1 For an account of this covert form of discrimination see Warren Mary Anne, “Secondary Sexism and Quota Hiring,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 6, no. 3 (1977).
2 Although goals are often distinguished from quotas, especially in legal arguments, I shall draw no such distinction here. The important differences between alternative policies lie in their administration, not in the terminology we use to characterize their objectives.
3 See, for example, Thomson Judith Jarvis, “Preferential Hiring,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 2, no. 4 (1973).
4 The standard objections can be found in Simon Robert, “Preferential Hiring: A Reply to Judith Jarvis Thomson,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 3, no. 3 (1974); Goldman Alan H., Justice and Reverse Discrimination (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), ch. 3; and Richards Janet Radcliffe, The Sceptical Feminist (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), ch. 4.
5 For the best treatment of this issue see Friedman Marilyn A. and May Larry, “Harming Women as a Group,” Social Theory and Practice, vol. 11, no. 2 (1985).
6 That traditional discrimination is an evil is clearer than why it is. If we say, for instance, that job candidates should always be assessed purely on the basis of merit then we will be barred from taking account of such additional factors as age, nationality, place of residence, seniority, and so on. On the other hand, if we say that the problem lies in assigning some independent weight specifically to gender then we will be forced to conclude that positive sexism is also an evil. A more convincing story will probably condemn traditional discrimination in employment for its assumption of the inferiority of women, or for the way in which it conspires with other oppressive social practices to deny them equal opportunity with men. For a discussion of these issues in the context of race see Dworkin Ronald, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), ch. 14. In Section 3 below, I consider the closely allied question of which rights (if any) are violated by discriminatory practices.
7 It is not essential to this argument that one social group is here disadvantaged in order to benefit another. The same group (broadly defined) may be both victim and beneficiary of positive discrimination. I recall reading some years ago of an inner city housing development in New York which consisted of a black majority and a white minority. Most applicants for flats in the development were black, but experience showed that if the percentage of black residents rose above some critical point then the phenomenon known as ‘tipping’ occurred and the whites began to leave, leading in the end to the creation of yet another black slum. In order to save the black residents from this fate, a quota had to be established which gave preference to white applicants. Thus in this case (some) blacks were discriminated against in order to prevent even greater discrimination against (other) blacks.
8 For a catalogue of such arguments, see Warren, “Secondary Sexism.”
9 In Section 3 below, I consider the claim that the male victims of positive sexism suffer not merely a loss but an injustice, which may not be balanced in this way against the injustices to women which such a policy will avert.
10 Those who wish to pursue them should consult the recent literature on agent-centered restrictions, especially Scheffler Samuel, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), ch. 4; and Nagel Thomas, The View from Nowhere (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), ch. 8.
11 Richards, Sceptical Feminist, pp. 142–143.
12 See my The Moral Foundation of Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
13 I owe this last suggestion to G. A. Cohen.
* An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy Discussion Group at All Souls College, Oxford. I am grateful for the valuable suggestions I received from the members of the audience on that occasion, especially from Ronald Dworkin and Janet Radcliffe Richards. I have also benefited from comments by G. A. Cohen, Marilyn Friedman, Nathan Isgur, Larry May, Kathryn Morgan, Ronald de Sousa, Mark Thornton, Heather Wright, and the editors of Social Philosophy & Policy.