Skip to main content Accesibility Help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
Cancel
×
×
Home
  • Home
Article
  • Access

European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (WT/DS246/AB/R)

  • Gene M. Grossman (a1) and Alan O. Sykes (a2)
Extract

The WTO case brought by India in 2002 to challenge aspects of the European Communities’ Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) brings fresh scrutiny to a policy area that has received little attention in recent years – trade preferences for developing countries. The idea for such preferences emerged from the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. The ensuing negotiations led to Resolution 21(ii) at the second session of UNCTAD in 1968, acknowledging “unanimous agreement” in favor of the establishment of preferential arrangements. Tariff discrimination violates the most-favored nation (MFN) obligation of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Art. I, however, and thus the legal authority for preferential tariff schemes had to await a GATT waiver of this obligation, which came in 1971. The waiver was to expire after 10 years, but the authority for preferences was extended by the GATT Contracting Parties Decision of November 28, 1979 on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, popularly known as the “Enabling Clause,” and now incorporated into the law of the WTO along with the GATT itself.

    •
      • Send article to Kindle

      To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

      Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

      Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

      European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (WT/DS246/AB/R)
      Available formats
      ×
      Send article to Dropbox

      To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

      European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (WT/DS246/AB/R)
      Available formats
      ×
      Send article to Google Drive

      To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

      European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (WT/DS246/AB/R)
      Available formats
      ×
Copyright
COPYRIGHT: © Cambridge University Press 2006
References
Hide All
K, Bagwell. and R. W, Staiger. (1999). An Economic Theory of GATT, American Economic Review 89, 215–248.
K, Bagwell. and R. W, Staiger. (2002). The Economics of The World Trading System, Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press.
K, Bagwell. and R. W, Staiger. (2004). Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Bilateral Opportunism and the Rules of GATT, Journal of International Economics 63,1–29.
A, Borrmann., C, Borrmann. and M, Steger. (1981). The EC’s Generalized System of Preferences, The Hague: Martinus Nijhof Publishers.
D. K, Brown. (1987). General Equilibrium Effects of the US Generalized System of Preferences, Southern Economic Journal 54,27–47.
D. K, Brown. (1989). Trade and Welfare Effects of the European Schemes of the Generalized System of Preferences, Economic Development and Cultural Change 37, 757–776.
D, Dollar. (1992). Outward-Oriented Developing Economies Really Do Grow More Rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDC’s, 1976–85, Economic Development and Cultural Change 40, 523–544.
S, Edwards. (1993). Openness, Trade Liberalization, ad Growth in Developing Countries, Journal of Economic Literature 31, 1358–1393.
J. M, Finger. and L. A, Winters. (1998). What Can the WTO Do for Developing Countries? In Krueger, A.O., ed., The WTO as an International Organization, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 365–392.
J. A, Frankel. and D, Romer. (1999). Does Trade Cause Growth, American Economic Review 89, 379–399.
G. M, Grossman. and P. C, Mavroidis. (2003). United States — Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom: Here Today, Gone Tomorrow? Privatization and the Injury Caused by Non-Recurring Subsidies. In Horn, H. and Mavroidis, P.C., eds., The WTO Case Law of 2001, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 170–200.
J. C, Hallak. and J. A, Levinsohn. (2004). Fooling Ourselves: Evaluating the Globalization and Growth Debate, NBER Working Paper No. 10244, Cambridge, MA.
R, Howse. (2003). India’s WTO Challenge to Drug Enforcement Conditions in the European Community Generalized System of Preferences: A Little Known Case with Major Repercussions for “Political” Conditionality in US Trade Policy, Chicago Journal ofInternational Law 4, 385–405.
G, Karsenty. and S, Laird. (1986). The Generalized System of Preferences: A Quantitative Assessment of the Direct Trade Effects and of Policy Options, UNCTAD Discussion Paper 18, UNCTAD, Geneva.
A, Keck. and P, Low. (2004). Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO: Why, When and How?, WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2004-03.
N, Limão. (2005). Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Evidence for the US, Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 4884, London UK.
C. R, MacPhee. and V. I, Oguledo. (1991). The Trade Effects of the US Generalized System of Preferences, Atlantic Economic Journal 19,19–26.
T, Murray. (1977). Trade Preferences for Developing Countries, New York: John Wiley and Sons.
OECD Secretary General, (1983). The Generalized System of Preferences: Review of the First Decade, Paris: Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development.
Ç, Özden. and E, Reinhardt. (2003). The Perversity of Preferences: GSP and Developing Country Trade Policies, 1976–2000, World Bank Working Paper 2955, The World Bank.
Rodíguez, F. and Rodrik, D. (2001). Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic’s Guide to Cross-National Evidence, NBER Macroeconomic Annual 15, 261–324.
Sachs, J. D. and Warner, A. M. (1995). Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 1–95.
Sapir, A. and Lundberg, L. (1984). The US Generalized System of Preferences and its Impacts. In Baldwin, R. E. and Krueger, A. O., eds., The Structure and Evolution of Recent US Trade Policy, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 195–231.
Schwartz, W. F. and Sykes, A. O. (1997). The Economics of the Most Favored Nation Clause. In Bhandani, J. S. and Sykes, A. O., eds., Economic Dimensions of International Law: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 34–79.
UNCTAD (1981). Operation and Effects ofthe Generalized System ofPreferences, Fifth Review, New York, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
UNCTAD (1999). Quantifying the Benefits Obtained by Developing Countries from the Generalized System ofPreferences, New York, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

World Trade Review
  • ISSN: 1474-7456
  • EISSN: 1475-3138
  • URL: /core/journals/world-trade-review
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *

CAPTCHA *

Skip to the audio challenge
×

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed

Cancel
Confirm
×