¹ The paper is part of a growing body of literature. See, for example, Barnett, Michael, “High Politics Is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security Policy, 1967–1977,” World Politics 42 (July 1990), 529–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Eichenberg, Richard, Public Opinion and National Security in Western Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Evangelista, Matthew, Innovation and the Arms Race (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988)Google Scholar; Krell, Gert, Riistungsdynamik und Riistungskpntrolle: Die geselbchaftlichen Auscinandersetzungen um SALT in den USA 10.60–1975 (Frankfurt am Main: Haag und Herchen, 1976)Google Scholar; Lebow, Richard N., Between Peace and War (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981)Google Scholar; Levy, Jack S., “Domestic Politics and War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988), 653–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Müller, Erwin, Réstungspolitik und Rüstungskpntrolle: Fall USA (Baden-Baden: NO-mos, 1985)Google Scholar; Russett, Bruce, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Wittkopf, Eugene, Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990).Google Scholar

² For excellent reviews of the debate, see Everts, Philip and Faber, Arthur, “Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and Democracy” (Paper presented at the ECPR Workshop “Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and the Democratic Process,” Bochum, April 2–7, 1990)Google Scholar; and Russett (fn. 1).

³ See, e.g., Page, Benjamin I. and Shapiro, Robert Y., “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy,” American Political Science Review 77, no. 1 (1983), 175–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ For Western Europe, see Eichenberg (fn. 1), pt. 5. For the U.S., see Holsti, Ole R. and Rosenau, James N., “The Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs of American headers,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 32 (June 1988), 248–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Wittkopf (fn. 1). For Japan, see Bobrow, Davis, “Japan in the World: Opinion from Defeat to Success,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 (December 1989), 571–603.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ See, e.g., Chomsky, Noam and Herman, Edward, Manufacturing Consent (New York: Pantheon, 1988)Google Scholar; Ginsberg, Benjamin, The Captive Public: How Mass Opinion Promotes State Power (New York: Basic Books, 1986)Google Scholar; Hughes, Barry, The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy (San Francisco: Freeman, 1979)Google Scholar; Margolis, Michael and Mauser, Gary, eds., Manipulating Public Opinion: Essays on Public Opinion as a Dependent Variable (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1989)Google Scholar; and Rosenau, James N., Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1961).Google Scholar

⁶ During election campaigns in the U.S., for example, the majority of the public was aware of the different foreign policy choices under debate and could identify the positions of the presidential candidates. See Aldrich, John H. et al., “Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates ‘Waltz before a Blind Audience’? American Political Science Review 83, no. 1 (1989), 123–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rattinger, Hans, “Foreign Policy and Security Issues as Determinants of Voting Behavior in the 1988 U.S. Presidential Election” (Paper presented at the ECPR Workshop “Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and the Democratic Process,” Bochum, April 2–7, 1990).Google Scholar See also Graham, Thomas, “The Pattern and Importance of Public Knowledge in the Nuclear Age,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 32, no. 2 (1988), 319–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷ For the U.S., see Smith, Tom W., “The Polls: America's Most Important Problem, Part I: National and International,” Public Opinion Quarterly 49, no. 2 (1985), 264–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for France, West Germany, and Japan, see Hastings, and Hastings, , eds., Index to International Public Opinion, 1982–1983 (New York: Greenwood, 1984), 563Google Scholar; and 1983–1984, 689.

⁸ Shapiro, Robert and Page, Benjamin I., “Foreign Policy and the Rational Public,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 32, no. 2 (1988), 211–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For data, see Eichenberg (fn. 1); Flynn, Gregory and Rattinger, Hans, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense (London: Croom Helm, 1985)Google Scholar; Graham, Thomas, American Public Opinion on NATO, Extended Deterrence, and Use of Nuclear Weapons (Cambridge: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1989)Google Scholar; and Russett (fn. 1), chap. 4.

⁸ For example, the well-documented “rally around the flag” effect, according to which presidents can use military interventions to raise their popular support, applies only to a minority of the U.S. population and does not last very long. See Russett (fn. 1), 34–51. For the original study on the effect, see Mueller, John, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley, 1973).Google Scholar For a general argument regarding elite-public interactions, see Joseph, Paul, Realizing the Peace Dividend: The End of the Cold War and the Emergence of Progressive Politics (forthcoming), chap. 4.Google Scholar

¹⁰ For a discussion of the cleavages in U.S. public and elite opinion, see Mandel-baum, Michael and Schneider, William, “The New Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy,” in Oye, Kenneth et al., eds., Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World (New York: Longman, 1979), 34–90Google Scholar; and Wittkopf (fn. 1).

¹¹ For data regarding the U.S., see Graham (fn. 8); and Russett (fn. i), 57–65; regarding Western Europe, see Eichenberg (fn. 1), chap. 4; and Szabo, Stephen, “West European Public Perceptions of Security Issues” (Manuscript, prepared for the USIA, July 1988)Google Scholar; for Japan, see Bobrow (fn. 4).

¹² For a similar argument focusing on the effects of party systems and electoral rules, see Eichenberg (fn. I), 235–41.

¹³ See, for example, Kitschelt, Herbert P., “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies,” British Journal of Political Science 16 (January 1986), 57–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Tarrow, Sidney, Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cycles of Protest (Ithaca, N.Y.: Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 1989).Google Scholar For an overview, see Meyer, David, “Peace Movements and National Security Policy: An Agenda for Study” (Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Ga., August 31-September 3, 1989).Google Scholar

¹⁴ The concept was originally developed by Katzenstein, Peter, “International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States,” International Organization 30 (Winter 1976), 1–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Krasner, Stephen, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials, Investments, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).Google Scholar For more recent discussions, see Mastanduno, Michael et al., “Toward a Realist Theory of State Action,” International Studies Quarterly 33 (December 1989), 457–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and John Ikenberry, G., “Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Economic Policy,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), 219–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁵ See, for example, John Ikenberry, G., “The Irony of State Strength: Comparative Responses to the Oil Shocks in the 1970s,” International Organization 40 (Winter 1986), 105–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also the special edition of International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), “Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy.”

¹⁶ Gourevitch, Peter, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization 32 (Autumn 1978), 881–911CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 904.

¹⁷ For coalition-building approaches, see, e.g., Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, Amerikanische Auβenpolitik (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1979)Google Scholar; Hagan, Joe D., “Regimes, Political Oppositions, and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy,” in Hermann, C. F. et al., eds., New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 339–65Google Scholar; Milner, Helen, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988)Google Scholar; Risse-Kappen, Thomas, Die Krise der Sicherheitspolitik Neuorientierungen und Entscheidungsprozesse im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1977–984 (Mainz-Munich: Griinewald-Kaiser, 1988)Google Scholar; and Rogowski, Ronald, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).Google Scholar

¹⁸ See Hagan (fn. 17).

¹⁹ See Gourevitch, Peter, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Katzenstein, Peter, “Introduction” and “Conclusion,” in Katzenstein, , ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 3–22Google Scholar, 295–336; and idem, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985).

²⁰ For the concept of “democratic corporatism,” see Katzenstein, Peter, Corporatism and Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984)Google Scholar; and Katzenstein (fn. 19, 1985). See also Schmitter, Philippe and Lehmbruch, Gerhard, eds., Trends towards Corporatist Intermediation (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979).Google Scholar

²¹ See Wright, Vincent, The Government and Politics of France (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978).Google Scholar On the role of the bureaucracy in French foreign policy, see Hayne, Mark B., “The Quai d'Orsay and the Formation of French Foreign Policy in Historical Context,” in Aldrich, Robert and Connell, John, eds., France in World Politics (London: Routledge, 1989), 194–218.Google Scholar

²² See Grosser, Alfred, Affaires extérieures: La politique de la France, 1944–10.84 (Paris: Flam-marion, 1984), 151–54.Google Scholar For a critical analysis of the institutions of French foreign policy, see Cohen, Samy, La monarchic nucléaire: Les coulisses de la politique étrangère sous La V’ Répu-blique (Paris: Hachette, 1986).Google Scholar

²³ See Drifte, Reinhold, Japan's Foreign Policy (London: Chatham House Papers, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990), 21–24Google Scholar; Fukui, Haruhiro, “Policy-making in the Japanese Foreign Ministry,” in Scalapino, R. A., ed., The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 3–35Google Scholar; and Sigur, Gaston J., “Power, Politics, and Defense,” in Buck, J. H., ed., The Modem Japanese Military System (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1975), 181–95.Google Scholar

²⁴ For details, see Baerwald, Hans, “The Diet and Foreign Policy,” in Scalapino (fn. 23), 37–54Google Scholar; and Welfield, John, An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System (London: Athlone Press, 1988).Google Scholar

²⁵ See Haftendorn, Helga, ed., Verwaltete Aufienpolitik (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1978)Google Scholar; and Blechman, Barry et al., The Silent Partner: West Germany and Arms Control (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), 27–60.Google Scholar On the German domestic structure in general, see Katzenstein, Peter, Policy and Politics in West Germany (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989).Google Scholar

²⁶ In particular, the proportionate vote combined with the provision that a party has to gain at least 5% of the votes nationwide in order to be represented in the Parliament.

²⁷ Thus, unlike the U.S. case, where hawks and doves are usually represented along bureaucratic roles, the party affiliation of the minister determines the policy direction of the Foreign Office as compared with that of the Ministry of Defense.

²⁸ After all, the strong state institutions of the Fifth Republic were intended to counterbalance the divisions of French society. See Ashford, Douglas E., Policy and Politics in France: Living with Uncertainty (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982).Google Scholar

²⁹ See Godt, Paul, ed., Policy-making in France: From de Gaulle to Mitterrand (London: Pinter, 1989).Google Scholar

³⁰ Data for 1979–83 are in Eichenberg (fn. 1), 186–87. For further evidence, see Eichenberg, 68, 141, 147, 189.

³¹ See Howorth, Jolyon, France: The Politics of Peace (London: Merlin Press, 1984).Google Scholar

³² For data, see Bobrow (fn. 4); and Stockwin, James A. A., “Japanese Public Opinion and Policies on Security and Defence,” in Dore, Ronald and Sinha, Radha, eds., Japan and World Depression (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 111–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³³ For details, see Drifte, Reinhold, Arms Production in Japan (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), 21–29Google Scholar; Kai, Fabig, Japan: Wirtschaftsriese—Rüstungszwerg (Bochum: Studienver-lag Brockmeyer, 1984)Google Scholar; and Welfield (fn. 24), 434–41.

³⁴ Wittkopf, (fn. 1), 34–36, 44–49.Google Scholar In fact, the ideological cleavages are deeper than those in the sociodemographic realm. See also Rattinger (fn. 6).

³⁵ On the U.S. armaments industry, see, e.g., Adams, Gordon, The Politics of Defense Contracting: The Iron Triangle (New York: Council on Economic Priorities, 1981)Google Scholar; Hampson, Fen O., Un-guided Missiles: How America Buys Its Weapons (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989)Google Scholar; on the U.S. peace movements, see Meyer, David S., A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics (New York: Praeger, 1990)Google Scholar; and McCrea, Frances B. and Markle, Gerald E., Minutes to Midnight: Nuclear Weapons Protest in America (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1989).Google Scholar

³⁶ For the 1980s, see Risse-Kappen (fn. 17). For the 1950s, see Cioc, Marc, Pax Atomica: The Nuclear Defense Debate in West Germany during the Adenauer Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).Google Scholar

³⁷ This, at least, is the finding of various studies. See, for example, Rosen, Stephen, ed., Testing the Theory of the Military Industrial Complex (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973)Google Scholar; Krell (fn. 1); and Müller (fn. 1). On the military procurement process, see Hampson (fn.35).

³⁸ See LePrestre, Phillippe G., “Lessons of Cohabitation,” in LePrestre, , ed., French Security Policy in a Disarming World (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 15–47.Google Scholar

³⁸ See Philippe G. LePrestre, “Lessons of Cohabitation,” in LePrestre, ed., French Security Howorth, and Chilton, Patricia, eds., Defence and Dissent in Contemporary France (London: Croom Helm, 1984).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ A content analysis of party and government documents for 1977–84 showed that “international cooperation” was by far the most frequently mentioned foreign policy objective. See Risse-Kappen (fn. 17).

⁴¹ On the importance of consensus building in Japanese politics and particularly in foreign policy, see Ishida, Takeshi, Japanese Political Culture (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1983), 3–22Google Scholar; Mendel, Douglas, “Public Views of the Japanese Defense System,” in Buck (fn. 23), 150Google Scholar; and Scalapino, (fn. 23), xv–xviii.Google Scholar

⁴² See, for example, Pempel, T. J., Politics and Policy in Japan: Creative Conservatism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982).Google Scholar For a critique of this analysis evaluating public policy in Japan as a more open process, see Calder, Kent, Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949–1986 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).Google Scholar

⁴³ See Drifte (fn. 33).

⁴⁴ The following data are taken from a variety of opinion polls. Although I have tried to use as many comparable data as possible, the wording of questions sometimes differed considerably from country to country. As a result, a note of caution is appropriate regarding the interpretation of these data. For example, I will refrain from analyzing minor changes in percentage. Also, I can only present here data on the aggregate level of overall mass public opinion. For comprehensive studies with breakdowns according to age, education, and political orientation, see Eichenberg (fn. 1); and Wittkopf (fn. 1).

⁴⁵ Data in Hastings, and Hastings, , eds., Index to International Public Opinion, 1987–1988 (New York: Greenwood, 1989), 574.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Data on support for nuclear arms control are taken from various U.S. polls on file at the Yale Public Opinion Research Project, New Haven.

⁴⁷ See Nincic, , “The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Politics of Opposites,” World Politics 40 (July 1988), 452–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and idem, “U.S. Soviet Policy and the Electoral Connection,” World Politics 42 (April 1990), 370–96. However, the “politics of opposites” seems to be a unique U.S. phenomenon. A similar cycle is not observable in the three other countries.

⁴⁸ See data in Flynn, Gregory, Public Images of Western Security (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1985), 65.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Data in Hastings, and Hastings, , eds., Index to International Public Opinion, 1984–1985 (New York: Greenwood, 1986), 237.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ For data on Ostpolitik, see Noelle-Neuman, Elisabeth and Piel, Edgar, eds., Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoshppie 1978–1983 (Munich: Saur, 1983), 637Google Scholar; on nuclear arms control, see various USIA polls, quoted in Szabo (fn. 11).

⁵¹ Data in Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth, “Wenn das Gefiihl der Bedrohung schwindet,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 22, 1988.Google Scholar In comparison, about 80 percent of the American public rejected such unilateral steps during the 1980s; data according to Roper and other U.S. polls, on file at the Yale Public Opinion Research Project, New Haven.

⁵¹ For this explanation, see Munton, Don, “NATO up against the Wall: Changing Security Attitudes in Germany, Britain, and Canada” (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., April 1990).Google Scholar

⁵³ For data regarding the perception of U.S. policies, see Szabo (fn. 11).

⁵⁴ This consideration would also explain why Nincic's “politics of opposites” (fn. 47, 1988) was not observable in Western Europe and Japan. The model is based on a pattern of attitudes in which the perception of Soviet foreign policy still dominates the preferences for specific security policies.

⁵⁵ See Page and Shapiro (fn. 3). Note, however, that the study does not prove the bottom-up model. It correlates public opinion data with policy outcomes and does not control for the impact of elite opinion. It would be consistent with the data to assume, for example, that elite opinion changed first and then affected the general public, which in turn led to policy changes.

⁵⁶ On the latter, see Kampelmann, Max, ed., Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984)Google Scholar; and Sanders, Jerry W., Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger (Boston: South End Press, 1983).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ For details, see Kubbig, Bernd W., Amerikanische Rüstungskpntrollpolitik: Die innergesell-schaftlichen Kräfteverhältnisse in der ersten Amtszeit Reagans (1981–1985) (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1988)Google Scholar; and Posen, Barry and Evera, Stephen Van, “Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration: Departure from Containment,” International Security 8 (Summer 1983), 3–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The best account of U.S. nuclear arms control policy during Reagan's first term is Talbot, Strobe, Deadly Gambits (New York: Knopf, 1984).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ The most comprehensive account of the freeze movement is Meyer (fn. 35).

⁵⁹ For details, see Talbot, Strobe, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Arms Race (New York: Knopf, 1988).Google Scholar See also Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, “U.S. Policy towards the Soviet Union under Carter, Reagan, and Bush” (Paper presented to the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., April 10–14, 1990)Google Scholar; and Joseph (fn. 9), chap. 5.

⁶⁰ This account is based largely on newspaper articles. See, e.g., “Cheney Remarks on Soviet Future Ruffle the White House's Feathers,” New York Times, may 1, 1989; “Bush Asks an End to Divided Europe,” New York Times, June 1, 1989; and “Bush Policy Makers Reach Uneasy Balance on an Approach to the Soviets,” New York Times, July 2, 1989.

⁶¹ See Grosser, (fn. 22), 161–72.Google Scholar

⁶² For details, see Cohen (fn. 22); Grosser (fn. 22); Howorth (fn. 31); and Aldrich and Connell (fn. 21).

⁶³ For details, see Cohen (fn. 22); Friend, Julius W., Seven Years in France (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), 75–81Google Scholar; and Tatu, Michel, “Valéry Giscard d'Estaing et la détente,” in Cohen, Samy and Smouts, Marie Claude, eds., La politique extérieure de Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (Paris: Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1985), 196–217.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ In addition, there were historical reasons for the isolation of the French peace movement. The notion of pacifism was identified with the politics of appeasement in the 1930s, and the largest French peace movement, the Mouvement de la Paix, was never able to distance itself convincingly from the Communist Party. For details, see Howorth and Chilton (fn.39).

⁶⁵ In this particular case, Mitterrand was apparently influenced by public opinion not only in France but also in West Germany and by the fear that rejection of zero INF would lead to German neutralism. Cf. Howorth, Jolyon, “Consensus and Mythology: Security Alternatives in Post-Gaullist France,” in Aldrich and Connell (fn. 21), 16–34Google Scholar; and LePrestre (fn. 38).

⁶⁶ See Eichenberg, (fn. 1), 222–24.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See Cerny, Philip G., “Gaullism, Nuclear Weapons, and the State,” in Howorth and Chilton (fn. 39), 46–74Google Scholar; and David Hanley, “The Parties and the Nuclear Consensus,” ibid., 75–93. On the institutional uncertainty of the French system as a dominant feature of the country's policy network, see Ashford (fn. 28).

⁶⁸ “Independence,” for example, was understood in an anti-Soviet sense by the French conservatives, in an anti-American way by the Left, and in a neutralist sense by nationalists at both ends of the political spectrum.

⁶⁹ For details, see Baring, Arnulf, Am Anfang war Adenauer: Die Entstehung der Kanzler-demokjratie (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1971)Google Scholar; Cioc (fn. 36); and Rupp, Hans-Karl, Aufierparlamentarische Opposition in der Ara Adenauer (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1970).Google Scholar

⁷⁰ For details, see Haftendorn, Helga, Sicherheit und Entspannung: Zur Aufienpolitilk der Bundesrepublik Deutschhnd, 10.55–1982 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1983)Google Scholar; Hanrieder, Wolfram F., Germany, America, Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 170–219CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Clemens, Clay, Reluctant Realists: The Christian Democrats and West German Ostpolitik (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1989)Google Scholar; and Hacke, Christian, Die Ostund Deutschlandpolitilk der CDU/CSU (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1975).Google Scholar

⁷¹ For details, see Risse-Kappen (fn. 17), pt. B.

⁷² For the following, see details ibid. On the peace movements in particular, see Janning, Josef et al., eds., Friedensbewegungen (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1987)Google Scholar; and Rochon, Thomas, The Politics of the Peace Movement in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).Google Scholar

⁷³ For analyses of these changes, see Baker, Kendall et al., Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the New Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981)Google Scholar; Barnes, Samuel et al., Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979)Google Scholar; Brand, Karl-Werner et al., Aufbruch in eine andere Gesellschaft: Neue soziale Bewegun-gen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschhnd (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1983)Google Scholar; and Stoss, Richard, ed., Parteien-Handbuch, 2 vols. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1983–1984).Google Scholar

⁷⁴ See, for example, Chapman, J. W. M., Drifte, R., and Gow, I. T. M., Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982)Google Scholar; Scalapino (fn. 23); and Welfield (fn. 24).

⁷⁵ In March 1983, 72% of Japanese were worried about Nakasone's defense policy; 48% disagreed with his remarks about the “unsinkable aircraft carrier.” While public opposition to Nakasone's policies declined somewhat over the years, he was nevertheless unable to change the prevailing trends. For data, see Hastings, and Hastings, , eds., Index to International Public Opinion, 1982–1983 (New York: Greenwood, 1984), 316.Google Scholar For analyses of Japanese foreign policies during the 1980s, see, e.g., Drifte (fn. 23); idem, Japan's Rise to International Responsibilities (London: Athlone Press, 1990); and Mclntosh, Malcolm, Japan Re-Armed (London: Frances Pinter, 1986).Google Scholar

⁷⁶ See details in Drifte, (fn. 75, 1990), 48–58.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ I thank Nobuo Okawara for pointing this out to me. See also Calder (fn. 42), 463. The most recent domestic turmoil in Japan on how to deal with the crisis and the war in the Persian Gulf confirms the analysis that mass public opinion severely contrains the country's ruling conservative coalition.

⁷⁸ This proved to be a major limitation of this study, particularly in the French case. The prevailing realist paradigm in international relations and the focus of most studies on elites do not encourage scholars to trace the impact of public opinion and societal actors on decisions in detail.