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  • Cited by 7
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Zuk, Peter D. 2015. A third version of constructivism: rethinking Spinoza’s metaethics. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 172, Issue. 10, p. 2565.

    Ross, Jacob 2014. DIVIDED WE FALL. Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 28, Issue. 1, p. 222.

    Shoemaker, David 2014. The Selves of Social Animals: Comments on Gruen. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 52, p. 66.

    Kahn, Leonard 2012. Rule Consequentialism and Scope. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 15, Issue. 5, p. 631.

    Debeljak, Jelena Debeljak, Jelena and Krkač, Kristijan 2008. “Me, myself & I”: practical egoism, selfishness, self‐interest and business ethics. Social Responsibility Journal, Vol. 4, Issue. 1/2, p. 217.

    Adams, Don 2004. Aquinas and modern consequentialism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 12, Issue. 4, p. 395.

    Dimova-Cookson, Maria 2001. T. H. Green’s Moral and Political Philosophy.


Self-Love and Altruism*

  • David O. Brink (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 January 2009

Whether morality has rational authority is an open question insofar as we can seriously entertain conceptions of morality and practical reason according to which it need not be contrary to reason to fail to conform to moral requirements. Doubts about the authority of morality are especially likely to arise for those who hold a broadly prudential view of rationality. It is common to think of morality as including various other-regarding duties of cooperation, forbearance, and aid. Most of us also regard moral obligations as authoritative practical considerations. But heeding these obligations appears sometimes to constrain the agent's pursuit of his own interests or aims. If we think of rationality in prudential terms–as what would promote the agent's own interests–we may wonder whether moral conduct is always rationally justifiable. Indeed, we do not need to think of rationality in exclusively prudential terms to raise this worry. The worry can arise even if there are impartial reasons–that is, nonderivative reasons to promote the welfare of others.

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Terence Irwin , Plato's Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), section 130.

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Social Philosophy and Policy
  • ISSN: 0265-0525
  • EISSN: 1471-6437
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