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Is There a Right to Respect?

  • M. ORESTE FIOCCO (a1)
Abstract

Many moral philosophers assume that a person is entitled to respect; this suggests that there is a right to respect. I argue, however, that there is no such right. There can be no right to respect because of what respect is, in conjunction with what a right demands and certain limitations of human agency. In this article, I first examine the nature and ontological basis of rights. I next consider the notion of respect in general; I adduce several varieties of respect, then present a primary distinction needed to discern the notion of respect relevant to the putative right. Then I propound the argument that there can be no right to respect and consider some means of challenging its conclusion. In closing, I trace some of the consequences of this argument and suggest how it might motivate a different approach to understanding our most basic obligations to one another.

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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

S. Buss , ‘Respect for Persons’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 29 (1999), pp. 517–50

W. Frankena , ‘The Ethics of Respect for Persons’, Philosophical Topics 14 (1986), pp. 149–67

S. Darwall , ‘Two Kinds of Respect’, Ethics, 88 (1977), pp. 3649

R. Dillon , ‘Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integration’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992), pp. 105–32

W. Sinnott-Armstrong , ‘ “Ought” Conversationally Implies “Can” ’, The Philosophical Review 93 (1984), pp. 249–61

S. Hudson , ‘The Nature of Respect’, Social Theory and Practice 6 (1980), pp. 6990

J. Silber , ‘Kant's Conception of the Highest Good as Immanent and Transcendent’, The Philosophical Review 68 (1959), pp. 469–92.)

H. Frankfurt , ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969), pp. 829–39

J. M. Fischer , ‘Recent Work on Moral Responsibility’, Ethics 110 (1999), pp. 93139

D. Widerker , ‘Frankfurt on “Ought Implies Can” and Alternative Possibilities’, Analysis 51 (1991), pp. 222–4

I. Haji , ‘Alternative Possibilities, Moral Obligation, and Moral Responsibility’, Philosophical Papers 22 (1993), pp. 4150

D. Copp , ‘Defending the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Blameworthiness and Moral Responsibility’, Noûs 31 (1997), pp. 441–56

J. Kekes , ‘ “Ought Implies Can” and Two Kinds of Morality’, The Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1984), pp. 459–67

W. Alston , ‘The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification’, Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988), pp. 257–99

R. Feldman , ‘Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation’, Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility and Virtue, ed. M. Steup (New York, 2001), pp. 7792

C. Ginet , ‘Deciding to Believe’, Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility and Virtue, ed. M. Steup (New York, 2001), pp. 6376

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Utilitas
  • ISSN: 0953-8208
  • EISSN: 1741-6183
  • URL: /core/journals/utilitas
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