Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa

Voluntarism and the Origins of Utilitarianism

  • J. B. Schneewind (a1)
Abstract

In the paper I offer a brief sketch of one of the sources of utilitarianism.

Our biological ancestry is a matter of fact that is not altered by the way we describe ourselves. With philosophical theories it is otherwise. Utilitarianism can be described in ways that make it look as if it is as old as moral philosophy – as J. S. Mill thought it was. For my historical purposes, it is more useful to have an account that brings out what is specific about Benthamism and its descendants. Let us try to make do with the following. First, utilitarianism asserts that the fundamental requirement of morality is that we are to maximize good, for everyone and not just for the agent. This basic principle presupposes that it makes sense to think of aggregating goods to make a total, and of comparing amounts of good thus aggregated. Second, the good to be brought about is located in feelings of pleasure, and the evil to be avoided in feelings of pain. These feelings have inherent value or disvalue regardless of how they are caused to exist and regardless of their own consequences. Third, all moral principles can be derived from the requirement that good be maximized. The principles involved in evaluating agents as well as in giving moral direction to action are nothing but applications of the basic principle.

Copyright
References
Hide All

1 This is a slightly revised version of a paper presented at the Fourth Conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies, held in Tokyo, 27–29 August 1994.

2 See the opening paragraph of Utilitarianism, ed. Robson John M., Toronto, 1969, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, x. 205.

3 The term ‘maximize” is not one used by seventeenth century writers, but I shall use it for convenience.

4 Paley remarks that the virtuous agent must deliberately act in compliance with a moral or religious rule in order to deserve a reward at God's hands. See Paley William, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, London, 1785, Book I, ch. vii. See also Book II, ch. vii. This does not entail that action from a rule is a conceptually necessary condition of possessing or producing happiness.

5 The quotations in this paragraph come from the Sixth Set of Replies, in Cottingham John et al. , Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 vols., Cambridge, 19851991, ii. 291–2, 293–4. See also the Correspondence in Philosophical Writings of Descartes, iii. 23, 25, 103; and the ‘Conversation with Burman”, iii. 343.

6 Traherne Thomas, Christian Ethicks, [1675], ed. Marks Carl L. and Guffey George Robert, Ithaca, 1968, p. 71.

7 In my account of Leibniz I rely very largely on the Theodicy, as the most important systematic exposition of his views that Leibniz published, and the most widely read. I give references only to the English translation by Huggard E. M., Salle La, Illinois, [1951], 1985, indicated in the text as Theod.

8 In what follows I cite Cumberland Richard from A Treatise of the Law of Nature [1672], trans. Maxwell John, London, 1727. I give the page number of this edition, indicating the volume as TLN.

9 Cumberland suggests that power is not the same as right. Quite early he insists that we must use moral terms we understand as we seek to know God's moral nature (TLN, 15). Thus our notion of right is not to be shaken, and Hobbes is mistaken in reducing it to power. Leibniz's repeated criticism of voluntarism on the ground that it cannot explain why God is praised for being just similarly supposes that our moral vocabulary is not to be shaken by theory. Cumberland's denial that God ever dispenses from the need to obey the laws of nature is another anti-voluntarist move (TLN, 31).

10 Though Cumberland earlier says he will not argue from God's nature, preferring to argue from the effects we can observe to what God's causal nature must be to explain them (see TLN, 219–26), he takes the a priori way in a later chapter (TLN, 318–19).

11 See Leibniz, Die philosophischen Schriften [1890], ed. Gerhardt C. J., Hildesheim, 1978, vii. 74–7 for a good summary.

12 In ‘The Ethical System of Richard Cumberland and its Place in the History of British Ethics”, Mind, new series xxi (1912), 371–98, F. C. Sharp argues that Cumberland is a hedonist. In a way this is quite right, but it is too simple. Cumberland would rather be a perfectionist; his hedonism is part of the battle against voluntarism.

13 In contrast to Malebranche's God, who sets policy but does not concern himself with the details of its execution.

14 Haakonssen Knud, ‘The Character and Obligation of Natural Law according to Richard Cumberland”, in Stewart M. A., Studies in Seventeenth Century Philosophy, Oxford, 1994, forthcoming.

15 Since a plurality of equally good worlds is possible, in Cumberland's view, he might think God's commands important because they indicate to us which one God has decided to realize. But he never suggests anything remotely like this – perhaps because it re-introduces an element of the voluntarism he is trying to avoid.

16 The quotations are from Bentham Jeremy, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. Burns J. H. and Hart H. L. A., London, 1970 (The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham), pp. 16, 28n.

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Utilitas
  • ISSN: 0953-8208
  • EISSN: 1741-6183
  • URL: /core/journals/utilitas
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 17 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 180 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 21st October 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.