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Making Sense of Phenomenal Unity: An Intentionalist Account of Temporal Experience

  • Julian Kiverstein (a1)

Our perceptual experiences stretch across time to present us with movement, persistence and change. How is this possible given that perceptual experiences take place in the present that has no duration? In this paper I argue that this problem is one and the same as the problem of accounting for how our experiences occurring at different times can be phenomenally unified over time so that events occurring at different times can be experienced together. Any adequate account of temporal experience must also account for phenomenal unity. I look to Edmund Husserl's writings on time consciousness for such an account.

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J. Zihl , D. von Cameron and N. Mai , ‘Selective Disturbance of Movement Vision after Bilateral Brain Damage’, Brain 106 (1983), 313–40

R. Le Poidevin , The Images of Time: an Essay on Temporal Representation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)

S. Siegel , ‘How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience?’, Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (2006), 127–42

D. Zahavi (‘Perception of Duration Presupposes Duration of Perception – or Does it? Husserl and Dainton on Time’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15:3 (2007), 464)

J. Foster , ‘In self-defence’ in G. F. MacDonald (ed.), Perception and Identity (London: MacMillan, 1979)

B. Dainton , ‘The Experience of Time and Change’, Philosophical Compass 3:4 (2008), 634

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Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements
  • ISSN: 1358-2461
  • EISSN: 1755-3555
  • URL: /core/journals/royal-institute-of-philosophy-supplements
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