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Human Extinction and Our Obligations to the Past

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 November 2019

Patrick Kaczmarek Open the ORCID record for Patrick Kaczmarek [Opens in a new window]  and
Simon Beard
Patrick Kaczmarek*
Affiliation:
Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, University of Cambridge
Simon Beard
Affiliation:
Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, University of Cambridge
*
*Corresponding author. Email: patrick@effectivegiving.nl
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Abstract

On certain plausible views, if humanity were to unanimously decide to cause its own extinction, this would not be wrong, since there is no one whom this act would wrong. We argue this is incorrect. Causing human extinction would still wrong someone; namely, our forebears who sacrificed life, limb and livelihood for the good of posterity, and whose sacrifices would be made less morally worthwhile by this heinous act.

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Type
Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , June 2020 , pp. 199 - 208
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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