matthew, ‘Democracy, internal war, and state-sponsored mass murder’, Human Rights Review, 1:3 (2000), pp. 40–8; Valentino, Benjamin, Huth, Paul, and Balch-Lindsay, Dylan, ‘“Draining the sea”: Mass killing and guerrilla warfare’, International Organization, 58:2 (2004), pp. 375407.

80 Of a total 54,555 dyad-years from 1990–2005, 7532 (13.81 per cent) faced general economic sanctions, and 7,407 (8.6 per cent) of 86,106 dyad-years faced arms embargoes from 1990–2010. This far exceeds the two hundred observations needed to generate unbiased logit estimates: King, Gary and Zeng, Langche, ‘Explaining rare events in international relations’, International Organization, 55 (2001), pp. 693715.

81 Researchers should avoid treating ordinal variables as continuous in an OLS regression, since the distances between categories are unknown and violate linear regression assumptions.

82 Meernik, James, Krueger, Eric L., and Poe, Steven C., ‘Testing models of U.S. foreign policy: Foreign aid during and after the Cold War’, Journal of Politics, 60:1 (1998), pp. 6385. Although information is arguably more instantly available in one dataset's most recent years, this is not the case with the full period covered, nor is it clear how it might systematically change government decision-making, if at all.

83 Since CLARIFY does not accommodate dyadic panel data, I use the Delta method to calculate the predicted probabilities of the main independent variables of interest.

84 Amnesty-coded human rights produce no substantively different results from the DOS variable.

85 Using the DOS list alone also produces positive and significant coefficients. Support for anti-terrorism treaties is insignificant, presumably because of the extremely high membership rates.

86 It becomes significant only with the removal of human rights from the model.

87 Removing oil production from the relevant models produces no significant changes for the human rights or interstate conflict coefficients.

88 The human rights analyses end at 2006, because the (non-lagged) human rights organisations variable ends at 2005. Excluding that variable, the human rights coefficients for 2007–10 are positive and significant.

89 Robert Kahn, ‘Have Sanctions Become the Swiss Army Knife of U.S. Foreign Policy?’, Council on Foreign Relations (24 July 2017), available at: {https://www.cfr.org/blog/have-sanctions-become-swiss-army-knife-us-foreign-policy} accessed 4 January 2018; Jacob Lew, ‘Remarks on the Evolution of Sanctions and Lessons for the Future’, Carnegie Endowment Peace (30 March 2016), available at: {https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0398.aspx} accessed 4 January 2018; Richard Haass, ‘Sanctioning madness’, Foreign Affairs, 76:6 (1997), pp. 74–85; Adam Szubin, ‘Remarks’, Center for a New American Security (15 April 2016), available at: {https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0425.aspx} accessed 4 January 2018.

90 Duquet, Nils, Business as Usual? Assessing the Impact of the Arab Spring on European Arms Export Control Policies (Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2014).

91 Horne, ‘Explaining norm enforcement’.

92 See Escribà-Folch, Abel and Wright, Joseph, ‘Dealing with tyranny: International sanctions and the survival of authoritarian rulers’, International Studies Quarterly, 54 (2010), pp. 335–59; McLean, Elena V. and Whang, Taehee, ‘Friends or foes? Major trading partners and the success of economic sanctions’, International Studies Quarterly, 54 (2010), pp. 427–47.

93 Scholars typically count sanctions that change target behaviour in accordance with sender expectations as ‘successful’ (Cortright and Lopez, Smart Sanctions; Hufbauer et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered). Of course, defining and measuring success may vary, based on senders’ goals and expectations and targets’ responses – without even considering how to establish causality. ‘Success’ can also be difficult to detect, because those states with stronger incentives to resolve their issues may do so before attracting sanctions (Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox; Miller, ‘The secret success of nonproliferation sanctions’). On defining and measuring sanctions success/effectiveness, see Baldwin, David, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) and Brzoska, ‘Measuring the effectiveness of arms embargoes’.

94 See Early, Bryan, Busted Sanctions: Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015); Galtung, Johan, ‘On the effects of international economic sanctions: With examples from the case of Rhodesia’, World Politics, 19:3 (1967), pp. 378416; Haass, ‘Sanctioning madness’; Pape, Robert A., ‘Why economic sanctions do not work’, International Security, 22:2 (1997), pp. 90136.

95 See Brooks, Risa A., ‘Sanctions and regime type: What works, and when?’, Security Studies, 11:4 (2002), pp. 150; Fruchart et al., United Nations Arms Embargoes; Hufbauer et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered; Miller, ‘The secret success of nonproliferation sanctions’; Kirshner, Jonathan, ‘The microfoundations of economic sanctions’, Security Studies, 6:3 (1997), pp. 3264.

96 ‘The punishment of Sisi Fuss’, Economist (10 June 2017), p. 49.

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Punishing the violators? Arms embargoes and economic sanctions as tools of norm enforcement

  • Jennifer L. Erickson (a1)

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