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THE LOGIC OF JUSTIFICATION

  • SERGEI ARTEMOV (a1)
Abstract

We describe a general logical framework, Justification Logic, for reasoning about epistemic justification. Justification Logic is based on classical propositional logic augmented by justification assertions t: F that read t is a justification for F. Justification Logic absorbs basic principles originating from both mainstream epistemology and the mathematical theory of proofs. It contributes to the studies of the well-known Justified True Belief vs. Knowledge problem. We state a general Correspondence Theorem showing that behind each epistemic modal logic, there is a robust system of justifications. This renders a new, evidence-based foundation for epistemic logic. As a case study, we offer a resolution of the Goldman–Kripke ‘Red Barn’ paradox and analyze Russell’s ‘prime minister example’ in Justification Logic. Furthermore, we formalize the well-known Gettier example and reveal hidden assumptions and redundancies in Gettier’s reasoning.

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*PROGRAMS IN COMPUTER SCIENCE, MATHEMATICS, AND PHILOSOPHY GRADUATE CENTER CUNY 365 FIFTH AVENUE NEW YORK, NY 10016 E-mail:sartemov@gc.cuny.edu
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The Review of Symbolic Logic
  • ISSN: 1755-0203
  • EISSN: 1755-0211
  • URL: /core/journals/review-of-symbolic-logic
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