Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa

Diversified FRAND Enforcement and TRIPS Integrity

  • WENWEI GUAN (a1)
Abstract
Abstract

As an integral part of the WTO trading regime and in line with the international trend of antitrust control, TRIPS harmonized intellectual property protection with competition in mind. However, diverse national FRAND enforcement practices that take either a contractual or an antitrust approach challenge TRIPS integrity. While personal property recognition for SEPs lends constitutional support to the contractual approach to FRAND enforcement, private property's in-built limitation warrants a balance with the antitrust approach for needs from others. A critical examination of the TRIPS conclusion and the analytical structure of TRIPS provisions reveal that TRIPS obligation against anticompetitive practices is imperative. The imbalance of harmonized TRIPS with un-harmonized FRAND practices reflects TRIPS birth defect and challenges TRIPS integrity. To improve balance of rights and obligations in international trade and to ensure innovation and technology dissemination that is conducive to social and economic welfare, the paper calls for a contract–antitrust balanced approach to FRAND enforcement and the resumption of WTO's competition negotiations.

Copyright
Corresponding author
*Email: w.guan@cityu.edu.hk.
Footnotes
Hide All

This research was partially supported by a Strategic Research Grant from the City University of Hong Kong (Project No.: 7004790). The author would like to thank Editor Prof. L. Alan Winters of the World Trade Review, an anonymous member of the Editorial Board, and two anonymous reviewers for their extensive and constructive comments on the earlier drafts of the paper. The author is very grateful for the support.

Footnotes
References
Hide All

1 The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC), ‘The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition’ (March 2011), 191, https://www.ftc.gov/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-remedies-competition (accessed 16 June 2016).

2 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2012); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-cv- 178-bbc, 2011 WL 7324582, at *1 (W.D.Wis. 2011).

3 US Department of Justice (DOJ) and US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), ‘Policy Statement on Remedies for Standard-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments’, 8 January 2013 (thereafter, Policy Statement), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/09/18/290994.pdf (accessed 16 May 2016).

4 European Commission, ‘Competition Policy Brief’ (2014), 1, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2014/008_en.pdf (accessed 26 May 2016).

5 European Commission,  ‘Competition Policy Brief’, 3.

6 Ibid., 2.

7 Contreras Jorge L., ‘Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based Patent Licensing’, 79.1 Antitrust Law Journal (2013), 4748 . See also, Sternberg Daniel S., ‘A Brief History of RAND’, 20.2 Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law (2014), 234.

8 Drahos Peter, ‘China, the TPP and Intellectual Property’, 47.1 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law (2016), 14 .

9 See, e.g., Contreras, ‘Fixing FRAND’; Contreras Jorge L., ‘A Market Reliancd Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges’, 479 Utah Law Review (2015); Kesan Jay P. and Hayes Carol M., ‘FRAND's Forever: Standards,Patent Transfers, and Licensing Commitments’, 89 Indiana Law Journal (2014); Ginsburg Douglas H., Wong-Ervin Koren W., and Wright Joshua D., ‘The Troubling Use of Antitrust to Regulate FRAND Licensing’, 10,1 CPI Antitrust Chronicle (2015).

10 Kesan and Hayes, ‘FRAND's Forever’, 262–285.

11 Ibid., 313.

12 Contreras, ‘A Market Reliancd Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges’, 558.

13 PRC Communication to the WTO TBT Committee: Intellectual Property Right (IPR) Issues in Standardization (G/TBT/W/251, 25 May 2005).

14 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, ‘Trade Policy Review: China, Minutes of Meeting Addendum’ (WT/TPR/M/199/Add.1, 28 August 2008), 192–193.

15 Ibid., 192.

16 Janow Merit E., ‘Trade and Competition Policy’, in Macrory Patrick F.J., Appleton Arthur E., and Plummer Michael G. (eds.), The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis (New York: Springer, 2005), 488.

17 Ibid., 499–500.

18 Lloyd P. J., ‘Anti-Dumping and Competition Law’, in Macrory Patrick F.J., Appleton Arthur E., and Plummer Michael G. (eds.), The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis (New York: Springer, 2005), 6970 .

19 Articles 15.3 and 15.5 of the SCM Agreement.

20 Articles 3.3 and 3.5 of the ADA.

21 Articles 5(c), 6.3(a), and 6.3(b), ADA.

22 Aggarwal Aradhna, The Anti-Dumping Agreement and Developing Countries: An Introduction (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 4965 .

23 The Antidumping Act of 1916 is the Title VIII (‘Unfair Competition’) of the Act entitled ‘An Act to Increase the Revenue and for Other Purposes’ approved 8 September 1916 (15 USC 72, 39 Stat. 756). The Act had heritage in competition law, mainly from the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 and the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894. It is repealed by Section 2006 to the Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 2004 (H.R. 1047, P. L. 108–429) which was signed into law by President Bush on 3 December 2004.

24 During the negotiations to establish the International Trade Organization, the US proposed an antidumping draft based on its Antidumping Act of 1921, which set out the basis for Article VI of the GATT 1947. See US House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means, Overview and Compilation of US Trade Statues 2013 (January 2013), at 101. See also Aggarwal, The Anti-Dumping Agreement and Developing Countries: An Introduction, 52–54.

25 Articles IX(1) and (2), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Of course, this concerns only service-related anti-competitive practices.

26 See Stiglitz Joseph E., The Roaring Nineties: A New History of the World's Most Prosperous Decade (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), 208.

27 The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (concluded in 1883, as amended in 1967, the Paris Convention). The Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19 of the Paris Convention 1967 are incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement by Article 2(1).

28 Article 5.A(2), the Paris Convention.

29 Article 10bis(1), the Paris Convention.

30 Articles 10bis(2) and(3), the Paris Convention.

31 Chapter 4, Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology (1985).

32 Article 2.1, the TRIPS Agreement.

33 Article 7, the TRIPS Agreement.

34 Article 8.1, the TRIPS Agreement.

35 European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs (EC–Trademarks and Geographical Indications), Panel report (WT/DS174/R, 15 March 2005), para. 7.210.

36 Article 27.2, the TRIPS Agreement.

37 See para. 19, Ministerial Declaration, adopted at the Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference at Doha on 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1.

38 Paragraph 5(a), the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, adopted at the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar on 14 November 2001, the 2001 Doha Declaration).

39 Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Canada–Pharmaceutical Patents), Panel Report (WT/DS114/R, 17 March 2000), para. 7.26.

40 Article 8.2, the TRIPS Agreement.

41 Article 40.1, the TRIPS Agreement.

42 Article 40.2, the TRIPS Agreement.

43 Article 30, the TRIPS Agreement.

44 Article 31, the TRIPS Agreement.

45 Article 31(k), the TRIPS Agreement.

46 Article 31(l), the TRIPS Agreement. See also, Section 24, German Patent Act (came into effect in 1998).

47 Article 31(l), the TRIPS Agreement.

48 Ginsburg, Wong-Ervin, and Wright, ‘The Troubling Use of Antitrust to Regulate FRAND Licensing’, 2.

49 Ibid., 6.

50 See, e.g., Research in Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F.Supp.2d 788, 797 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 3 October 2013); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10–1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 25 April 2013), aff'd 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1083–84 (W.D. Wis. 2012); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999–1001 (W.D. Wash. 2012), reaffirmed, 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1030–33 (W.D. Wash. 2012), aff'd in relevant part, 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012).

51 Ginsburg, Wong-Ervin, and Wright, ‘The Troubling Use of Antitrust to Regulate FRAND Licensing’, 6.

52 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1083 (W.D. Wis. 2012).

53 Ibid., 1083–1084.

54 See Brooks Roger G. and Geradin Damien, ‘Interpreting and Enforcing the Voluntary FRAND Commitment’, 9.1 International Journal of IT Standards and Standardization Research (2011), 123 ; Geradin Damien, ‘The Meaning of “Fair and Reasonable” in the Context of Third-Party Determination of FRAND Terms’, 21.4 Georgy Mason Law Review (2014), 921.

55 See, e.g., ESS Technology, Inc. v. PC–Tel., Inc., 1999 WL 33520483, *4 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. 854 F.Supp.2d 993, 997 (W.D. Wash. 2012); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1087 (W.D. Wis. 2012); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F.Supp.2d, 1023, 1030–1033 (W.D. Wash. 2012); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012). It should be noted that the ‘third party beneficiary’ approach might not be recognized in other jurisdictions, such as in Germany (see, Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 2012)) and in South Korea (see, Cotter Thomas F., ‘Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND Royalties’, Texas Intellectul Property Law Journal 22.3 (2014): 319 (footnote 30)).

56 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012).

57 It should be made clear that this is a popular, yet not universally accepted view of the nature of FRAND commitments. Some commentators argue – indeed quite convincingly – that SSO FRAND policy ‘is not a contract’. See Contreras, ‘A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges’, 506 (particularly the analysis’ reference to the Interdigital ITC Initial Determination case and the True Position case). This diversity of views is indeed the key controversy driving the current paper's argument for a balance between contractual (private) and antitrust (public) measures in FRAND terms enforcement.

58 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 US 388, 394 (2006).

59 Moreover, the FTC stated that ‘[p]atent hold-up risks harming competition, innovation, and consumers’. See the US FTC, ‘Interest of Amicus Curiae’, filed to US Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir. (Nos. 2012–1548, 2012–1549), 4 December 2012, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy/amicus-briefs/2012/12/apple-inc-and-next-software-inc-v-motorola-inc-and-motorola (assess 16 May 2016).

60 Cotter, ‘Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND Royalties’, 320.

61 US DOJ and USPTO, Policy Statement, 6.

62 Ibid., 7.

63 Cotter, ‘Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND Royalties’, 327–332.

64 TiVo v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 670 (E.D. Tex. 2006). For references of 19 other post-eBay cases in the similar position, see FTC, The Evolving IP Marketplace, 270, footnote 97.

65 Cotter, ‘Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND Royalties’, 332.

66 US ITC, Notice of Final Determination, In the Matter of Certain Electronic Devices, Inv. No. 337-TA-794 (4 June 2013).

67 See Letter from Michael B. G. Froman, Executive Office of the President of the US Trade Representative, to the Honorable Irving A. Williamson, Chairman, US International Trade Commission (3 August 2013), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/08032013%20Letter_1.PDF (accessed 21 May 2016).

68 European Commission, ‘Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to the Horizontal Co-Operation Agreement’ (OJ C 11/01, 14.1.2011), para. 287.

69 European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Samsung on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents’ (Press Release, Brussels, 21 December 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1448_en.htm (assessed 18 May 2016).

70 See IMS Health GmbH & Co. v. Commc'n, para. 49, case C-418/01 (2004 E.C.R. I-5069.). See also Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commc'n,, C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P (1995 E.C.R. I-808).

71 Huawei v. ZTE, case C-170/13 (16 July 2015), para. 47.

72 Ibid., paras. 53, 54. According to the ECJ, ‘the irrevocable undertaking’ of FRAND ‘justif[ies] the imposition on that proprietor of an obligation to comply with specific requirements when bringing actions against alleged infringers for a prohibitory injunction or for the recall of products’.  Accordingly, while the SEP holder is expected to alert and notify the alleged infringer of the infringement and offer a specific and written offer for a FRAND licence before seeking an injunctive relief, the alleged infringer must diligently respond with acceptance or counter-offer, and appropriate security if the counter-offer rejected. Ibid., paras. 59–61, 63, and 65–67.

73 Motorola v. Apple, 2012, Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe, Federal Republic of Germany, Case No. 6 U 136/11. See Maskus Keith and Merrill Stephen A. (eds.), Patent Challenges for Standard-Setting in the Global Economy: Lessons from Information and Communications Technology (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2013), 107.

74 IPCom v. Nokia and HTC [2012] EWCA Civ 567; Samsung v. Apple District Court of The Hague, 20 June 2012, case numbers/docket numbers 400367/HA ZA 11-2212, 400376/HA ZA 11-2213, and 400385/HA ZA 11-2215.

75 Sternberg, ‘A Brief History of RAND’, 238 (in-text note omitted).

76 Sections 24.1 and 85.1, German Patent Act.

77 Herr Jochen, ‘Patent Litigation and Industry Standards: The Compulsory License Defense’, 21.1 Intellectual Property and Technology Law Journal (2009), 11 (in-text notes omitted).

78 Sternberg, ‘A Brief History of RAND’, 238.

79 Ibid. In Australia, too, where the SEPs holder is in contravention of the Competition and Consumer Act, a license can be sought under the compulsory licensing provisions in Australian Patents Act. See, Productivity Commission, Australia, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patents’ (28 March 2013), 102–103. This is the final report of the Public Inquiry by Productivity Commission that was entrusted by the Australian Government, http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/patents/report/patents.pdf  (accessed 18 May 2016).

80 Sokol D. Daniel and Zheng Wentong, ‘FRAND in China’, Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal 22 (2013); Zhang Guangliang, ‘Enforcement of F/RAND and Antitrust Intervention: Discussion from the Huawei Decisions in China’, 2.3 China Legal Science (2014); Wang Elizabeth X. R. and Foster Harry, ‘An Economic Perspective of Standards and FRAND Enforcement in China’, 3.suppl_1 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement (2015).

81 See Zhang, ‘Enforcement of F/RAND and Antitrust Intervention: Discussion from the Huawei Decisions in China’, 6–9.

82 PRC Supreme People's Court, ‘Letter of Reply on Whether Chaoyang Xingnuo Co. Infringed on a SEP included in a Ministry of Construction Standard when it Implemented the Patent’ (8 July 2008). Of course, according to the Supreme Court (ibid.), the SEPs holder may ask users to pay a royalty fee, yet the amount of the royalty should be substantially lower than the normal amount.

83 PRC Supreme People's Court, ‘Interpretations on Several Issues relating to Law Application in Adjudication of Patent Infringement Disputes II’, Articles 24.1 and 24.2 (Fashi[2016]1, 25 January 2016, came into effect as of 1 April 2016). Moreover, the SEPs holder and implementers can negotiate license conditions, or apply for court's determination on FRAND terms in the absence of an agreement. Ibid. Article 24.3.

84 China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)’s investigation against InterDigital in June 2013, for example, shows a clear antitrust preference. NDRC dropped its investigation against InterDigital without a fine in May 2014 upon InterDigital's commitment to change its licensing practices to be FRAND consistent.  See InterDigital, ‘China's NDRC Accepts InterDigital's Commitments and Suspends Its Investigation’ (22 May 2014), http://ir.interdigital.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=849959 (accessed 25 May 2016).

85 Standardization Administration of China and the State Intellectual Property Office, ‘Interim Provisions on the Administration of National Standards Involving Patents’, Articles 9 and 10 (issued on 19 December 2013, came into effect on 1 January 2014).

86 PRC State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), ‘Rules on Prohibiting Behaviors of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Eliminate or Restricting Competition’, Article 13 (7 April 2015 [2015]74).

87 China committed during the 7th US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in 2015. See 2015 US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Joint US–China Fact Sheet (Economic Track), US Department of Treasury, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0092.aspx (accessed 28 May 2016).

88 UNCTAD, ‘Competition Policy and the Exercise of Intellectual Property’ (TD/B/COM.2/CLP/68, 15 May 2008), para. 8.

89 Articles 38.1(c) and 38.1(d), Statute of the International Court of Justice.

90 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006). See also, UK Patents Act 1977, s. 30(1).

91 4th Recital of the Preamble, the TRIPS Agreement.

92 China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (China–Intellectual Property Rights), Panel Report (WT/DS362/R, 26 January 2009), para. 7.247.

93 EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Panel), para. 7.602, and footnote 558 to para. 7.611 (emphasis added).

94 Ibid., para. 7.210. Emphasis added.

95 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006).

96 Ibid., 395. Emphasis original.

97 Bentham, for example, argues that ‘[p]roperty and law are born together, and die together’. See Bentham J., Theory of Legislation (London: TrüBner & Co., 1871), 113.

98 Hayek F. A., The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (London: Routledge, 1988), 63.

99 Pipes R., Property and Freedom (Alfred A. Knopf. 1999).

100 Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, 30–31. According to Hayek, the adoption of private property ‘marks the beginning of civilization’.

101 Hegel G. W. G., The Philosophy of Right, trans. Knox T. M. (Oxford University Press, 1967), §§ 4 and 51. The references are to the numbered paragraphs of Hegel's text. According to Hegel (§41), ‘[a] person must translate his freedom into an external sphere in order to exist as Idea’.

102 Locke John, The Second Treatise of Government (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1997), §§ 25, 27. The references are to the numbered paragraphs of Locke's text.

103 From legal right's autonomy, to self-sufficiency, to self-alienation, see Carty Anthony, ‘From the Right to Economic Self-Determination to the Right to Development: A Crisis in Legal Theory’, Third World Legal Studies (1984), 76.

104 Ibid. at, §§51, 53.

105 Maine Henry S., Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society and Its Relation to Modern Ideas (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1906), 188, 97.

106 Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, §§ 72–74.

107 See, e.g. Article 2.1, German Basic Law; Article 5.1, Greek Constitution.

108 Pound Roscoe, ‘Liberty of Contract’, 18.7 Yale Law Journal (1909), 456457 .

109 Article 1134(1), French Civil Code.

110 Mayer David N., ‘Substantive Due Process Rediscovered: The Rise and Fall of Liberty of Contract’, 60 Mercer Law Review (2009), 572.

111 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006).

112 Ibid. Internal footnotes omitted.

113 Ibid.

114 Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, § 37.

115 Ibid., § 31.

116 Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, § 53.

117 Ibid., §51.

118 Pound, ‘Liberty of Contract’, 455.

119 Ibid. 457.

120 Kessler Friedrich, ‘Contracts of Adhesion – Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract’, 43 Columbia Law Review (1943), 640.

121 Ibid. 641.

122 Corbin Arthur L, Corbin on Contracts: A Comprehensive Treatise on the Working Rules of Contract Law, vol. IV (St Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1951), § 959, footnote 1.

123 Ibid.

124 Article 7, TRIPS Agreement.

125 Articles 8(1) and 8(2), TRIPS Agreement.

126 Similar to exceptions to patent rights provided in Article 30 (see discussion supra in the main text associated with footnote 69 in section III.A), the TRIPS regime also provides exceptions to copyrights in Article 13, exceptions to trademark rights in Article 17, and exceptions to industrial designs in Article 26(2) of the TRIPS Agreement.

127 China – Intellectual Property Rights (Panel), paras. 7.131–7.132. Under the context of discussion of the tension between government's sovereign exception and exercise of private IPRs, the Panel spelt out WTO's conformity to WIPO's interpretation of the sovereign exception that authors may exercise their copyrights ‘only if that exercise does not conflict with public order’.

128 Oxford English Dictionary, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/balance (accessed 23 May 2016).

129 UNCTAD, ‘Competition Policy and the Exercise of Intellectual Property’, para. 6.

130 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), ‘IP and Competition Policy’, http://www.wipo.int/ip-competition/en/ (accessed 19 December 2015).

131 The US DOJ and FTC, ‘Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property’ (jointly issued on 6 April 1995), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/0558.pdf (accessed 27 May 2016).

132 UNCTAD, ‘Competition Policy and the Exercise of Intellectual Property’, executive summary.

133 See China – Intellectual Property Rights (Panel), paras. 7.135–7.140.

134 Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents (Panel), para. 8.1. In this case, the stockpiling provision that permitted producers of generic drugs to make and start stockpiling the drugs six months prior to the expiration of the patent was found to be inconsistent with Canada's obligations under TRIPS. The judgment was criticized as indicating the Panel's ‘myopic focus on the interests of the rights-holder’ without regard to the policy goals or purpose of the patent reception. See Trebilcock M. J. and Howse R., The Regulation of International Trade (London: Routledge, 2005), 418421 .

135 Dreier Thomas, ‘Balancing Proprietary and Public Domain Interests: Inside or Outside of Proprietary Rights?’, in Dreyfuss Rochelle Cooper, Zimmerman Diane leenheer, and First Harry (eds.), Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 295.

136 Ibid., 297.

137 Ricupero Rubens and Ortiz Ricardo Melendez, ‘Preface’, in UNCTAD-ICTSD (eds.), Resource Book on TRIPS and Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), vii.

138 Ibid.

139 Yu Peter K., ‘The Objectives and Principles of the Trips Agreement’, 46.4 Houston Law Review (2009), 982.

140 UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3.

141 Ibid. at, 3–4. See also, Yu, ‘The Objectives and Principles of the Trips Agreement’, 983–984.

142 Gervais Daniel J., ‘Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: The State of Play’, 74.2 Fordham Law Review (2005), 507508 .

143 Suggestion by the United States for Achieving the Negotiating Objective (Revision), United States Proposal for Negotiations on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (MTN.GNG/NG11/W/14/Rev.1, 17 October 1988), 3.

144 Ibid., 18.

145 Indian submission, ‘Standards and Principles concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights’ (MTN.GNG/NG11/W/37, 10 July 1989), Communication from India to Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods.

146 Ibid., 2.

147 Ibid. India argued that this is ‘particularly important for developing countries’ as the intellectual property system has ‘wide ranging implications for their economic and social development’.

148 Ibid., 19–20.

149 See Gervais Daniel, The Trips Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 2nd edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003), 280; Roffe Pedro, ‘Control of Anti-Compettive Practices in Contractual Licences under the Trips Agreement’, in Correa Carlos M. and A. Abdulqawi (eds.), Yusuf Intellectual Property and International Trade: The Trips Agreement (London: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 279–80.

150 Communication from Peru, Guidelines for Negotiation that Strike a Balance between Intellectual Property Rights and Development Objectives (MTN.GNG/NG11/W/45, 27 October 1989).

151 UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, 4.

152 Gervais, ‘Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: The State of Play’, 508.

153 Chairman's report to the Group of Negotiation on Goods (MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76), 23 July 1990.

154 UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, 543–546.

155 Ibid., 462.

156 Article 5.A(2), Paris Convention.

157 UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, 463.

158 Indian submission, ‘Standards and Principles concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights’ (MTN.GNG/NG11/W/37, 10 July 1989).

159 Article 5.A(2), the Paris Convention.

160 The issue of licensing on grounds of non-working was addressed indirectly by Articles 27.1 and 70.6 of the Agreement. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, 467.

161 For more discussion on TRIPS ‘birth defect’, see Guan W., Intellectual Property Theory and Practice: A Critical Examination of China's TRIPS Compliance and Beyond (Heidelberg: Springer, 2014), 57 .

162 Para. 23, Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1), 20 November 2001.

163 United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), Public Goods for Economic Development (Vienna: UNIDO, 2008), 80.

164 See, for example, the coalition of developing countries known as the Like Minded Group (LMG)’s attempt to challenge the launch of the Doha Round negotiation. Narlikar Amrita, World Trade Organization: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 5455 . See also, Dinwoodie Graeme B. and Dreyfuss Rochelle C., ‘Designing a Global Intellectual Property System Responsive to Change: The WTO, WIPO, and Beyond’, 46.4 Houston Law Review (2009), 11881189 .

165 Article 32, 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT 1969). See also, Jennings Robert and Watts Authur, Oppenheim's International Law, 9th edn, vol. 1 (London: Longman, 1992), 1278.

166 UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, 543–544.

167 UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, 546.

168 Article 40.1, the TRIPS Agreement.

169 UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, 555.

170 Article 40.2, the TRIPS Agreement.

171 Article 40.3, the TRIPS Agreement.

172 Article 40.4, the TRIPS Agreement.

173 According to Article 4.2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), ‘[e]ach Member undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding any representations made by another Member concerning measures affecting the operation of any covered agreement taken within the territory of the former’.

174 Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut (Panel Report, WT/DS22/R, 17 October 1996), para. 287.

175 Article 4.7, DSU.

176 Article 3.2, DSU.

177 See, Sutherland Peter et al. , The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium (Geneva: WTO, 2004), para. 39.

178 WTO Secretariat, World Trade Report 2009: Trade Policy Commitments and Contingency Measures (Geneva: WTO, 2009), xiii.

179 Article 1.1, the TRIPS Agreement.

180 The original text correspondent to Article 40 included an extensive list of practices that might be considered as unlawful per se yet was replaced with a shorter and more open-ended text as current, due to industrialized countries’ objection because of the fear of the ‘risk of a ruling of per se illegality’. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, 545–546.

181 Jennings and Watts, Oppenheim's International Law, vol. 1, 82.

182 During the Uruguay round negotiation, the question of whether the WTO Agreement should be given direct effect attracted a great deal of attention among leading trade scholars. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, 23.

183 WTO Secretariat, ‘The WTO’, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm (accessed 16 April 2016).

184 Brand Ronald A., ‘Sovereignty: The State, the Individual, and the International Legal System in the Twenty First Century’, 25 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review (2002), 286287 .

185 United States – Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act 1974 (US – Section 301 Trade Act), Panel report (WT/DS152/R, 22 December 1999), para. 7.72.

186 Of course, the Panel in US – Section 301 Trade Act also emphasized that the statement was made as a matter of fact, and it is an issue of ‘internal constitutional principles’ and Panel's statement ‘does not prejudge any decisions by national courts on this issue’. Ibid. footnote 661 to para. 7.72. (emphasis added)

187 See the ‘doctrine of non-intervention’ as indicated in Article 2.7, the Charter of United Nations (UN Charter).

188 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006).

189 These issues are covered under Parts II, III, and IV of the TRIPS Agreement respectively.

190 de Carvalho Nuno Pires, The Trips Regime of Patent Rights, 3rd edn (The Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer, 2010), 223.

191 Article 1.1, the TRIPS Agreement.

192 According to Gervais, ‘Article 8 is thus essentially a policy statement that explains the rationale for measures taken under Arts 30, 31, and 40’. Gervais, The Trips Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 121.

193 Article XVI.4, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the WTO Agreement).

194 Article 24.12, GATT 1994. See, similarly, Article 18.4, the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.

195 Article 2.2, UN Charter; Articles 26 and 27, VCLT 1969.

196 Article 27, VCLT 1969.

197 See Article 1.1, the TRIPS Agreement; Jennings and Watts, Oppenheim's International Law, vol 1, 82.

198 Picht Peter, ‘From Transfer of Technology to Innovation through Access’, in Ullrich Hanns et al. (eds.), TRIPS Plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles (Heidelberg: Springer, 2016), 518.

This research was partially supported by a Strategic Research Grant from the City University of Hong Kong (Project No.: 7004790). The author would like to thank Editor Prof. L. Alan Winters of the World Trade Review, an anonymous member of the Editorial Board, and two anonymous reviewers for their extensive and constructive comments on the earlier drafts of the paper. The author is very grateful for the support.

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

World Trade Review
  • ISSN: 1474-7456
  • EISSN: 1475-3138
  • URL: /core/journals/world-trade-review
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 2
Total number of PDF views: 14 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 132 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between 26th April 2017 - 19th October 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.