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Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value

  • Duncan Pritchard (a1)
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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

C. Elgin (2004) “True Enough”, Philosophical Issues 14, 113–31.

S. Grimm (2006) “Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge?”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57, 515–35.

P. Kitcher (2002) “Scientific Knowledge”, in Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, (ed.) P. Moser , Oxford University Press, Oxford.

D. H. Pritchard (2002). “Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10, 283307.

D. H. Pritchard (2005) Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

W. Rabinowicz , & T. Roennow-Rasmussen (1999) “A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For its Own Sake”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100, 3349.

C. Sartwell (1992) “Why Knowledge is Merely True Belief”, Journal of Philosophy, 89, 167–80.

E. Sosa (2007) A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

P. Unger (1968) “An Analysis of Factual Knowledge”, Journal of Philosophy 65, 157–70.

L. Zagzebski (2001) “Recovering Understanding”, in Knowledge, Truth and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility and Virtue, (ed.) M. Steup , Oxford University Press, Oxford.

L. Zagzebski (2003) “The Search for the Source of the Epistemic Good”, Metaphilosophy 34, 1228; and reprinted in Moral and Epistemic Virtues, (eds.) M. S. Brady & D. H. Pritchard, 13–28, Blackwell, Oxford (2003).

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Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements
  • ISSN: 1358-2461
  • EISSN: 1755-3555
  • URL: /core/journals/royal-institute-of-philosophy-supplements
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