TOPICS OF ARISTOTLE'S PROTREPTICUS IN AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO THE TRANSMISSION OF CICERO AND THE CONTEXT OF THEIR USE

¹ For a good summary on the question of Augustine's knowledge of Aristotle, see Stead, G. C., “Aristoteles,” in Augustinus-Lexikon (Basel and Stuttgart, 1986), 1:cols. 445–48; and Tkacz, M. W., “Aristotle,” in Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia (Cambridge, 1999), 57–59.

² Augustine, De civitate Dei, 8.12, 9.4.

³ Augustine, Confessiones, 4.16.28. Augustine knew a little Greek, but he did not seem to have the capacity to read Aristotle in his original language. Some authors, such as F. Bömer, P. Courcelle, H.-I. Marrou, and M. Testard, think that the Latin translation Augustine used was that of Marius Victorinus, although, according to L. Minio-Paluello, and supported by P. Hadot, this hypothesis is unlikely because there were several translations of the Categories available in Augustine's time, and he does not mention Marius Victorinus as the author of the version that he reads. See Bömer, F., Der lateinische Neuplatonismus und Neupythagoreismus und Claudianus Mamertus in Sprache und Philosophie (Leipzig, 1936), 87 ; Courcelle, P., Late Latin Writers and Their Greek Sources (Cambridge, MA, 1969), 168 ; Marrou, H.-I., Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique, 4th ed. (Paris, 1958), 34 ; M. Testard, Saint Augustin et Cicéron, vol. 1, Cicéron dans la formation et l'oeuvre de Saint Augustin (Paris, 1958), 10; Minio-Paluello, L., “The Text of the Categoriae: The Latin Tradition,” Classical Quarterly 39 (1945): 63–74, at 66; Hadot, P., Marius Victorinus: Recherches sur sa vie et ses oeuvres (Paris, 1971), 188 . Victorinus's translation no longer exists, and the only indications available in other works of his do not allow us to decide on this matter. On Aristotle's Categories and Augustine's use of this work in the Confessions, see House, D. K., “Manera de tratar Agustín a Aristóteles en el libro 4 de las Confesiones,” Augustinus 40 (1995): 119–24; Foley, M. P., “Augustine, Aristotle, and the ‘Confessions,’” The Thomist 67 (2003): 607–22.

⁴ Augustine, De trinitate, 5.2.3–8.9, 7.5.10.

⁵ See, e.g., Augustine, Contra Iulianum, 1.4.12, 2.10.37, 5.14.51, 6.20.64, Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum, 2.51. Julian himself (who was a Pelagian) makes the same charge against Augustine and calls him “Aristoteles Poenorum” (c. Iul. imp. 3.199).

⁶ See, e.g., Combès, G., Saint Augustin et la culture classique (Paris, 1927), 14n11; Marrou, Saint Augustin, 34n7; and O'Donnell, J. J., Augustine: Confessions, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1992), 2:264.

⁷ He does seem to have read, however, the pseudo-Aristotelian De mundo in the Latin translation of Apuleius, whom Augustine considered to be the author of the work (civ. Dei 4.2).

⁸ Cicero probably read the Protrepticus directly. Gigon, O., “Cicero und Aristoteles,” Hermes 87 (1959): 143–62, at 144–46 and 154, demonstrates that Cicero depends on Hellenistic editions of Aristotle's works and specifically on exoteric writings such as the Protrepticus rather than on the extant Corpus Aristotelicum.

⁹ Nowadays we cannot share the idea, held by P. Hartlich and popularized by E. Bignone and W. Jaeger, that this work was born as a kind of imitation of the Aristotelian Protrepticus, whose topics, structure, and organization it followed: Hartlich, P., “De exhortationum a Graecis Romanisque scriptarum historia et indole,” Leipziger Studien zur klassischen Philologie 11 (1889): 207–336 ; Bignone, E., L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro (Milan, 2007; orig. publ. 1936), 82, 210, 339; and Jaeger, W., Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development, 2nd ed. (London, Oxford, and New York, 1962), 55, 63, 73. The author of a recent article even goes so far as to say that the Hortensius was a Latinized version of the Protrepticus: Trundle, R. and Anoz, J., “Modalidades aristotélicas de San Agustín,” Augustinus 42 (1997): 14 . The Hortensius was inspired by the Protrepticus and it took several ideas and arguments in favor of philosophizing from it, but its formal structure and general purpose were different: see, e.g., Rabinowitz, W. G., Aristotle's Protrepticus and the Sources of Its Reconstruction (Berkeley, 1957); C. O. Brink, review of L'Hortensius de Cicéron, by Ruch, M., Journal of Roman Studies 51 (1961): 220–22; Gigon, “Cicero und Aristoteles,” 154; Grilli, A., “Cicerone e l'Eudemo,” Parola del Passato 17 (1962): 96 ; and Flashar, H. et al. ., Aristoteles: Werke in deutscher Übersetzung; Fragmente zu Philosophie, Poetik, Rhetorik (Berlin, 2006): 120, 176. On the relationship between the Hortensius and the Protrepticus, and on the sources of the Ciceronian dialogues, see also Diels, H., “Zu Aristoteles’ Protreptikos und Cicero's Hortensius,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 1 (1888): 477–97; and D. Turkowska, L'Hortensius de Cicéron et le Protreptique d'Aristote (Wroclaw, 1965), especially 14–45.

¹⁰ Schlapbach, K., “Hortensius,” in Augustinus-Lexikon (Basel, 2006), 3:col. 426.

¹¹ Düring, I., Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction (Gothenburg, 1961); and idem, Der Protreptikos des Aristoteles (Frankfurt am Main, 1969). This edition has been taken as a basis by subsequent ones, such as A. H. Chroust, Aristotle: Protrepticus; A Reconstruction (Notre Dame, 1964); Berti, E., Aristotele: Protreptico; Esortazione alla filosofía (Padua, 1967); or Megino, C., Aristóteles: Protréptico; una exhortación a la filosofía (Madrid, 2006). On other criteria, restrictive to excess, O. Gigon published this work within his compiled edition of Aristotle's fragments: Aristotelis Opera, vol. 3, Librorum deperditorum fragmenta (Berlin, 1987). Schneeweiss, G., Aristoteles: Protreptikos – Hinführung zur Philosophie (Darmstadt, 2005) proposes an alternative reconstruction, where he reorganizes the material and adds several more texts, especially of other works by Aristotle himself, although he probably makes a methodological error when he does not sort the texts, and as a result literal fragments get mixed with paraphrases, testimonies, and vestiges. I believe, however, that Hutchinson, D. S. and Johnson, M. R., “Authenticating Aristotle's Protrepticus, ” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 29 (2005): 193–294 and H. Flashar, Aristoteles, are to be taken into account in order to correct and complement Düring's edition.

¹² This is accepted by the three most recent editors of the Hortensius: Ruch, M., L'Hortensius de Cicéron: Histoire et reconstitution (Paris, 1958); Grilli, A., M. Tulli Ciceronis Hortensius (Milan, 1962); idem, M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio (Bologna, 2010); and Straume-Zimmermann, L., Ciceros Hortensius (Bern and Frankfurt, 1976). They unanimously admit the Augustinian quotations referred to as part of the work.

¹³ I find very relevant in this regard the words of Tkacz, “Aristotle” (n. 1 above), 58: “In contrast to the generally anti-Aristotelian attitude among Latin Christian writers, some viewed Aristotle more favorably. Notable among these is Augustine, who not only considered him the source for the tradition of dialectical studies but also as part of the general pagan philosophical heritage available to Christian intellectuals. Accepting the Neoplatonic synthesis of Platonism and Aristotelianism into a single philosophy, Augustine understood the Peripatetic tradition as part of a Platonically oriented philosophy which can be put into service articulating the Christian faith.” In that sense, and as this article tries to show, Grandgeorge's assertion that the influence of Aristotle on Augustine was virtually nil has no foundation. Grandgeorge, L., Saint Augustin et le néo-platonisme (Paris, 1896), 31 .

¹⁴ See, e.g., Lazzati, G., L'Aristotele perduto e gli scrittori cristiani (Milan, 1938), 44, who already noticed this fact. The relevance of the work of Augustine for the reconstruction of the Protrepticus and the Hortensius has been stressed by P. Valentin, who from the analysis of Contra Academicos, an exhortation to philosophy inspired by both works, has tried to deduce the plan and structure of these works. Valentin, P., “Un ‘protreptique’ conservé de l'Antiquité: le ‘Contra Academicos’ de saint Augustin,” Revue des sciences religieuses 43 (1969): 1–26, 97–117 .

¹⁵ “Tullius in Hortensio dialogo disputans: Si nobis, inquit, cum ex hac vita migraverimus, in beatorum insulis immortale aevum, ut fabulae ferunt, degere liceret, quid opus esset eloquentia, cum iudicia nulla fierent, aut ipsis etiam virtutibus? nec enim fortitudine egeremus nullo proposito aut labore aut periculo, nec iustitia cum esset nihil quod adpeteretur alieni, nec temperantia quae regeret eas quae nullae essent libidines. nec prudentia quidem egeremus, nullo delectu proposito bonorum et malorum. una igitur essemus beati cognitione naturae et scientia, qua sola etiam deorum est vita laudanda. ex quo intellegi potest cetera necessitatis esse, unum hoc voluntatis.” Cic. Hort. fr. 92 Ruch = 110 Grilli = 101 St.-Zimm. Translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.

¹⁶ The mythical motif of the Isles of the Blessed, seen in Hesiod (Op. 167–73) for the first time, is introduced into philosophical literature by Plato, who refers to it on several occasions as the last place of residence for eminent men who deserve to be honored for their life, philosophers being among them (see e.g. Plato's Symposium 179e–180b, Gorgias 523b, 526c, Republic 519c, 540b). The use of this mythical motif is repeated in Aristotle (Düring, Protrepticus, B 43, Politics, 1334a 22–40), from whom Cicero could have taken it, as we will see.

¹⁷ For eloquence owes its origin to human moral depravity, which it tries to mend in the sphere of the law: see Ruch, L'Hortensius de Cicéron, 162. It is also possible, however, that the inclusion of eloquence had something to do with the fact that Hortensius, the interlocutor of the Ciceronian dialogue, considered it to be the supreme good: see Jaeger, Aristotle, 73.

¹⁸ See Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 5.24.68–25.71, wherein Cicero, speaking about the conditions required by the soul of the wise to enjoy the happy life, refers to, firstly, “the knowledge of the reality and the explanation of nature” (“cognitione rerum et explicatione naturae”], which is understood above all as the contemplation of the movements of stars and an investigation of the principles of reality. Once the wise man has contemplated all these things, he takes into consideration the human and worldly things with great peace of mind, from which the knowledge of virtue originates. See also Republic, 1.17.28.

¹⁹ See, e.g., Bernays, J., Die Dialoge des Aristoteles (Berlin, 1863), 120 ; Ruch, L'Hortensius de Cicéron, 161.

²⁰ See Augustine De trinitate 14.9.12 (this is the continuation of Cicero's quoted passage): “Thus, when he praised philosophy, that great orator [Cicero], recalling what he had received from the philosophers and explaining it in a clear and persuasive manner, declared that only in this life, which we see filled with tribulations and delusions, are all four virtues necessary; that there will be none of them, however, when we have departed from this life [“cum ex hac vita emigraverimus”], provided only that we are permitted to live there where we can live blessedly; but that good minds are blessed merely by learning [“cognition”] and knowing [“scientia”], that is, by contemplating the nature [“contemplatione naturae”], than which there is none better and more amiable.” S. McKenna, trans., St. Augustine: The Trinity, The Fathers of the Church 45 (Washington, DC, 1963), 429.

²¹ “Ac veteres quidem philosophi in beatorum insulis fingunt qualis futura sit vita sapientium, quos cura omni liberatos, nullum necesarium vitae cultum aut paratum requirientes, nihil aliud esse acturos putant, nisi ut omne tempus inquirendo ac discendo in naturae cognitione consumant.” Cicero, De finibus, 5.19.53.

²² See Grilli, M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio (n. 12 above), 247–48.

²³ The connection between the innate love for knowing and the intellective character of the happy life is repeated in Tusc. 1.44, where Cicero gives as cause of the purely intellective character of the happy life the natural and innate desire for knowing the truth.

²⁴ See n. 20 above.

²⁵ See n. 16 above.

²⁶ See, e.g., Bernays, Die Dialoge, 121; Rose, V., Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta, 3rd ed. (Leipzig, 1886), 68 ; Walzer, R., Aristotelis dialogorum fragmenta (Florence, 1934), 52 ; Jaeger, Aristotle, 72–73; Ross, D., Aristotelis fragmenta selecta (Oxford, 1955), 45–46 ; or Düring, Aristotle's Protrepticus (n. 11 above), 211–12 (who also adds later on as a possible source EN 1178b7–23). Turkowska, L'Hortensius de Cicéron (n. 9 above), 23–24, and Grilli, M. Tulli Ciceronis Hortensius (n. 12 above), 174, idem, M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio, 248–50, are of the same opinion. Others, however, are more skeptical, like Gigon, Aristotelis Opera (n. 11 above), fr. 824.

²⁷ Arist. Protr. B 41–43 Düring (= Iambl. Protr. 41.7–9, 52.16–23, 53.2–15 Pistelli): τὸ ϕρονεῖν καὶ τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἐστὶν αἱρετὸν καθ᾿ αὑτὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις (οὐδὲ γὰρ ζῆν δυνατὸν ὡς ἀνθρώποις ἄνευ τούτων). . . . Τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν ἀπὸ πάσης ἐπιστήμης ἕτερόν τι γενέσθαι καὶ δεῖν χρησίμην αὐτὴν εἶναι, παντάπασιν ἀγνοοῦντός τινός ἐστιν ὅσον διέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα· διαϕέρει γὰρ πλεῖστον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δι᾿ ἕτερον ἀγαπώμενα τῶν πραγμάτων, ὧν ἄνευ ζῆν ἀδύνατον, ἀναγκαῖα . . . λεκτέον, ὅσα δὲ δι᾿ αὑτά, κἂν ἀποβαίνῃ μηδὲν ἕτερον, ἀγαθὰ κυρίως. . . . Ἴδοι δ᾿ ἄν τις ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀληθῆ ταῦτα λέγομεν, εἴ τις ἡμᾶς οἷον εἰς μακάρων νήσους τῇ διανοίᾳ κομίσειεν. ἐκεῖ γὰρ οὐδενὸς χρεία οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τινὸς ὄϕελος ἂν γένοιτο, μόνον δὲ καταλείπεται τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν, ὅνπερ καὶ νῦν ἐλεύθερόν ϕαμεν βίον εἶναι. εἰ δὲ ταῦτ᾿ ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, πῶς οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιτο δικαίως ὅστις ἡμῶν ἐξουσίας γενομένης ἐν μακάρων οἰκῆσαι νήσοις ἀδύνατος εἴη δι᾿ ἑαυτόν; οὐκοῦν οὐ μεμπτὸς ὁ μισθός ἐστι τῆς ἐπιστήμης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὐδὲ μικρὸν τὸ γιγνόμενον ἀπ᾿ αὐτῆς ἀγαθόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ὥς ϕασιν οἱ σοϕοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ἐν Ἅιδου κομιζόμεθα τὰς δωρεάς, οὕτως τῆς ϕρονήσεως ἐν μακάρων νήσοις, ὡς ἔοικεν.

²⁸ That is what can be deduced from Cicero's testimony (fin. 5.11), which, as Düring maintains in Aristotle's Protrepticus, 44–45 (Düring lists it as test. A 7), can be referred to the Protrepticus: “The way of life that they [sc. Aristotle and Theophrastus] most commended was one spent in quiet contemplation [“contemplatio”] and study [“cognitio”]. This is the most god-like of lives, and so most worthy of the wise person. Some of their most noble and distinguished writing is to be found on this theme.” Annas, J., ed., Cicero: On Moral Ends, trans. Woolf, R. (Cambridge and New York, 2001), 121. Düring maintains that the words contemplatio and cognitio seem an echo of διανοεῖσθαι and θεωρεῖν from the fragment of Aristotle.

²⁹ See Arist. Protr. B 40–42 D. (= Iambl. Protr. 39.20–40.1, 41.6–15, 52.16–53.2 P.)

³⁰ This textual parallelism is shown by Grilli, M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio, 105, 249, who also points out the correspondence between ἐξουσία and liceret, extended to οἰκῆσαι and “degree,” and, of course, the one between ἀναγκαῖα and cetera necessitatis.

³¹ Ibid., 248–49. Grilli talks, for example, about the mise en scène, the vision of the Isles of the Blessed, the underlying approach, and the reference to the virtues.

³² As it has already been pointed out by Turkowska, L'Hortensius de Cicéron, 24–25 and Grilli, M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio, 250.

³³ “But that perfect happiness is a contemplative activity will appear from the following consideration as well. We assume the gods to be above all other beings blessed and happy; but what sort of actions must we assign to them? Acts of justice? Will not the gods seem absurd if they make contracts and return deposits, and so on? Acts of a brave man, then, confronting dangers and running risks because it is noble to do so? Or liberal acts? To whom will they give? It will be strange if they are really to have money or anything of the kind. And what would their temperate acts be? Is not such praise tasteless, since they have no bad appetites? If we were to run through them all, the circumstances of action would be found trivial and unworthy of gods. Still, every one supposes that they live and therefore that they are active; we cannot suppose them to sleep like Endymion. Now if you take away from a living being action, and still more production, what is left but contemplation? Therefore the activity of God, which surpasses all others in blessedness, must be contemplative; and of human activities, therefore, that which is most akin to this must be most of the nature of happiness.” Aristotle: Nichomachean Ethics, trans. Ross, W. D. (Oxford, 2009), 1178b 7–23 (p. 197).

³⁴ Düring, Aristotle's Protrepticus, 211.

³⁵ And even with a different purpose, as it happens in Politics 1334a28–34, where Aristotle mentions the Isles of the Blessed again, but this time in order to describe them as the place where his inhabitants are more in need of philosophy (ϕιλοσοϕία), prudence (σωϕροσύνη), and justice (δικαιοσύνη), for they are necessary in order to prevent the abundance of the goods they enjoy turning them to pride.

³⁶ Jaeger, Aristotle, 72–74. Düring, Aristotle's Protrepticus, 211, for example, denies his thesis.

³⁷ See Hagendahl, H., Augustine and the Latin Classics, 2 vols. (Gothenburg, 1967), 2:495.

³⁸ See Aug. Trin. 14.9.12: “And so these works of the virtues, which are necessary for this mortal life, like the faith to which they must be referred, will be reckoned among the things that have passed; and they form one trinity now, when we hold on to them as present, contemplate them, and love them; they will form another trinity then, when we shall find that they no longer are, but have been, by means of some traces of their passing which they have left in the memory, because even then there will be a trinity when that trace, of whatever sort it may be, will be retained in the memory, will be truly known, and both of these will be joined together by the will as a third.” McKenna, The Trinity (n. 20 above), 430.

³⁹ “Ex quibus humanae vitae erroribus et aerumnis fit ut interdum veteres illi sive vates sive in sacris initiisque tradendis divinae mentis interpretes, qui nos ob aliqua scelera suscepta in vita superiore poenarum luendarum causa natos esse dixerunt, aliquid vidisse videantur verumque sit illud quod est apud Aristotelem, simili nos affectos esse supplicio atque eos qui quondam, cum in praedonum Etruscorum manus incidissent, crudelitate excogitata necabantur, quorum corpora viva cum mortuis, adversa adversis accommodata quam aptissime colligabantur: sic nostros animos cum corporibus copulatos ut vivos cum mortuis esse coniunctos.” Cic. Hort. fr. 85 Ruch = 112 Grilli = 99 St.-Zimm.

⁴⁰ According to Lactantius (Inst. 3.18.18), Cicero had already stated this same doctrine in the Consolatio to his daughter Tullia. The Protrepticus as the origin of the idea that life is a punishment for old offenses is also recognized by K. Schlapbach, “Hortensius” (n. 10 above), col. 432.

⁴¹ See Arist. Protr. B 108 D. (= Iambl. Protr. 48.9–13 P.): “Mankind has nothing worthy of consideration as being divine or blessed, except what there is in us of reason (νοῦς) and wisdom (ϕρόνησις); this alone of our possessions seems to be immortal, this alone to be divine.” Düring, Protrepticus, 91. See also Turkowska, L'Hortensius de Cicéron, 34.

⁴² Arist. Protr. B 106–07 D. (= Iambl. Protr. 47.21–48.9 P.): τίς ἂν οὖν εἰς ταῦτα βλέπων οἴοιτο εὐδαίμων εἶναι καὶ μακάριος, οἳ πρῶτον εὐθὺς ϕύσει συνέσταμεν, καθάπερ ϕασὶν οἱ τὰς τελετὰς λέγοντες, ὥσπερ ἂν ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ πάντες; τοῦτο γὰρ θείως οἱ ἀρχαιότεροι λέγουσι τὸ ϕάναι διδόναι τὴν ψυχὴν τιμωρίαν καὶ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ κολάσει μεγάλων τινῶν ἁμαρτημάτων. πάνυ γὰρ ἡ σύζευξις τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς. ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τῇ Τυρρηνίᾳ ϕασὶ βασανίζειν πολλάκις τοὺς ἁλισκομένους προσδεσμεύοντας κατ' ἀντικρὺ τοῖς ζῶσι νεκροὺς ἀντιπροσώπους ἕκαστον πρὸς ἕκαστον μέρος προσαρμόττοντας, οὕτως ἔοικεν ἡ ψυχὴ διατετάσθαι καὶ προσκεκολλῆσθαι πᾶσι τοῖς αἰσθητικοῖς τοῦ σώματος μέλεσιν. I accept the common opinion that this passage comes from the Protrepticus. There are authors who have held that this fragment comes from the dialogue Eudemus, a lost work of Aristotle's youth: see, e.g., Gigon, “Prolegomena to an Edition of the Eudemus,” in Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, ed. Düring, I. and Owen, G. E. L. (Gothenburg, 1960), 27–28; Grilli, “Cicerone e l'Eudemo,” 114–16; Brunschwig, J., “Aristote et les pirates tyrrhéniens (A propos des fragments 60 Rose du Protreptique),” Revue philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger 153 (1963): 171–90.

⁴³ See Plato, Phaedo 69c, wherein there is a reference to these officiating priests as “those who instituted the initiations” (οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες), terms similar to those Aristotle uses.

⁴⁴ It is said of Orpheus that it was he who introduced the initiation rites (τελεταί) amongst the Greeks (Ephor. FGrHist 70 F 104 ap. D. S. 5.64.4 = Orph. Fr. 519 Bernabé) and that he was an officiating priest of mystery rites (Strab. VII fr. 18).

⁴⁵ See Plato, Cratylus 400c, Meno 81b, Phaedo 62b and Schol. ad loc. (10 Greene), Gorgias 493a. The terminology that Aristotle uses to refer to this Orphic doctrine reminds one of the terminology Plato uses in some passages wherein the same doctrine is referred to, as, e.g., in the Seventh Letter (335a), wherein the idea that we must “pay with the greatest of punishments” (τίνειν τὰς μεγίστας τιμωρίας) is attributed to the “ancient sacred tales”; or in Cratylus (400c), wherein the idea that the body is the enclosure where the soul “pays its penalty” (δίκην διδούσης) is explicitly applied to Orpheus and his followers. On the Orphic references in the Aristotelian passage, see, e.g., Pépin, J., “La légende orphique du supplice tyrrhénien,” in L'art des confins: mélanges offerts à Maurice de Gandillac, ed. Cazenave, A. and Lyotard, J. F. (Paris, 1985), 387–406 ; É. Places, Des, Jamblique: Protreptique (Paris, 1989), 78n1; Bernabé, A., “Platone e l'orfismo,” in Destino e salvezza: Tra culti pagani e gnosi cristiana; Itinerari storico-religiosi sulle orme di Ugo Bianchi, ed. Gasparro, G. Sfameni (Cosenza, 1998), 76 ; Beatrice, P. F., “Le corps-cadavre et le supplice des pirates tyrrhéniens,” in Kêpoi: De la religion à la philosophie; Mélanges offerts à André Motte, ed. Delruelle, E. and Pirenne-Delforge, V. (Liège, 2001), 269–83; and Megino, C., “Aristóteles y el Liceo ante el orfismo,” in Orfeo y la tradición órfica: Un reencuentro, ed. Bernabé, A. and Casadesús, F. (Madrid, 2008), 2: 1296–98.

⁴⁶ See, e.g., Xenocrates, fr. 219, Parente, M. Isnardi, ed., Senocrate-Ermodoro (Naples, 1982), 132 ; and D. Chr. 30.10.

⁴⁷ Philol. 44 B 14 Diels-Kranz (= Clem. Al., Strom. 3.3.17): μαρτυρέονται δὲ καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ θεóλoγοι τε καὶ μάντιες, ὡς διά τινας τιμωρίας ἁ ψυχὰ τῷ σώματι συνέζευκται καὶ καθάπερ ἐν σήματι τούτῳ τέθαπται.

⁴⁸ We can find the description of Orpheus as a “theologian” in several authors, Aristotle himself being one of them. Orpheus being considered as a “seer” is found in Philochorus, FGrH 328 F 76.

⁴⁹ We cannot accept Ruch's assertion that Cicero would have quoted Aristotle through Posidonius because we have no testimony by Posidonius that could corroborate such an assertion: see M. Ruch, L'Hortensius de Cicéron (n. 12 above), 156. As Brink in his review of Ruch's work claimed, nothing indicates an intermediate source, and Reinhardt already remarked that the following series is false: Plato, Aristotle's Protrepticus, Posidonius, Cicero's Hortensius. Brink, review of L'Hortensius (n. 9 above), 221; K. Reinhardt, Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumwissenschaft 22, 1 (1953), col. 768.

⁵⁰ The same topos on the Etruscan pirates also appears in Servius, Commentarii in Aeneidem, 8.497 (who takes it from Cicero) and in Valerius Maximus, 9.2.10. On said topos, see, e.g., J. Brunschwig, “Aristote et les pirates tyrrhéniens,” 171–90; J. Pépin, “La légende orphique du supplice tyrrhénien,” 387–406; P. F. Beatrice “Le corps-cadavre,” 278–83; Bos, A. P., “Aristotle on the Etruscan Robbers: A Core Text of ‘Aristotelian Dualism,’” Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (2003): 289–306 .

⁵¹ “It seems significant that some of them approximated the Christian Faith when they perceived that this life, which is replete with deception and misery, came into existence only by divine judgment, and they attributed justice to the Creator by whom the world was made and is administered. How much better than you and nearer the truth in their opinions about the generation of man are those whom Cicero names in the last part of the Hortensius, who seemed to be drawn and compelled by the very evidence of things.” Aug. c. Iul. 4.15.78 (trans. Schumacher, M. A., Saint Augustine: Against Julian [New York, 1957], 234). However, Augustine rejects the idea that the soul is embodied as a punishment for previously committed wrongs. See Gn. litt. 6.9.15 ( Schlapbach, K., Augustin: Contra Academicos [vel de Academicis], Buch 1 [Berlin and New York, 2003], 31n8). For Augustine's critique of reincarnation as punishment, see, e.g., O'Daly, G., Augustine's Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1987), 71–73 .

⁵² Aug. c. Iul. 4.15.75.

⁵³ “Did not the philosophers who thought these things perceive much more clearly than you the heavy yoke upon the children of Adam, and the power and justice of God, though not aware of the grace given through the Mediator for the purpose of delivering men? Following your suggestion, then, I have found in the writings of the Gentile philosophers a teaching that can justly be preferred to you, although you, who could find no such thing in them and were not willing to hold your peace, were the occasion of my discovering matter to be used against you.” Ibid., 4.15.78; trans. Schumacher, 235.

⁵⁴ Augustine, however, was not the first Christian author to do something similar in perceiving the doctrinal parallelism between the content of the Aristotelian Protrepticus’s passage and the Christian conception of human life as a punishment resulting from original sin. Before him Clement of Alexandria already made reference to that parallelism in the following terms: “For that wicked reptile monster, by his enchantments, enslaves and plagues men even till now; inflicting, as seems to me, such barbarous vengeance on them as those who are said to bind the captives to corpses till they rot together” (Protr. 1.7.4). In fact, Walzer and Ross, in their editions of Aristotle's Protrepticus, include this passage, together with Augustine's quotation from Cicero, as fragment 10b of the work, although it is in fact only a vestige of the original text, just like the passage in Augustine. On the possible influence of Aristotle's Protrepticus on Clement, see, e.g., Lazzati, L'Aristotele perduto (n. 14 above), 16–18, who, however, tends to exaggerate that influence, as Düring, Aristotle's Protrepticus (n. 11 above), 265, observes.

⁵⁵ 1 John 3:2: ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ ἐσόμεθα, ὅτι ὀψόμεθα αὐτὸν καθώς ἐστιν, which Augustine quotes as follows (Trin. 14.19.25): “Similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est.”

⁵⁶ According to Grilli, M. Tulli Ciceronis Hortensius (n. 12 above), 169, who relates this sentence to one of Iamblichus in his work On the Soul (ap. Stob. 1.49.32.90 W.) and to others of Cicero himself in De divinatione (1.30.62) and Tusculanae Disputationes (1.23.55), these ancient philosophers would be Socrates, Plato, Pythagoras, and the Aristotle of the Eudemus. Straume-Zimmermann, Ciceros Hortensius (n. 12 above), 223, for his part, believes that they are Plato and Aristotle.

⁵⁷ “Hanc contemplativam sapientiam, quam proprie puto in Litteris sanctis a scientia distinctam sapientiam nuncupari, duntaxat hominis, quae quidem illi non est, nisi ab illo cuius participatione vere sapiens fieri mens rationalis et intellectualis potest, Cicero commendans in fine dialogi Hortensii: ‘Quae nobis,’ inquit, ‘dies noctesque considerantibus, acuentibusque intelligentiam, quae est mentis acies, caventibusque ne quando illa hebescat, id est, in philosophia viventibus magna spes est aut si hoc quo sentimus et sapimus mortale et caducum est, iucundum nobis perfunctis muneribus humanis occasum, neque molestam exstinctionem, et quasi quietem vitae fore, aut, si ut antiquis philosophis iisque maximis longeque clarissimis placuit, aeternos animos ac divinos habemus, sic existimandum est, quo magis hi fuerint semper in suo cursu, id est in ratione et investigandi cupiditate, et quo minus se admiscuerint atque implicuerint hominum vitiis et erroribus, hoc iis faciliorem adscensum et reditum in caelum fore.’ deinde addens hanc ipsam clausulam repetendoque sermonem finiens, ‘Quapropter,’ inquit, ‘ut aliquando terminetur oratio, si aut exstingui tranquille volumus, cum in his artibus vixerimus, aut si ex hac in aliam haud paulo meliorem domum sine mora demigrare, in his studiis nobis omnis opera et cura ponenda est.’” Aug. Trin. 14.19.26 = Cic. Hort. fr. 93 Ruch = 115 Grilli = 102 St.-Zimm.

⁵⁸ The exclusivity of this happy end for the philosophical souls is an idea underlined by Cicero in the final part of the Hortensius, wherein he, mainly following Plato, distinguishes between the good and bad fate of souls in the afterlife, linking that fate to their morality in the present life (Hort. fr. 114 G. = 83 St.-Zimm.). In Tusc. 1.44–47, Cicero himself offers a description of the happy life awaiting the soul after death, free from the body, and of its ascension to its natural home, the heaven beyond the clouds.

⁵⁹ Ruch, L'Hortensius de Cicéron, 165.

⁶⁰ On the impossibility of the “arcibus” reading that, since Rose (n. 26 above), Aristotelis, 73, some editors have adopted, such as Walzer, Aristotelis (n. 26 above), 47 and Ross, Aristotelis (n. 26 above), 43, see Düring, Aristotle's Protrepticus (n. 26 above), 268.

⁶¹ Arist. Protr. B 34 D. See also fr. B 37 D.: “science of truth and science of the virtue of the soul” (τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς περὶ ψυχὴν ἀρετῆς ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη).

⁶² As Grilli, M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio (n. 12 above), 246 points out, “in aliam haud paulo meliorem domum . . . demigrare” is a textual echo of the ἀποδημία (61e, 67c) and the μετοίκησις (117c) in the Phaedo. Grilli also shows that the conversation between Socrates and Simmias in the Phaedo is in the background of the final part of the Ciceronian dialogue: e.g., the assertion that truth and perfect wisdom (66e, 68b) are only reached after death because of the obstacle of the body (65b–c, 66a), the same assertion to which it refers the fr. 108 G.; the image of body as prison of the soul (62b), to which it also refers the fr. 108 G.; or the difference in the fate of soul in the afterlife according to its merits in this life (63c), to which it refers the fr. 114 G.

⁶³ Düring, Aristotle's Protrepticus, 267.

⁶⁴ Arist. Protr. B 110 D: ἢ ϕιλοσοϕητέον οὖν ἢ χαίρειν εἰποῦσι τῷ ζῆν ἀπιτέον ἐντεῦθεν. According to Düring, Aristotle's Protrepticus, 267–68, this sentence would be the model for the final declaration of the Hortensius passage that follows “sermonem finiens.”

⁶⁵ See also Arist. Eudemus fr. 44 Rose = 65 Gigon. This is a traditional idea in Greek thought: see, e.g., Thgn. 425–26, Young, Hdt. 1.31, 7.46, S. OC 1225, E. Cresph. fr. 449 Nauck-Snell. Cicero also echoes it in Tusc. 1.48.115.

⁶⁶ See, e.g., EN 1177a12, EE 1249b16, Pol. 1323b21.

⁶⁷ Cic. Div. 1.25.53 = Arist. Eudemus fr. 37 Rose = 56 Gigon.

⁶⁸ That is not an obstacle to the argument that the primary source is the Phaedo, as Grilli, M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio, 246, wants, since, as is known, the Aristotelian Eudemus was written taking Plato's dialogue as a model.

⁶⁹ See, e.g., Méautis, G., “L'orphisme dans l’ ‘Eudème’ d'Aristote,” Revue des études anciennes 57 (1955): 254–66; and C. Megino, “Aristóteles y el Liceo ante el orfismo,” 1299.

⁷⁰ Arist. Protr. B 106–7 D. (= Iambl. Protr. 47.21–48.9 P.).

⁷¹ See above, c. Iul. 4.15.78 = Cic. Hort. fr. 85 Ruch = 112 Grilli = 99 St.-Zimm.

⁷² “I marvel here that a man of such talent promises a pleasant setting upon the discharge of their human offices to those who have spent their lives in philosophy, which makes men happy by the contemplation of the truth, if our sentiments and knowledge are mortal and transitory, just as if this which we did not love, or rather fiercely hated, were then to die and be reduced to nothing so that its setting might be pleasant for us . . . . But, as he himself admits, he had learned from the philosophers, ‘the greatest and by far the most illustrious,’ that souls are eternal. For eternal souls are not unfittingly aroused by this exhortation, so that they may be found in their proper course when the end of this life comes, that is, in reason and in the eagerness for investigating, and they mingle less and become less entangled in the vices and delusions of men, in order that their return to God may be easier. But this course, which consists in the love of God and in the search for the truth, does not suffice for the miserable, that is, for all mortals who rely on this reason alone without the faith of the Mediator.” Aug. Trin. 14.19.26. McKenna, The Trinity (n. 20 above), 448–49.

⁷³ Grilli, M. Tulli Ciceronis Hortensius (n. 12 above), 147–49, and idem, M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio, 242–43, proves it so, and he opposes Hirzel's, Ruch's, and others’ reservations on some parts of the passage in question coming from the Hortensius. Hirzel, R., Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1883), 3:297n2; Ruch, L'Hortensius de Cicéron (n. 12 above), 168. Of the same opinion as Grilli is Schlapbach, Augustin: Contra Academicos (n. 51 above), 91.

⁷⁴ “Placuit enim Ciceroni nostro beatum esse qui veritatem investigat, etiamsi ad eius inventionem non valeat pervenire. . . . Quis ignorat eum adfirmasse vehementer nihil ab homine percipi posse nihilque remanere sapienti nisi diligentissimam inquisitionem veritatis, propterea quia si incertis rebus esset assensus, etiam si fortasse verae forent, liberari errore non posset? Quae maxima est culpa sapientis. Quam ob rem si et sapientem necessario beatum esse credendum est et veritatis sola inquisitio perfectum sapientiae munus est, quid dubitamus existimare beatam vitam etiam per se ipsa investigatione veritatis posse contingere?” Cic. Hort. fr. 95 Ruch = 107 Grilli = 91 St.-Zimm.

⁷⁵ Arist. Protr. B 65 D. (= Iambl. Protr. fr. 42.13–23 P.): “If then man is a simple animal and his being is ordered according to reason and intelligence, he has no other proper function [ἔργον, cf. “munus”] than the attainment of the most exact truth [μόνη ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἀλήθεια, cf. “diligentissimam inquisitionem veritatis”], truth about reality; but if he is composed of several faculties, it is clear that when someone can perform several functions, the best of them is always his proper function; health is the proper function of the doctor, and safety that of the sea-captain. Now we can name no better function of thought or of the thinking part of the soul [διανοίας] than the attainment of truth. Truth therefore is the supreme function [τὸ κυριώτατον ἔργον] of this part of the soul.”

⁷⁶ Grilli, M. Tulli Ciceronis Hortensius, 151; idem, M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio, 244–45.

⁷⁷ Hort. fr. 93 Ruch = 115 Grilli = 102 St.-Zimm.

⁷⁸ See Grilli, M. Tulli Ciceronis Hortensius, 150–52; idem, M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio, 244–45. See also Testard, Saint Augustin et Cicéron (n. 3 above), 27.

⁷⁹ See, e.g., Arist. Protr. 79–81 D. (= Iambl. Protr. fr. 56.15–57.12 P.).

⁸⁰ It is possible that the munus of the Ciceronian-Augustinian passage echoed this Aristotelian ἔργον.

⁸¹ Arist. Protr. B 65–66, 85 D. (= Iambl. Protr. frr. 42.13–29, 58.3–10 P.).

⁸² Arist. Protr. B 66–70 D. (= Iambl. Protr. fr. 42.23–43.25 P.).

⁸³ Trans. by Düring; Arist. Protr. B 103 D. (= Iambl. Protr. fr. 46.28–47.4 P.): ὅστις δὲ οἴεται μὴ πάντα τρόπον ὑπομένειν αὐτὸ δεῖν, καταγέλαστον ἤδη τὸ μὴ πάντα πόνον πονεῖν καὶ πᾶσαν σπουδὴν σπουδάζειν ὅπως κτήσηται ταύτην τὴν ϕρόνησιν ἥτις γνώσεται τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

⁸⁴ I. Düring, Aristotle's Protrepticus (n. 11 above), 134, for instance, recognizes that precedent in Aristotle, and he quotes the passage from Augustine in relation to fragment 45 of the Protrepticus, although he does not explain the relation in his comment. Grilli, M. Tulli Ciceronis Hortensius, 149, M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio, 245, and Schlapbach, Augustin: Contra Academicos, 91 also recognize the precedent.

⁸⁵ Augustine, following the Neoplatonic thesis, believes these doctrines to be in accordance with Plato's, since they, considered under the light of the Christian revelation, constitute the true philosophy (c. Acad. 3.19.42).

⁸⁶ So, e.g., G. Lazzati, L'Aristotele perduto (n. 14 above), 47–49, Schlapbach, Augustin: Contra Academicos (n. 51 above), 82–83.

⁸⁷ See c. Acad. 3.12.27 and Trin. 15.7.11, wherein the most excellent part of the soul is called mens once again, for it is the only thing that can be called properly the “image of God.”

⁸⁸ Arist. Protr. B 60–70D.

⁸⁹ Aug. c. Acad. 1.1.4.

⁹⁰ See G. Lazzati, L'Aristotele perduto, 47–50.

⁹¹ Cic. Hort. fr. 59 Ruch = 58 Grilli = 69 St.-Zimm. = Arist. Protr. fr. 4 Walzer: “Beati certe omnes esse volumus.” Augustine also quotes this sentence, with slight variations, in other passages from the Hortensius: see c. Iul. imp. 6.26, b. vit. 2.10, epist. 130.5.10, Trin. 13.5.8, mor. eccl. 1.3.4, etc.

⁹² Iambl. Protr. 24.22 P. = Arist. Protr. fr. 4 Walzer.

⁹³ Cf. Pl. Euthyd. 278e: ἆρά γε πάντες ἄνθρωποι βουλόμεθα εὖ πράττειν.

⁹⁴ Iambl. Protr. 24.22–26.24 P., wherein the Euthydemus’s argument is reproduced from 278a to 282d.

⁹⁵ Jaeger, Aristotle (n. 9 above), 63.

⁹⁶ Recently, Grilli, M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio (n. 12 above), 192–93, has echoed Jaeger's argument, denying that Cicero took it directly from Plato and suggesting that the intermediary source was Aristotle. Nevertheless, he does not mention the Protrepticus as source, but the beginning of Nicomachean Ethics (1094a): Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐϕίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς ἀπεϕήναντο τἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντ' ἐϕίεται. “Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim” (trans. by W. D. Ross [n. 33 above], 3). However, the sentence from the Euthydemus is a clearer textual precedent of “beati certe omnes esse volumus.” If it is denied that the Euthydemus is the direct source for Cicero, it should be taken as the intermediary source the Protrepticus (as Jaeger does), but that, as I say, is doubtful and conjectural.

⁹⁷ See Ruch, L'Hortensius de Cicéron (n. 12 above), 127–28.

⁹⁸ See Schlapbach, Augustin: Contra Academicos (n. 51 above), 77, who quotes other examples of similar declarations in Aristotle, as, e.g., APo 1, 1, 71a 1, Metaph. 1, 1, 980a 21, Pol. 1, 1, 1252a 1–6, and EN 1, 1, 1094a 1.

⁹⁹ See Schlapbach, Augustin: Contra Academicos, 77.

¹⁰⁰ Rabinowitz, Düring, and Hagendahl, for example, also express themselves in this sense. Rabinowitz, Aristotle's Protrepticus (n. 9 above), 52–54; Düring, Aristotle's Protrepticus (n. 11 above), 156; Hagendahl, Augustine (n. 37 above), 490n2. Most of the editors of the Protrepticus after Walzer, like D. Ross, A. H. Chroust, E. Berti, and O. Gigon, do not include the formula that Iamblichus quoted. However, Schneeweiss, Aristoteles (n. 11 above), 58 does do it as fr. 1a, but he does not offer any explanation for its inclusion.

¹⁰¹ “See what he [sc. Cicero in the Hortensius] says about the quality of the mind over against the pleasure of the body [“vide quod iste pro vivacitate mentis contra voluptatem corporis dicat”]. He says: ‘Should one seek the pleasures of the body, which, as Plato said truly and earnestly, are the enticements and baits of evil [“illecebrae esse atque escae malorum”]? What injury to health, what deformity of character and body, what wretched loss, what dishonor is not evoked and elicited by pleasure? Where its action is the most intense, it is the most inimical to philosophy. The pleasure of the body is not in accord with great thought. Who can pay attention or follow a reasoning or think anything at all when under the influence of intense pleasure [“voluptate ea qua nulla possit maior esse”]? The whirlpool of this pleasure is so great that it strives day and night, without the slightest intermission, so to arouse our senses that they be drawn into the depths. What fine mind would not prefer that nature had given us no pleasures at all?’” Cic. Hort. fr. 77 Ruch = 84 Grilli = 84 St.-Zimm. = Arist. Protr. fr. 17 Walzer. (Trans. M. A. Schumacher [n. 51 above], 229.) Augustine echoes the same ideas in c. Iul. 5.8.33 and 5.10.42. He takes them from the same passage of Cicero's Hortensius.

¹⁰² Walzer, Aristotelis (n. 26 above), 61–62.

¹⁰³ Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantiis, 1040e.

¹⁰⁴ As a matter of fact, the editors of Aristotle's fragments after Walzer believe so. They consider that the fragment of Plutarch comes from the dialogue On Justice. See Ross, Aristotelis (n. 26 above), 98; Laurenti, R., Aristotele: I Frammenti dei dialoghi (Naples, 1987), 1:138; and Gigon, Aristotelis Opera (n. 11 above), 258.

¹⁰⁵ See, e.g., Arist. Protr. B 56, 87, 91–92, 98 D. (= Iambl. Protr. 40.20–41.2, 58.15–17, 59.7–18, 45.6–13 P.).

¹⁰⁶ Bignone, L'Aristotele perduto, 343–45. A more recent author, J. Doignon, also follows Bignone in regarding the Protrepticus as the source of the Ciceronian attack on bodily pleasures in the Hortensius passage. “Une leçon méconnue du fragment 81 (Müller) de l'Hortensius de Cicéron transmis par saint Augustin,” Revue de philologie, de littérature et d'histoire ancienne 55 (1981): 237–44, at 243.

¹⁰⁷ The connection of these words with the Protrepticus is accepted by Grilli, M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio (n. 26 above), 222, who refers to Bignone.

¹⁰⁸ “Omnino a philosophia semovendas putabo, primum Aristippi Cyrenaicorumque omnium, quos non est veritum in ea voluptate, quae maxima dulcedine sensum moveret, summum bonum ponere contemnentis istam vacuitatem doloris. hi non viderunt, ut ad cursum equum, ad arandum bovem, ad indagandum canem, sic hominem ad duas res, ut ait Aristoteles, ad intellegendum et agendum, esse natum quasi mortalem deum.” Cic. Fin. 2.13.39–40.

¹⁰⁹ Protr. B 98 D.: Παντὶ δὴ οὖν τοῦτό γε πρόδηλον, ὡς οὐδεὶς ἂν ἕλοιτο ζῆν ἔχων τὴν μεγίστην ἀπ᾿ ἀνθρώπων οὐσίαν καὶ δύναμιν, ἐξεστηκὼς μέντοι τοῦ ϕρονεῖν καὶ μαινόμενος, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλοι τὰς νεανικωτάτας ἡδονὰς διώκειν χαίρων, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι τῶν παραϕρονούντων διάγουσιν.

¹¹⁰ See, e.g., Bignone, L'Aristotele perduto, 148, 179; Grilli, M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio, 222.

¹¹¹ For example, Grilli, M. T. Cicerone: Ortensio, 222, after mentioning the possibility of the Protrepticus being the source, proposes as an alternative that the intermediary could be Antiochus of Ascalon, teacher of Cicero and an author markedly antihedonist, in whom Cicero had found the teachings of Plato and Aristotle.

¹¹² Pl. Tim. 69d: ἡδονήν, μέγιστον κακοῦ δέλεαρ.

¹¹³ This was recognized by Testard, Saint Augustin et Cicéron (n. 3 above), 26, for whom Cicero “y développe le theme platoniciene de l'incompatibilité de la vie de l'esprit avec les voluptés du corps.”

¹¹⁴ See, e.g., Arist. EN 1152b 16–22.

¹¹⁵ Arist. EN 1174b 20–1175a 1.

¹¹⁶ Arist. Protr. B 87–92 D., EN 1177a 23–27, Metaph. 1072b 24.

¹¹⁷ “The great majority [sc. of the fragments of the Hortensius quoted by Augustine] fall within the Cassiciacum dialogues (386–387). In the writings dating from 387 to 413 there are only repetitions of previously quoted passages. New and important fragments appear, on the other hand, in the last books of De trinitate (416 or later) and in Contra Iulianum (421). At that time Augustine renewed his acquaintance with the Hortensius: it came once more to influence his thought as it had done at the beginning of his literary activity.” Hagendahl, Augustine (n. 37 above), 489. See also Madec, “L’Hortensius de Cicéron dans les livres XIII–XIV du De Trinitate ,” Revue des études augustiniennes 15 (1969): 167–73, at 167.

¹¹⁸ B. vita, 1.4, Conf. 3.4.7, 8.7.17. A sign of this importance is that Augustine mentions it more often than any other work of Cicero's except De republica, as Hagendahl, Augustine, 488, pointed out. A detailed examination of the impact that reading the Hortensius had on Augustine and of the long process of inner change that led to his conversion can be seen in Madrid, T. C., “Agustín y el Hortensio,” Revista augstiniana 33 (1992): 169–224 . See also Testard, Saint Augustin et Cicéron, 19–39, 2:74–81; Hagendahl, Augustine, 486–88; Asiedu, F. B. A., “El Hortensius de Cicerón, la filosofía y la vida mundana del joven Agustín,” Augustinus 45 (2000): 5–25 ; Schlapbach, “Hortensius,” cols. 428–29. For someone who minimizes the importance of that impact, see O'Meara, J. J., The Young Augustine: The Growth of St. Augustine's Mind up to His Conversion (London, 1954), 57–59 .

¹¹⁹ Hist. Aug. 2.97.20–22.

¹²⁰ Lact. Inst. 3.16 = Cic. Hort. fr. 32 Ruch = 54 Grilli = 49 St.-Zimm.

¹²¹ Arist. Protr. A 2–6 D. See also Brink, review of L'Hortensius, by Ruch (n. 9 above), 221.

¹²² See, e.g., Bignone, E., L'Aristotele perduto, 39; Lazzati, G., L'Aristotele perduto (n. 9 above), 44–45, although I do not share the laxity of these authors when finding Aristotelian echoes in Augustine. See also Trundle, “Modalidades aristotélicas de San Agustín” (n. 9 above), 14.