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The research and ideas in this article benefitted from interactions with many people. Here, I have room to thank only those who commented on this particular iteration: Katerina Clark, Adeeb Khalid, Stephen Kotkin, Benjamin Nathans, Michael A. Reynolds, and Jonathan Steinberg. I am particularly indebted to Derek Hirst, Peter Holquist, and Mark D. Steinberg.

1. Massell, Gregory J., The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionär)/ Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919-1929 (Princeton, 1971), 218–19.

2. See, for example, Edgar, Adrienne, “Bolshevism, Patriarchy, and the Nation: The Soviet ‘Emancipation’ of Muslim Women in Pan-Islamic Perspective,” Slavic Review 65, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 252–72; Kamp, Marianne, The New Woman in Uzbekistan: Islam, Modernity, and Unveiling under Communism (Seattle, 2006), esp. 66–75 ; Khalid, Adeeb, “;Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization: Early Soviet Central Asia in Comparative Perspective,” Slavic Review 65, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 231–51. Albeit as part of a different story, the comparison of modernization programs is key in Findley's, Carter Vaughan The Turks in World History (Oxford, 2005), 175–223.

3. Kotkin, Stephen, “Modern Times: The Soviet Union and the Interwar Conjuncture,“ Kritika 2, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 111–64.

4. For an excellent account of debates that relate geopolitics to the meaning of a different set of cultural and social reforms, see Cracraft, James, The Petrine Revolution in Russian Culture (Cambridge, Mass., 2004), 1–24. On Peter the Great's relevance in the SovietTurkish context, see the description of Mustafa Kemal's reaction to a report on the Russian tsar in Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI), f. 544, op. 3, d. 122,1.19 (Aralov to Karakhan, 4 February 1923).

5. Masseil,Surrogate Proletariat, 219.

6. Support for Massell's hypothesis can be found in Northrop, Douglas, Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia (Ithaca, 2004), 71.

7. See, for example, the Turkish ambassador's request to silence unfavorable comparisons in the Caucasus: Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVP RF), f. 4, op. 39, pap. 244, d. 53295,1.13 (Conversation between Tevfik [Biyikhoğlu] and Lev Karakhan, 10 February 1928).

8. For reflections that focus on Moscow and Ankara, see Reynolds, Michael A., Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1908-1918 (Cambridge, Eng., 2011), 259–62; Khalid, Adeeb, “Central Asia between the Ottoman and Soviet Worlds,” Kritika 12, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 470–75. Khalid's account of the SovietTurkish story differs significantly from mine because he looks at the Soviet Union primarily through the activities of the Communist International and its associates rather than the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (NKID). The former organization provides evidence of the very real ideological difference between the two states, but, at least in the case of Turkey, it was the NKID that determined interstate relations.

9. In accordance with editorial policy, I have not capitalized west, east, and other related terms. Nonetheless, in every instance in this essay that I refer to west or east, I refer to a political and cultural construct. On the instrumentalist nature of the Soviet and Turkish states’ policies toward women, see Kamp, New Woman in Uzbekistan, 67; and Zehra F. Arat, “Turkish Women and the Republican Reconstruction of Tradition,” in Göcek, Fatma Müge and Balvaghi, Shiva, eds., Reconstructing Gender in the Middle East: Tradition, Identity, and Power (New York, 1994), 58–59.

10. Lewis, Bernard, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford, 1961), 285; Barlas, Dilek, Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey: Economic and Foreign Policy Strategies in an Uncertain World, 1929-1939 (New York, 1998), 111; Steiner, Zara, The Lights That Failed: European International History, 1919-1933 (Oxford, 2005), 671.

11. See also Hoffmann, David L., and especially his comparisons of the Soviet Union to Turkey and other “late-developing nations.” Hoffmann, Cultivating the Masses: Modern State Practices and Soviet Socialism, 1914-1939 (Ithaca, 2011), esp. 100, 167, 217–18, 306-8.

12. For evidence of personnel continuity, see Ivan Komzin's account of his interwar stay in Turkey and Cold War sojourn in Egypt. Komzin, I. V., Ia veriu v mechtu (Moscow, 1973). On discontinuity, see Boden, Ragna, “Cold War Economics: Soviet Aid to Indonesia,” Journal ofCold War Studies 10, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 110–28; Zubok, Vladislav M., A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold Warfrom Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill, 2009), 109–10. For a longer trajectory, but ultimately an argument that also emphasizes the novelty of Cold War Soviet aid, see Odd Westad, Arne, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making ofOur Times (Cambridge, Eng., 2007), esp. 55,67.

13. Much of the literature on Soviet ideology and the Enlightenment cites as inspiration Malia's, Martin The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York, 1994); one of the classic accounts of Turkish westernization is Lewis's Emergence of Modern Turkey,

14. See Adas, Michael, “Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the Civilizing Mission Ideology,” Journal of World History 15, no. 1 (March 2004): 31–63; Aydin, Cemil, The Politics ofAnti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in PanIslamic and Pan-Asian Thought (New York, 2007), esp. 136–37.

15. On the “supremacy-oriented ethnoracialist elements” of Turkish nationalism, see Davison, Andrew and Paria, Taha, Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order? (Syracuse, 2004), esp. 80; Yildiz, Ahmet, Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliginin Etno-Seküler Simrlan, 1919-1938 (Istanbul, 2001); Cagaptay, Soner, Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk? (New York, 2006), esp. 48–56.

16. Clark, Katerina, Moscow, The Fourth Rome: Stalinism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Evolution of Soviet Culture, 1931-1941 (Cambridge, Mass., 2011); David-Fox, Michael, Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921-1941 (Oxford, 2011).

17. Khalid, Adeeb, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia (Berkeley, 1998); Kane, Eileen, “Pilgrims, Holy Places, and the Multi-Confessional Empire: Russian Policy toward the Ottoman Empire under Tsar Nicholas 1,1825-1855” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2005); Karpat, Kemal H., The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructingldentity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State (Oxford, 2001); Kinmli, Hakan, National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars, 1905-1916 (Leiden, 1996); Meyer, James H., “Immigration, Return, and the Politics of Citizenship: Russian Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, 1860-1914,” International Journal ofMiddleEast Studies 39, no. 1 (February 2007): 15–32; Tuna, Mustafa, “Imperial Russia's Muslims: Inroads of Modernity” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2009).

18. Reynolds, Michael A., “Buffers, not Brethren: Young Turk Military Policy in the First World War and the Myth of Panturanism,” Past and Present 203, no. 1 (May 2009): 137–79; Reynolds, Shattering Empires; Holquist, Peter, “The Politics and Practice of the Russian Occupation of Armenia, 1915-February 1917,” in Suny, Ronald Grigor, Gögek, Fatma Müge, and Naimark, Norman, eds., A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End ofthe Ottoman Empire (Oxford, 2011), 151–74; Badern, Candan, Carlik Rusyasi Yönetiminde Kars Vilayeti (Istanbul, 2010); Pravilova, Ekaterina, “The Property of Empire: Islamic Law and Russian Agrarian Policy in Transcaucasia and Turkestan,” Kritika 12, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 353–86.

19. Lieven, Dominic, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (London, 2000); Barkey, Karen and Hagen, Mark von, eds., After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires (Boulder, Colo., 1997); Miller, Alexei and Rieber, Alfred J., eds., Imperial Rule (Budapest, 2004); Rieber, Alfred J., “Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay,” in Ragsdale, Hugh, ed., Imperial Russian Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Eng., 1993), 315–59, esp. 339.

20. For this point made explicit, see the editors’ introduction, “Models, Margins, and Imperial Entanglements,” Kritika 12, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 276. On “marginality” and Russia, see Rieber, “Persistent Factors,” 344.

21. Layton, Susan, Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest ofthe Caucasus from Pushkin to Tolstoy (Cambridge, Eng., 1994); Makdisi, Ussama, “Ottoman Orientalism,” American Historical Review 107, no. 3 Qune 2002): 768–96. The literatures on Russian and Ottoman orientalisms are extensive, if not conversant. See, for example, Slezkine, Yuri, Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small Peoples of the North (Ithaca, 1994); Tolz, Vera, Russia's Own Orient: The Politics of Identity and Oriental Studies in the Late Imperial and Early Soviet Periods (Oxford, 2011); van der Oye, David Schimmelpenninck, Russian Orientalism: Asia in the Russian Mindfrom Peter the Great to the Emigration (New Haven, 2010); Celik, Zeynep, Displaying the Orient: Architecture of Islam at Nineteenth-Century World's Fairs (Berkeley, 1992); Deringil, Selim, “'They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery': The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 45, no. 2 (April 2003): 311–42.

22. Taki, Viktor, “Orientalism on the Margins: The Ottoman Empire under Russian Eyes,” Kritika 12, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 323.

23. Hanioglu, M. Sükrü, A Brief History ofthe Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton, 2008), 113. For a remarkable exception, see Findley, Carter Vaughan, “An Ottoman Occidentalist in Europe: Ahmed Mithat Meets Madame Gülnar, 1889,” American Historical Review 103, no. 1 (February 1998): 15–49, esp. 28-29.

24. Maier, Charles, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World War I (Princeton, 1975).

25. For the years prior to the 1934 Turkish law on surnames, I refer to individuals by their given name and indicate later surnames in parentheses only at the first instance.

26. On this phase of Bolshevik-Turkish relations, see Yerasimos, Stefanos, Türk-Sovyet Ili$küeri: Ekim Devriminden ‘MUH Mücadele'ye (Istanbul, 1979); Gökay, Bülent, Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920-1991: Soviet Foreign Policy, Turkey and Communism (London, 2006), 14–35.

27. Manela, Erez, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford, 2007).

28. On the Paris treaties as “System,” see Weitz, Eric, “From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions,” American Historical Review 113, no. 5 (December 2008): 1313–43, esp. 1314. On Soviet and Turkish anti-imperialism, see Stalin, Iosif, Marksizm i natsional'no-kolonial ‘nyi vopros: Sbornik izbrannykh statei i rechei (Moscow, 1934), 75; RGASPI, f. 5, op. 1, d. 1520,11.1-2 (Mustafa Kemal to Lenin, 4 January 1922).

29. RGASPI, f. 5, op. 1, d. 1990,1.8 (Chicherin to Aralov, 20 February 1923).

30. Manela argues that “the revolt against the West” was born in 1919 from the failure of the Paris Conferences to recognize the political aspirations of colonial peoples. The course of Soviet-Turkish relations, especially after independence for both states had been achieved, reveals that anti-westernism was a reaction, not only to political imperialism, but to economic imperialism as well. Manela, Wilsonian Moment, esp. 215-25. On Manela's neglect of the economics of the “Wilsonian moment,” see Karl, Rebecca, review of The Wilsonian Moment, American Historical Review 113, no. 5 (December 2008): 1474–76.

31. Carr, E. H., Radek, Karl, and Philips, Price M., “Radek's ‘Political Salon’ in Berlin 1919,” Soviet Studies 3, no. 4 (April 1952): 411–30; Vourkoutiotis, Vasilis, Making Common Cause: German-Soviet Secret Relations, 1919-22 (Houndmills, Eng., 2007).

32. See Kadro 1, no. 6 (June 1932); Kadro 1, no. 7 (July 1932); Kadro 1, no. 9 (September 1932).

33. Ericson III Edward, E., Feeding the German Eagle, 1933-1941 (Westport, Conn., 1999), 12–17; Sevost'ianov, G. N., ed., Moskva-Rim: Politika i diplomatüa Kremlia, 19201939 (Moscow, 2003), esp. 5–8, 202.

34. Davies, R. W., Crisis and Progress in the Soviet Economy, 1931-1933 (Houndmills, Eng., 1996), 118–22,313-16.

35. The National Archives (TNA), Public Record Office (PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 424/273 E 4975/3476/44 (G. Clerk to A. Henderson, 4 September 1930); Tezel, Yahya Sezai, Cumhuriyet Döneminin Iktisadi Tarihi (Ankara, 1982), 187.

36. For public discussion of the matter, see Nadi, Yunus, “Rusya tarafindan Bize acilan Kredi mes'elesi,” Cumhuriyet, 16 April 1932.

37. DokumentyvneshneipolitikiSSSR (DVP), vol. 15 (Moscow, 1969), 458 (Conversation with Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pasha, 10 August 1932).

38. For one example of such debate, see Martin, Terry, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca, 2001); Hirsch, Francine, Empire of Nations: Ethnographie Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca, 2005). For the Turkish periodization, see Tuncay, Mete, T.C.'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulmasi (1923-1931) (Ankara, 1981).

39. DVP, vol. 12 (Moscow, 1967), 255-56 (Report of a conversation between Kurskii and Tevfik Rüstü, 29 April 1929).

40. ismet Pasamn Siyasi ve iftimai Nutuklan, 1920-1933 (Ankara, 1933), 275 (12 December 1929). Boratav, Korkut identifies ismet's speech as one of the key moments in the formation of Turkish statism: Boratav, Türkiye'de Devletcilik (Ankara, 2006), 85.

41. ismet Pasamn Siyasi ve ictimai Nutuklan, 281.

42. Ibid., 275. On this chronology, see llkin, Selim and Tekeli, ilhan, 1929 Dünya Buhramnda Türkiye'nin iktisadi Politika Arayislan (Ankara, 1977), esp. 98–102.

43. AVP RF, f. 5, op. 10, pap. 68, d. 124,1. 21 (Diary of Karakhan's trip to Turkey, 27 December 1929).

44. Ibid., 1.2 (Political evaluation of Karakhan's trip, 1 January 1930).

45. Basbakanhk Cumhuriyet Arşivi (BCA), 30.1.0.0/1.5.32,3 (ismet to Mustafa Kemal, 15 December 1929).

46. Collins, F. W., “Turkey and Soviet in Closer Accord,” New York Times, 19 December 1929. See also the London Times's report that associated Turkey's new economic policy with Karakhan's visit: The Times, 13 March 1930.

47. In the 1920s, Kaya, Sükrü and Ağaoğlu, Ahmet still used the French “etatist.“ DVP, vol. 8 (Moscow, 1963), 57 (Conversation between Surits and şükrü Kaya, 13 January 1925); AVP RF, f. 4, op. 39, pap. 242, d. 53268,1.175 (Conversation between Potemkin and Agaoglu, 31 March 1927). On statist continuity, see Kuruc, Bilsay, Mustafa Kemal Döneminde Ekonomi (Ankara, 1987); Boratav, Korkut, Türkiye iktisat Tarihi, 1908-2002,9th ed. (Ankara, 2005), 39–40.

48. AVP RF, f. 4, op. 39, pap. 242, d. 53268,1.175 (Conversation with Ahmet Ağaoğlu, 31 March 1927); AVP RF, f. 5, op. 10, pap. 68, d. 124,1.2 (Surits to Karakhan, 1 January 1930).

49. AVP RF, f. 5, op. 12, pap. 86, d. 72,1.11 (Karakhan to Surits, 21 January 1932).

50. DVP, vol. 15:345 (Karakhan to Petrovskii, 31 May 1932).

51. On the Kadro movement, see Türkes, Mustafa, “A Patriotic Leftist DevelopmentStrategy Proposal in Turkey in the 1930s: The Case of the Kadro (Cadre) Movement,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 33, no. 1 (February 2001); Türkes, Mustafa, UlusÇu Sol BirAkim: Kadro Hareketi, 1932-1934 (Ankara, 1999); Tekeli, Ilhan and Ilkin, Selim, Bir Cumhuriyet öyküsü: Kadroculan ve Kadro'yu Anlamak (Istanbul, 2003).

52. Such top-down language was, of course, not solely an import. On the Ottoman origins of Turkish elitism, see the works of şükrüHanioglu, M., The Young Turks in Opposition (Oxford, 1995), esp. 206–8; Hanioğlu, , Preparation for Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908 (Oxford, 2001), esp. 308–11.

53. Kadro 1, no. 1 (January 1932): 1.

54. Atay, Falih Rifki, Yeni Rusya (Ankara, 1931), 171–72.

55. Kadro 2, no. 10 (October 1933): 4. ismet's Statement was also published in Cumhuriyet, 31 October 1933.

56. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Zabit Ceridesi ﹛TBMM) (Ankara, 1983), d. 4, c. 9, b. 76, s. 447 (2 July 1932).

57. TBMM, d. 3, c. 21, b. 84, s. 46 (2 October 1930).

58. Ibid., s. 59.

59. DVP, vol. 15: 344-48 (Karakhan to Petrovskii, 31 May 1932).

60. BCA, 30.10.0.0/200.362.11,2 (Report on Soviet agriculture, 21 June 1932).

61. BCA, 30.10.0.0/200.362.16, 2 (Moscow Embassy's report of Celal Bayar's trip, 14 August 1935).

62. BCA, 30.10.0.0/248.678.28,1 (1 November 1933).

63. TNA, PRO, FO 424/276 E 2711/449/44 (Clerk to Simon, 19 May 1932).

64. On Voroshilov's proximity to Stalin, see Sabin Dullen [Sabine Dullin], Stalin i ego diplomaty: Sovetskü Soiuz i Evropa 1930-1939 gg,, trans. E. M. Kustovaia (Moscow, 2009), 22.

65. AVP RF, f. 5, op. 11, pap. 78, d. 94,1. 9 (Karakhan to Surits, 10 October 1931); AVP RF, f. 5, op. 12, pap. 86, d. 72,1.15 (Karakhan to Surits, 20 March 1932).

66. DVP, vol. 14 (Moscow, 1968), 744-45 (29 December 1931); on the economic orientation of the Turkish delegation, see ilhan Tekeli and Selim ilkin, Uygulamaya Gegerken Türkiyede Devletgiligin Oluşumu (Ankara, 1982), 138.

67. RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 1330,1. 6 (Surits to Karakhan, 26 April 1932).

68. “Soviet Women Wear Evening Garb at Ball,” New York Times, 30 April 1932.

69. AVP RF, f. 5, op. 13, pap. 93, d. 59 (Surits to Karakhan, 5 August 1933). On Voroshilov's success in interesting Turks in the Soviet military, see BCA, 30.10.0.0/46.293.4 (Cevdet's report on military maneuvers in the Kiev region, Autumn 1934); BCA, 30.10.0.0/46.293.5 (Zeki Dogan's report on military maneuvers in Ukraine, Autumn 1934); BCA, 30.18.1.2/49.80.14 (Decision to send a delegation to the Soviet Union for the purchase of war materials, 28 November 1934).

70. RGASPI, f. 74 (Personal collection of Kliment Voroshilov), op. 2, d. 42,1.116 (Maksim Litvinov to Voroshilov, 4 September 1933); AVP RF, f. 5, op. 13, pap. 93, d. 59,11.12-13 (Litvinov to Georgii Astakhov, 9 October 1933); Stalin objected because he would be on vacation at the time and Kuibyshev, who would be the senior Bolshevik left in Moscow, was liable to go on a drinking binge. See Kosheleva, L., Lei‘chuk, V., Naumov, V., and others, Pis'ma I. V. Stalina V. M. Molotovu: 1925-1936 gg, (Moscow, 1995), 247,149.

71. BCA, 30.18.1.2/40.71.20 (17 October 1933).

72. TNA, PRO, FO 424/279 E 6992/130/44 (James Morgan to John Simon, 10 November 1933). Voroshilov's visit to the Turkish Ministry of Defense is confirmed in BCA, 30.10.0.0/198.352.14 (Program of the Soviet visit, 27 October 1933).

73. DVP, vol. 16 (Moscow, 1970), 592 (Surits to NKID, 28 October 1933).

74. Ibid.

75. DVP, vol. 16: 600 (Surits to NKID, 31 October 1933).

76. Laue, Theodore von, Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia (New York, 1963), 57; ZaferToprak, , Türkiye'de Milli tktisat, 1908-1918 (Ankara, 1982), 170–71; Asim, Karaömerlioglu M., “Helphand-Parvus and His Impact on Turkish Intellectual Life,” Middle Eastern Studies 40, no. 6 (November 2004): 145–65.

77. Kieser, Hans-Lukas, “World War and World Revolution: Alexander HelphandParvus in Germany and Turkey,” Kritika 12, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 387–410.

78. DVP, vol. 15:303 (Record of a conversation with Ismet Pasha, 6 May 1932).

79. Szporluk, Roman has highlighted the Listian elements of Soviet economics in Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List (Oxford, 1988), 216.

80. In addition to the sources noted above, key expositions of the state's role in Soviet and Turkish Republican politics, both made with explicit reference to European economic power, can be found in: Lenin, Vladimir II'ich, “Doklad o kontsessiiakh: Sobranie aktiva moskovskoi organizatsii RKP (b) (6 dekabria 1920 g.),” Polnoe sobranie sochinenü (Moscow, 1969), 42:55–78, esp. 77; and Kemal, Mustafa's speech at the izmir Fair in August 1935, quoted in Kuruc, Mustafa Kemal Döneminde Ekonomi, 136. Stephen F. Cohen's biography of Nikolai Bukharin contains excellent coverage of early Bolshevik debates about the role of the State. Cohen, , Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888-1938 (New York, 1973).

81. See also Tooze, Adam, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking ofthe Nazi Economy (New York, 2007), xxiv, 660.

82. Gerschenkron, Alexander, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (New York, 1965).

83. On eulture and the Soviet and Turkish states, see Fitzpatrick, Sheila, The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia (Ithaca, 1992); Groys, Boris, The Total Art of Stalinism: Avant-Garde, Aesthetic Dictatorship, and Beyond (Princeton, 1992); öztürk, Serdar, “Karagöz Co-opted: Turkish Shadow Theatre of the Early Republic (1923-1945),“ Asian Theater Journal 23, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 292–313.

84. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury i iskusstva (RGALI), f. 3070, op. 1, d. 503,1.1 (Report of trip to Turkey, delivered at the Russian Association of Revolutionary Cinematography, RossARK, 16 January 1934).

85. Ibid., 1.4.

86. Ibid., 1.5.

87. Ibid., 11.12-13.

88. RGALI, f. 350, op. 1, d. 40,1.1 (published in Izvestiia, 28 October 1933).

89. Ibid. Nikulin and other Soviet writers used the words oriental'nyi and ekzoticheskii interchangeably and sarcastically. Although the Soviet usage did not have all the nuances of Edward Said's “Orientalism,” there was unquestionably a note of criticism. Vera Tolz writes that Said was not aware of Soviet scholars’ works on the subject, but she establishes an intellectual link between the two in Anwar Abdel-Malek, who cites the latter and was cited by the former. Tolz, “European, National, and (Anti-) Imperial: The Formation of Academic Oriental Studies in Late Tsarist and Early Soviet Russia,” Kritika 9, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 79.

90. Shub, Esfir’ Il'inichna, Zhizri moia—kinematograf(Moscow, 1972), 348–49.

91. Karaosmanoğlu, Yakup Kadri, “Ankara—Moskova—Roma,” Kadro 1, no. 10 (October 1932): 41–42.

92. Atay, YeniRusya, 170.

93. DVP, vol. 15:456 (Surits to NKID, 9 August 1932).

94. Ibid.

95. Vera Tolz argues that Marr and other Russian academics were frustrated by what they perceived as European arrogance. Tolz, “European, National, and (Anti-) Imperial,” 75.

96. DVP, vol. 16: 216 (Astakhov to the NKID, 3 April 1933).

97. Nikulin was present at the meeting between Marr and Mustafa Kemal and has left a detailed account. RGALI, f. 350, op. 1, d. 59,1.33.

98. Marr, Ibid Nikolai, 0 lingvisticheskoi poezdke v Vostochnoe Sredizemnomor'e (Leningrad, 1934), 21.

100. Zhukovskii, P. M., Zemledel'cheskaia Turtsiia (Leningrad, 1933), xxv.

101. TBMM, d. 4, c. 25, b. 1, s. 4 (1 November 1934).

102. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), f. 5283, op. 4, d. 142,1. 29 (Linde to Kulebko, 5 December 1934).

103. Ibid., 1.35 (Program of radio concert for Turkey, 20 December 1934).

104. DVP, vol. 18 (Moscow, 1973), 177 (Karakhan to NKID, 14 March 1935).

105. RGALI, f. 648, op. 2, d. 996,1. 9.

106. Ulus, 16 April 1935; Aksam, 13 May 1935.

107. RGALI, f. 648, op. 2, d. 996,1. 9.

108. Ibid., 1.11.

109. Released in the Soviet Union as Ankara-Serdtse Turtsii and in Turkey as Türkiye'nin Kalbi Ankara, the original Version of the film had audible Turkish dialogue and Russian-language intertitles.

110. GARF, f. 5283, op. 4, d. 55,1. 24 (NKID to Sovkino, 6 May 1930).

111. Ulus, 19 October 1933.

112. RGALI, f. 2003, op. 1, d. 61 (“Chelovek, kotoryi ne ubil“). The title of the screenplay itself was an implicit criticism of a European Orientalist novel by the French author Claude Farrere, The Man Who Killed, with which the Soviet artists were familiär. Farer, Klod [Claude Farrere], Chelovek, kotoryi ubil (Paris, 1921).

113. Ulus, 26 November 1933.

114. RGALI, f. 3070, op. 1, d. 1327,1.98 (Interview with Zarkhi, April 1933).

115. “Serdtse Turtsii—beseda s rezhisserom S. I. Iutkevichem,” Krasnaia gazeta, 26 January 1934.

116. RGALI, f. 3070, op. 1, d. 1327,1. 56.

117. Gor'kovskaia kommuna, 21 June 1934; Proletarn, 14 May 1934; Zaria Vostoka, 18 June 1934; Krasnaia Bashkiriia, 6 January 1934; Sovetskaia Abkhaziia, 14 July 1934.

118. GARF, f. 5283, op. 4, d. 142,11.129-30; Cumhuriyet, 3 March 1934.

119. Haber, 19 February 1934.

120. Milliyet, 27 April 1934.

121. Son Posta, 26 April 1934.

122. BCA, 30.10.0.0/146.43.20,2 (Hikmet Bayur to tsmet Inönü, 20 March 1934).

123. Burhan Asaf, “Türkiye'nin kalbi-Ankara,” Ulus, 25 March 1934.

124. Ibid.

125. Falih Rifki Atay, “Iki örnek,” Ulus, 25 October 1933.

126. RGALI, f. 2003, op. 2, d. 3,1. 2 (9 June 1933).

127. RGALI, f. 3070, op. 1, d. 1327,1.19.

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid., 1.30 (9 August 1933).

130. Kotkin, Stephen, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as Civilization (Berkeley, 1995), 78.

131. Asaf, “Türkiye'nin Kalbi.“

132. Krasnaia zvezda, 6 May 1934.

133. AVP RF, f. 5, op. 15, pap. 110, d. 86,1.8 (NKID internal report, 28 May 1935).

134. Selim Deringil also concludes that a fear of Italy was the dominant factor in 1930s Turkish foreign policy. Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An “Active” Neutrality (Cambridge, Eng., 1989), 7.

135. Burds, Jeffrey, “The Soviet War against ‘Fifth Columnists': The Case of Chechnya, 1942-1944,” Journal of Contemporary History 42, no. 2 (April 2007): 267–314.

136. On the development of Soviet-Turkish hostility, see Gasanly, Dzhamil, SSSRTurtsiia: Ot neitraliteta k kholodnoi voine, 1939-1953 (Moscow, 2008); Zubok, , Failed Empire, 36–40.