Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa

Being and Betterness

  • JENS JOHANSSON (a1)
Abstract

In this article I discuss the question of whether a person's existence can be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence. Recently, Nils Holtug and Melinda A. Roberts have defended an affirmative answer. These defenses, I shall argue, do not succeed. In different ways, Holtug and Roberts have got the metaphysics and axiology wrong. However, I also argue that a person's existence can after all be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence, though for reasons other than those provided by Holtug and Roberts.

Copyright
Linked references
Hide All

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

K. Bykvist , ‘The Benefits of Coming into Existence’, Philosophical Studies 135 (2007), pp. 335–62

N. Holtug , ‘On the Value of Coming into Existence’, The Journal of Ethics 5 (2001), pp. 361–84

M. Roberts , ‘Can it Ever Be Better Never to Have Existed At All? Person-Based Consequentialism and a New Repugnant Conclusion’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 20 (2003), pp. 159–85

F. Feldman , ‘Some Puzzles about the Evil of Death’, The Philosophical Review 100 (1991), pp. 205–27, at p. 216

G. Harman , ‘Toward a Theory of Intrinsic Value’, The Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967), pp. 792804

F. Feldman , ‘Basic Intrinsic Value’, Philosophical Studies 99 (2000), pp. 319–46

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Utilitas
  • ISSN: 0953-8208
  • EISSN: 1741-6183
  • URL: /core/journals/utilitas
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×