¹ See, e.g., Keller, Andrew N., Punishment for Violations of International Criminal Law: An Analysis of Sentencing at the ICTY and ICTR, 12 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 53, 53 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² See, e.g., Harmon, Mark B. & Gaynor, Fergal, Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes, 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 683, 694–96 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ See, e.g., Drumbl, Mark A., Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. Rev. 539, 549 (2005)Google Scholar.

⁴ See, e.g., Danner, Allison Marston, Constructinga Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. Rev. 415, 430 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schrag, Minna, Lessons Learned from ICTY Experience, 2 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 427, 428 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ See, e.g., Schabas, William A., Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach, 7 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 461, 516 (1997)Google Scholar; Meron, Theodor, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 AJIL 551, 578 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ Sloane, Robert D., The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 Stan. J. Int’l L. 39, 42 (2007)Google Scholar.

⁷ Meron, supra note 5, at 577–78; UN Press Release, Address of Judge Fausto Pocar, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, to the United Nations General Assembly, UN Press Release AH/MOW/1288e (Oct. 13, 2008), 2008 WL 6159941.

⁸ See, e.g., Henham, Ralph, The Philosophical Foundations of International Sentencing, 1 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 64, 81 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Stephen D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, Daedalus, Winter 2003, at 47, 61; Forsythe, David P., Politics and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 Crim. L.F. 401, 403, 406, 408 (1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Leslie Vinjamuri, European Council on Foreign Relations, International Justice and the Prevention of Atrocities, Case Study: Justice, Peace and Deterrence in the Former Yugoslavia (Nov. 2013), at http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/IJP_BosniaHerzegovina.pdf.

¹⁰ Those favoring establishment of the Tribunals countered that aggressive prosecution and long sentences could help achieve peace and reconciliation by discouraging unrest and counteratrocities. We acknowledge the fragility of a distinction between sentencing norms intended to favor justice versus those intended to favor peace and reconciliation, a point to which we return in the conclusion.

¹¹ See generally Meron, Theodor, Procedural Evolution in the ICTY, 2 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 520 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹² Concerning retribution against perpetrators, see, for example, Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Sentence, para. 2 (May 21, 1999) [hereinafter Kayishema Sentence]; Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence, para. 20 (Feb. 5, 1999). Concerning deterrence against future atrocities, see, for example, Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, paras. 1231, 1234 (Nov. 16, 1998). Concerning substituting and reflecting local customs, see, for example, Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgement, para. 829 (Feb. 22, 2001). Concerning establishment of a historical record of the events, see, for example, Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T bis, Sentencing Judgement, para. 21(Mar. 5, 1998) [hereinafter Erdemović 1998 Sentencing Judgement]; Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze (Media Case), Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence, paras. 106, 107, 347, 362 (Dec. 3, 2003); International Law—Genocide— U.N. Tribunal Finds That Mass Media Hate Speech Constitutes Genocide, Incitement to Genocide, and Crimes Against Humanity.— Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze (Media Case), Case No. ICTR-99-52-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Trial Chamber I Dec. 3, 2003), 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2769, 2773 (2004). Concerning building international law and jurisprudence on the topic, see, for example, Press Release, Judge Kirk McDonald Urges That the International Permanent Court “Must Be Effective,” UN Press Release CC/PIO/236-E (Aug. 14, 1997), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/7478. Concerning expression of humanity’s stake in redressing horrendous crimes, see, for example, Kayishema Sentence, supra, para. 2; Serushago, supra, para. 20. Concerning the advancement of justice, see, for example, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Arts. 20–22, SC Res. 827, annex (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Arts. 19–21, SC Res. 955, annex (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute] (ICTR provisions mirroring ICTY provisions); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 45 (Oct. 2, 1995). Concerning restoration of peace and reconciliation, see, for example, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T bis-R7, Sentencing Judgment, paras. 7–9 (Nov. 11, 1999) [hereinafter Tadić Sentencing Judgment]; Serushago, supra, para. 19.

¹³ Jescheck, Hans-Heinrich, The General Principles of International Criminal Law Set Out in Nuremberg, As Mirrored in the ICC Statute, 2 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 38 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See generally Meron, Theodor, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 AJIL 551 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ We do not address the normative debate over whether the Tribunals’ sentences have been too short or consider reasons why the Tribunals’ sentences are lighter than those handed down at Nuremberg, matters addressed at length elsewhere. See, e.g., Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 2; Ivković, Sanja Kutnjak, Justice by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 Stan. J. Int’l L. 255 (2001)Google Scholar; Schabas, William A., Life, Death and the Crime of Crimes: Supreme Penalties and the ICC Statute, 2 Punishment & Soc’y 263 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ Shaffer, Gregory & Ginsburg, Tom, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AJIL 1 (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ Following convention, a “significant” relationship between a hypothesized factor and sentence length is said to exist when the p -value is less than .05. The p -value is the probability of observing a result as strong (or stronger) as the one in the study if no relationship exists between the hypothesized factor and sentence length.

¹⁷ For a similar empirical study in the domestic U.S. context, see U.S. Sentencing Commission, Special Report to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (Aug. 1991), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/1991_Mand_Min_Report.pdf.

¹⁸ See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law 60 (2007).

¹⁹ Holá, Barbora, Smeulers, Alette & Bijleveld, Catrien, Is ICTY Sentencing Predictable? An Empirical Analysis of ICTY Sentencing Practice, 22 Leiden J. Int’l L. 79 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Meernik, James, Victor’s Justice or the Law? Judging and Punishing at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 47 J. Conflict Resol. 140 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Meernik, James, King, Kimi Lynn & Dancy, Geoffrey, Judicial Decision Making and International Tribunals: Assessing the Impact of Individual, National, and International Factors, 86 Soc. Sci. Q. 683 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁰ See infra notes 161, 170.

²¹ Formally, the ICTR’s jurisdiction is more limited than that of the ICTY: unlike the ICTY Statute, the ICTR Statute does not formally provide express jurisdiction for violations of the laws or customs of war, but the ICTR Statute does provide jurisdiction over violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, which covers many violations of the laws or customs of war. Compare ICTR Statute, supra note 12, Arts. 1–4, with ICTY Statute, supra note 12, Arts. 1–5.

²² ICTR Statute, supra note 12, Art. 23; ICTY Statute, supra note 12, Art. 24.

²³ ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 101(B), UN Doc. ITR/3/Rev. 1 (Mar. 14, 2008), available at http://ictrcaselaw.org/docs/20080314-RPP2007%20ENFR.pdf [hereinafter ICTR RPE]; ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 101(B), UN Doc. IT/32/Rev.42 (Nov. 4, 2008), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032_Rev42_en.pdf [hereinafter ICTY RPE].

²⁴ Prosecutor v. Blašskić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgement, para. 682 (July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgement, para. 141 (Dec. 18, 2003); Kunarac, supra note 12, para. 829; Prosecutor v. Kayishema, ICTR-95-1-A, Judgement (Reasons), para. 337 (June 1, 2001) [hereinafter Kayishema Judgement (Reasons)].

²⁵ E.g., Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 2, at 710 –11; Dubinsky, Andrew, An Examination of International Sentencing Guidelines and a Proposal for Amendments to the International Criminal Court’s Sentencing Structure, 33 New Eng. J. On Crim. & CIV. Confinement 609, 623–24 (2007)Google Scholar.

²⁶ Prosecutor v. Mucić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, para. 1225 (Nov. 16, 1998); see also Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No.ICTR-01-72-A, Judgement, para. 145 (Mar. 18, 2010); Prosecutor v. Serugendo, Case No.ICTR- 2005-84-I, Judgement and Sentence, para. 39 (June 12, 2006); Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgement, para. 903 (July 31, 2003).

²⁷ See generally Jan Philipp Book, Appeal and Sentence in International Criminal Law 31–43 (2011).

²⁸ Prosecutor v. Zelenović, Case No. IT-96-23/2-T, Sentencing Judgement, para. 38 (Apr. 4, 2007); Prosecutor v. Cešić, Case No. IT-95-10/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, para. 32 (Mar. 11, 2004).

²⁹ Prosecutor v. Nchamihigo, Case No. ICTR-01-63-T, Judgement and Sentence, para. 391 (Nov. 12, 2008); Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-01-71-A, Judgement, para. 135 (Jan. 16, 2007); Erdemović 1998 Sentencing Judgement, supra note 12, para. 15; Prosecutor v. Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-S, Sentencing Judgement, para. 32 (Dec. 7, 2005).

³⁰ Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-A, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, para. 106 (July 20, 2005).

³¹ Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case Nos. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1A bis, Judgement in Sentencing Appeals [hereinafter Tadić Judgement in Sentencing Appeals], Sep. Op. Cassese, J., paras. 14, 15 (Jan. 26, 2000).

³² Id., para. 15; see also Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgement, Decl. Vohrah, J., paras. 5, 8–11 (July 21, 2000); Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Appeals Judgment [hereinafter Erdemović Appeals Judgment], Joint Sep. Op. McDonald & Vohrah, JJ., para. 20 (Oct. 7, 1997).

³³ Danner, supra note 4, at 477; Carcano, Andrea, Sentencing and the Gravity of the Offence in International Criminal Law, 51 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 583, 608 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁴ See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgement and Sentence, paras. 12–17 (Sept. 4, 1998); see abo Kunarac, supra note 12, paras. 851, 860.

³⁵ Kayishema Judgement (Reasons), supra note 24, para. 367 (quoting ICTR Statute, supra note 12, Art. 1).

³⁶ Stakić, supra note 26, para. 375.

³⁷ Tadić Judgement in Sentencing Appeals, supra note 31, para. 69; see also Meron, Theodor, Remarks by Judge Theodor Meron, 103 ASIL Proc. 107, 108 (2009)Google Scholar (labeling a crime does not automatically lead to a greater sentence); Furundzija, supra note 32, para. 243.

³⁸ See Furundžija, supra note 32, para. 246; Book, supra note 27, at 32.

³⁹ This formulation has been suggested in a few opinions. See, e.g., Tadić Sentencing Judgment, supra note 12, paras. 27–29; see also Kunarac, supra note 12, paras. 851, 860; Tadić Judgement in Sentencing Appeals, Supra note 31, Sep. Op. Cassese, J., para. 10.

⁴⁰ Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, para. 784 (Mar. 3, 2000) [hereinafter Blaškić Trial Judgment] (noting that the number of victims has been raised on several occasions as an aggravating circumstance and reflects the scale of the crime committed); Tadić Sentencing Judgment, supra note 12, paras. 14–18 (victim-by-victim analysis by Trial Chamber that highlighted the number of victims); Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, para. 15 (Nov. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Erdemović 1996 Sentencing Judgement] (noting number of victims killed as an aggravating factor); Kambanda, supra note 34, para. 42 (“The magnitude of the crimes involving the killing of an estimated 500,000 civilians in Rwanda, in a short span of 100 days constitutes an aggravating fact.”).

⁴¹ Steven Glickman, Note, Victims’ Justice: Legitimizing the Sentencing Regime of the International Criminal Court, 43 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 229, 264 (2004) (arguing that it would be appropriate to have sentence minimums based on the number of victims affected by each offense); Sloane, Robert D., Sentencing for the ‘Crime of Crimes’: The Evolving ‘Common Law’ of Sentencing of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 713, 723–24 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (“If ‘gravity of the offence’ means something like ‘magnitude of the harm,’ as some cases suggest, then genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Common Article 3 should be deemed equally grave if they cause death or serious harm to an equal number of victims, or if they result in roughly comparable suffering—and sentences for these crimes, all other factors being held constant, should not be hierarchically graduated” (footnote omitted).).

⁴² Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement and Sentence, para. 571 (May 15, 2003) (“Since the number of victims is an element of extermination as a crime against humanity, the Chamber already considered it in assessing the gravity of the offence of extermination and cannot also consider it as an aggravating factor in sentencing for extermination.”).

⁴³ Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-01-71-A, Judgement, para. 135 (Jan. 16, 2007) (“[T]he Trial Chamber did not err in considering the large number of victims at Gitwa Hill as an aggravating circumstance relevant to the sentence. As to the conviction for genocide, there need not be a large number of victims to enter a genocide conviction. As for extermination, the actus reus requires ‘killing on a large scale.’ While this does not ‘suggest a numerical minimum,’ a particularly large number of victims can be an aggravating circumstance in relation to the sentence for this crime... “ (footnote omitted).).

⁴⁴ Blaškić Trial Judgment, supra note 40, para. 784 (“By noting that the crimes were committed systematically, the Trial Chambers also took into account as aggravating circumstances the recurrence of the crimes” (footnote omitted).); Prosecutor v. Todorović, Case No. IT-95-9/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, paras. 63–65 (July 31, 2001) (considering as an aggravating factor the repeated nature of the crimes and long duration of sadistic activity); see also Beresford, Stuart, Unshackling the Paper Tiger—The Sentencing Practices of the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 1 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 33, 56 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (“The ad hoc Tribunals have also taken into account as an aggravating circumstance the number of victims, as well as the systematic nature of the crimes and the length of time over which they were perpetrated” (footnotes omitted).).

⁴⁵ See Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-A, Judgement, para. 320 (Nov. 27, 2007) (the Chamber finding that zeal and sadism should be considered as “aggravating factors rather than in the assessment of the gravity of an offence” and noting the dissenting opinion of Judge Liu Daqun arguing that zeal and sadism may still be correctly taken into account as particular circumstances relevant to the gravity of the offense).

⁴⁶ Kayishema Judgement (Reasons), supra note 24, para. 361; Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, Judgement and Sentence, para. 499(iv) (May 16, 2003); Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10-T & ICTR-96-17-T, Judgement and Sentence, para. 912 (Feb. 21, 2003); Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgement, para. 130 (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Jelistić Trial Judgment].

⁴⁷ Ntakirutimana, supra note 46, para. 884; see also Nikolit, supra note 24, Annex: Non-authoritative Summary, paras. 45, 47, 49(i), (ii).

⁴⁸ Alvarez, José E., Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadić Judgment, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 2031, 2052 & n. 76, 2053–54 (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁹ Sloane, supra note 41, at 727–28.

⁵⁰ ICTR Statute, supra note 12, Art. 6; ICTY Statute, supra note 12, Art. 7.

⁵¹ Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T, Judgement and Sentence, para. 764 (Jan. 22, 2004); Stakić, supra note 26, para. 913; Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement, para. 721 (Aug. 2, 2001); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement, para. 183 (Mar. 24, 2000).

⁵² Tadić Judgement in Sentencing Appeals, supra note 31, paras. 55–57.

⁵³ See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-A, Judgement, para. 233 (May 21, 2007).

⁵⁴ Krstić, supra note 51, para. 709 & n.1493 (noting that “[s]entences imposed by the ICTY on subordinates are of an average of 15 years imprisonment as opposed to sentences imposed on superiors, which are of an average of 17 years imprisonment”).

⁵⁵ Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-A, Judgement, para. 268 (Nov. 28, 2006); Kayishema Judgement (Reasons), supra note 24, para. 358.

⁵⁶ E.g., Kamuhanda, supra note 51, para. 764.

⁵⁷ William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes 329–30 (2000).

⁵⁸ Meron, Theodor, From Nuremberg to the Hague, 149 Mil. L. Rev. 107, 108 (1995)Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ Clark, Jennifer J., Note, Zero to Life: Sentencing Appeals at the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 96 Geo. L.J. 1685, 1702 (2008)Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ Sloane, supra note 6, at 59–60.

⁶¹ Sloane, supra note 41, at 724; Beresford, supra note 44, at 60–61 (noting that “the criminal culpability of those leading others is higher than those who follow”).

⁶² Drumbl, Mark A. & Gallant, Kenneth S., Sentencing Policies and Practices in the International Criminal Tribunals, 15 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 140, 143 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Adam Klawonn comments on the problem of prosecutors not even bringing cases trying middlemen; however, he makes no mention of the sentencing disparities due to rank for the cases actually tried. Adam Klawonn, Prosecuting War Crimes: An Arizona Lawyer at the Hague, ARIZ. Att’y, Feb. 2007, at 8–10, available at http://www.myazbar.org/AZAttorney/PDF_Articles/0207Hannis.pdf.

⁶³ Interviews with anonymous ICTY Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) trial attorneys and Tribunal defense counsel, in the Hague (June 2008).

⁶⁴ Glickman, supra note 41, at 264.

⁶⁵ See, e.g., Erdemović 1996 Sentencing Judgement, supra note 40, para. 46 (quoting this statement as obiter dictum in United States v. List (The Hostage Case), 11 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law no. 10, at 1317 (1950));see also Kambanda, supra note 34, para. 37; Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence, para. 80 (June 1, 2000).

⁶⁶ See, e.g., Erdemović Appeals Judgment, supra note 32, para. 19; id., Sep. & Diss. Op. Stephen, J., para. 5; id., Joint Sep. Op. McDonald & Vohrah, JJ., paras. 88–90; id., Sep. & Diss. Op. Li, J., para. 17.

⁶⁷ Id., para. 19 (Appeals Judgment).

⁶⁸ See, e.g., id., Sep. & Diss. Op. Stephen, J., para. 24; Fichtelberg, Aaron, Liberal Values in International Criminal Law: A Critique of Erdemović, 6 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 3, 18 (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wall, Illan Rua, Duress, International Criminal Law and Literature, 4 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 724, 743 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁹ See Chiesa, Luis E., Duress, Demanding Heroism, and Proportionality, 41 V and. J. Transnat’l L. 741, 772 (2008)Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ Erdemović Appeals Judgment, supra note 32, Sep. & Diss. Op. Li, J., para. 11. (Although a separate and dissenting opinion, this section, refuting the “it would have happened anyway” claim, was endorsed by the majority.)

⁷¹ See Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law 285–89 (2d ed. 2008); see also Hall, Jerome, General Principles of Criminal Law 448 (2d ed. 1960)Google Scholar.

⁷² Erdemović 1996 Sentencing Judgement, supra note 40, para. 17; Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, Case No. ICTR-95-1C-T, Judgement and Sentence, para. 161 (Mar. 14, 2005).

⁷³ Erdemović Appeals Judgment, supra note 32, Joint Sep. Op. McDonald & Vohrah, JJ., paras. 45, 59, 66.

⁷⁴ E.g., Rutaganira, supra note 72, paras. 159, 161–62; Erdemović 1996 Sentencing Judgement, supra note 40, paras. 14, 17.

⁷⁵ 1 Model Penal Code and Commentaries §2.09 cmt. 3 (1985).

⁷⁶ Chiesa, supra note 69, at 767; See also Schmidtz, David, Islands in a Sea of Obligation: Limits of the Duty to Rescue, 19 ,Law & Phil. 683, 699 (2000)Google Scholar (commenting on strength of the duty of parents to their children).

⁷⁷ Dana, Shahram, Revisiting the Blaškić Sentence: Some Reflections on the Sentencing Jurisprudence of the ICTY, 4 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 321, 331–32 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁸ See, e.g., Glickman, supra note 41, at 250.

⁷⁹ See, e.g., Sloane, supra note 41, at 731–32.

⁸⁰ Clark, supra note 59, at 1693–94; see also Serugendo, supra note 26, para. 91 (giving limited weight to good character); Kamuhanda, supra note 51, paras. 757–58 (considering good character but giving it no weight); Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement, para. 853 (Jan. 17, 2005) (simply considering good character as a factor with no reference to weight given); Prosecutor v. Obrenović, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing Judgement, para. 134 (Dec. 10, 2003) (finding good character as an “important” mitigating factor).

⁸¹ Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeals Judgement, paras. 129–30 (July 5, 2001) [hereinafter Jelisić Appeals Judgement]; Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, para. 1130 (Sept. 1, 2004); Jelisić Trial Judgment, supra note 46, para. 124; Rutaganira, supra note 72, para. 136; Serushago, supra note 12, para. 39.

⁸² Erdemović 1998 Sentencing Judgement, supra note 12, para. 16(i); Serushago, supra note 12, para. 39.

⁸³ Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, paras. 104, 105 (Feb. 27, 2003).

⁸⁴ Brđanin, supra note 81, para. 1130; Serugendo, supra note 26, para. 91.

⁸⁵ See, e.g., Sloane, supra note 6, at 64.

⁸⁶ Clark, supra note 59, at 1702.

⁸⁷ Sloane, supra note 41, at 731–32 (quoting Aleksovski, supra note 51, para. 185).

⁸⁸ Porcella, Kelly, Note, The Past Coming Back to Haunt Them: The Prosecution and Sentencing of Once Deadly but Now Elderly Criminals, 81 St. John’s L. Rev. 369, 397 (2007)Google Scholar. But see Andrew Von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles 176 (2005) (suggesting that age may be appropriate as a mitigating factor even under a retribution theory).

⁸⁹ Clark, supra note 59, at 1694.

⁹⁰ Blaškić Trial Judgment, supra note 40, para. 778 (discussing age ranges considered or given mitigation in each Tribunal).

⁹¹ E.g., Brđanin, supra note 81, para. 1119; Serushago, supra note 12, para. 38; Rutaganira, supra note 72, para. 155.

⁹² Stakić, supra note 26, para. 916.

⁹³ Serushago, supra note 12, para. 38; Rutaganira, supra note 72, para. 155.

⁹⁴ Prosecutor v. Nzabirinda, Case No. ICTR-2001-77-T, Sentencing Judgement, para. 77 (Feb. 23, 2007).

⁹⁵ E.g., Češtić, supra note 28, paras. 77–87.

⁹⁶ Goldsmith & Krasner, supra note 9, at 57.

⁹⁷ Jenia Turner questions the wisdom of that stance, pointing out the tension between the Tribunals’ purposes of apportioning guilt and promoting peace, and she warns that if too much value is given to a defendant’s peace promotion efforts, the goal of apportioning guilt may be lost. Turner, Jenia Iontcheva, Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in International Criminal Triah, 48 VA. J. Int’l L. 529, 539 (2008)Google Scholar.

⁹⁸ See, e.g., Blagojević, supra note 80, paras. 858 – 60 (noting defendants’ efforts in demining); Ntakirutimana, supra note 46, para. 908.

⁹⁹ Plavšić, supra note 83, paras. 79 – 81.

¹⁰⁰ Ntakirutimana, supra note 46, para. 908.

¹⁰¹ E.g., Plavšić, supra note 83, para. 73; Todorović, supra note 44, paras. 74, 77; Erdemović 1996 Sentencing Judgement, supra note 40, para. 55.

¹⁰² Plavšić, supra note 83, para. 81.

¹⁰³ Prosecutor v. Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-S, Statement of Mehmed Ahmić appended to the public version of the Defense Sentencing Brief, para. 85 (Nov. 25, 2005) (noting that Ahmić, the president of a city council in the region, believes that statements of remorse will have a “fantastic effect” on relations in the area).

¹⁰⁴ E.g., Serugendo, supra note 26, para. 41; Serushago, supra note 12, paras. 40 – 41; Rutaganira, supra note 72, para. 158.

¹⁰⁵ Serugendo, supra note 26, paras. 55, 91.

¹⁰⁶ Clark, supra note 59, at 1693 (noting relative sentence equality between two convictions even though one defendant showed remorse and the other did not).

¹⁰⁷ E.g., de Roca, Inés Monica Weinberg & Rassi, Christopher M., Sentencing and Incarceration in the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 44 Stan. J. Int’l L. 1, 8 (2008)Google Scholar; see also Gallimore, Timothy, The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and lts Contributions to Reconciliation in Rwanda, 14 New Eng. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 239, 254 (2008)Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁸ Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 2, at 712.

¹⁰⁹ E.g., Sloane, supra note 41, at 730–31.

¹¹⁰ ICTR RPE, supra note 23, Rule 101(B)(ii); ICTY RPE, supra note 23, Rule 101(B)(ii) (both rules only specifically mentioning cooperation with the prosecutor); see abo Plavšić, supra note 83, para. 63 (noting that “[a]n accused’s ‘substantial’ co-operation with the Prosecutor is the only mitigating circumstance that is expressly mentioned in the Rules”).

¹¹¹ E.g., Plavšić, supra note 83, para. 81; Todorović, supra note 44, para. 82; Jelisić Appeals Judgement, supra note 81, paras. 119–23; Erdemović 1998 Sentencing Judgement, supra note 12, para. 16(ii); Prosecutor v. Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-A, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, para. 44 (Apr. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Bralo Judgement on Sentencing Appeal].

¹¹² E.g., Kambanda, supra note 34, para. 52; Prosecutor v. Bisengimana, Case No. ICTR-00-60-T, Judgement and Sentence, paras. 180, 201 (Apr. 13, 2006); Nzabirinda, supra note 94, para. 71; Serugendo, supra note 26, para. 91.

¹¹³ See Plavšić, supra note 83, para. 73; Todorović, supra note 44, paras. 80–81; Kambanda, supra note 34, para. 54; Bisengimana, supra note 112, para. 139.

¹¹⁴ Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 2, at 703.

¹¹⁵ Tieger, Alan & Shin, Milbert, Plea Agreements in the ICTY: Purpose, Effects and Propriety, 3 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 666, 679 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹⁶ Keller, supra note 1, at 59–60; see also Wald, Patricia M., ICTY Judicial Proceedings: An Appraisal from Within, 2 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 466, 471 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (claiming that careful use of plea bargains results in saving resources as well as a more complete record of the crimes committed).

¹¹⁷ Combs, Nancy Amoury, Procuring Guilty Pleas for International Crimes: The Limited Influence of Sentence Discounts, 59 V and. L. Rev. 69, 117–20, 149–50 (2006)Google Scholar [hereinafter Combs, Procuring Guilty Pleas]; see also Drumbl, supra note 3, at 583 (noting how guilty plea negotiations can frustrate victims and weaken the legitimacy of the Tribunal). But see generally Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International Crimes, 151 U. PA. L. Rev. 1, 152–57 (2002) [hereinafter Combs, Copping a Plea ] (where Combs takes a more optimistic approach to plea bargaining in this earlier paper, an opinion that she revises to reject plea bargaining in her 2006 work cited above).

¹¹⁸ ICTR RPE, supra note 23, Rule 101(B)(ii) (“In determining the sentence, the Trial Chamber shall take into account... such factors as:... (ii) any mitigating circumstances including substantial co-operation with the Prosecutor by the convicted person before or after conviction.”); ICTY RPE, supra note 23, Rule 101(B)(ii) (same); see also Bralo Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, supra note 111, para. 11 (holding that the “only mitigating circumstance that Trial Chambers are specifically required to consider as a matter of law, pursuant to Rule 101(B)(ii) of the Rules, is cooperation with the Prosecution”).

¹¹⁹ E.g., Nzabirinda, supra note 94, para. 74; Plavšić, supra note 83, para. 65.

¹²⁰ E.g., Todorović, supra note 44, paras. 86–87 (noting that compliance with a plea agreement was “substantial cooperation”).

¹²¹ E.g., Plavšić, supra note 83, para. 63.

¹²² E.g., Nzabirinda, supra note 94, para. 74.

¹²³ Plavšić, supra note 83, para. 66.

¹²⁴ Id. ; Serugendo, supra note 26, para. 61.

¹²⁵ Serugendo, supra note 26, para. 89.

¹²⁶ Scharf, Michael P., Trading Justice for Efficiency: Plea-Bargaining and International Tribunals, 2 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 1070, 1081 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹²⁷ Damašska, Mirjan, Negotiated Justice in International Criminal Courts, 2 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 1018, 1036 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹²⁸ E.g., Serushago, supra note 12, para. 34; Rutaganira, supra note 72, para. 145; Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-2-S, Sentencing Judgement, para. 107 (Oct. 17, 2002); Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, paras. 853, 860, 863 (Jan. 14, 2000).

¹²⁹ Kunarac, supra note 12, para. 868.

¹³⁰ Rutaganira, supra note 72, para. 145; Serushago, supra note 12, para. 41 (quoting Erdemović 1996 Sentencing Judgement, supra note 40, para. 55).

¹³¹ Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 2, at 705, 712.

¹³² Glickman, supra note 41, at 253 (“‘[S]pecial deterrence, as a general sentencing factor, is generally of little significance before this jurisdiction. The main reason is that the likelihood of persons convicted here ever again being faced with an opportunity to commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide or grave breaches is so remote as to render its consideration in this way unreasonable and unfair’” (quoting Kunarac, supra note 12, para. 840).).

¹³³ E.g., Naumov, Anatolyi V., The New Russian Criminal Code as a Reflection of Ongoing Reforms, 8 Crim. L. F. 191, 216 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (discussing the Russian code’s mandatory sentence reduction for voluntary surrender); U. S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §3E1.1, Application Note 1(D) (2015); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397–99 (1987) (ordering consideration of voluntary surrender as a mitigating factor even when not statutorily mandated); Wang, Zhiqiang, Case Precedent in Qing China: Rethinking Traditional Case Law, 19 Colum. J. Asian L. 323, 335 (2005)Google Scholar (Chinese acceptance of surrender as mitigating).

¹³⁴ E.g., Kirchmeier, Jeffrey L., A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors and the Progression Toward a disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 Or. L. Rev. 631, 664 (2004)Google Scholar.

¹³⁵ Von Hirsch & Ashworth, supra note 88, at 177.

¹³⁶ Interviews with anonymous ICTY OTP and defense trial attorneys, in the Hague (June 2008, Apr. 2009).

¹³⁷ Schabas, William A., Perverse Effects of the Nulla Poena Principle: National Practice and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 521, 539 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Leinwand, Jessica, Note, Punishing Horrific Crime: Reconciling International Prosecution with National Sentencing Practices, 40 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 799, 801 (2009)Google Scholar (claiming that “the ICTY delivers more lenient sentences than its counterpart ad hoc tribunal, the ICTR”); Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 2, at 684–86, 707 (finding and discussing why ICTY sentences are more lenient than those from the ICTR, Nuremberg, and Tokyo tribunals); Ohlin, Jens David, Proportional Sentences at the ICTY, in The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 322, 323 (Swart, Bert, Zahar, Alexander & Sluiter, Göran eds., 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³⁸ E.g., Drumbl, supra note 18, at 15 (attributing the disparity to the lack of a sentencing heuristic and broad discretion given to the judges); Leinwand, supra note 137, at 813–16.

¹³⁹ ICTR Statute, supra note 12, Art. 23(1); ICTY Statute, supra note 12, Art. 24(1).

¹⁴⁰ E.g., Serushago v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-39-A, Reasons for Judgment, para.30 (Apr. 6,2000) (holding that accounting for Rwandan sentencing practices “does not oblige the Trial Chambers to conform to that practice”). See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1996).

¹⁴¹ See generally Alvarez, José E., Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 Yale J. Int’l L. 365, 365–85 (1999)Google Scholar (examining justifications for the creation and operation of the ad hoc tribunals, such as their effect on local communities).

¹⁴² Sloane, supra note 6, at 41.

¹⁴³ Kayishema Sentence, supra note 12, para. 6;Semanza, supra note 42, para. 561; Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Judgement and Sentence, paras. 810–12 (Feb. 25, 2004).

¹⁴⁴ Kunarac, supra note 12, para. 831; Nikolić, supra note 24, paras. 99–100; see also Drumbl, supra note 18, at 99–109.

¹⁴⁵ Interviews with anonymous ICTY defense counsel, in the Hague (June 2008).

¹⁴⁶ Smith, Adam M., “Judicial Nationalism” in International Law: National Identity and Judicial Autonomy at the ICJ, 40 Tex. Int’l L. J. 197, 204 (2005)Google Scholar; Ivković, Sanja Kutnjak & Hagan, John, The Politics of Punishment and the Siege of Sarajevo: Toward a Conflict Theory of Perceived International (In)Justice, 40 Law & Soc’y Rev. 369, 389, 394 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴⁷ Ivković & Hagan, supra note 146, at 389 –90.

¹⁴⁸ Smith, supra note 146, at 204.

¹⁴⁹ Meernik, King & Dancy, supra note 19, at 700.

¹⁵⁰ ICTR RPE, supra note 23, Rule 15; ICTY RPE, supra note 23, Rule 15.

¹⁵¹ ICTR RPE, supra note 23, Rule 14; ICTY RPE, supra note 23, Rule 14.

¹⁵² Prosecutor v. Sešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Motion for Disqualification, para. 4 (June 10, 2003); see also ICTR Press Release, Barayagwiza to Be Tried by ICTR (Mar. 31, 2000), available at http://unictr.unmict.org/en/news/barayagwiza-be-tried-ictr (ICTR Judge Rafael Nieto-Navia strongly denying judicial bias or political influence at the Tribunal).

¹⁵³ Interviews with anonymous ICTY defense counsel, supra note 145.

¹⁵⁴ Turner, supra note 97, at 577–78 (noting that defendants have challenged a Tribunal’s legitimacy about ten times since the first two challenges from the Kanyabashi and Tadić cases); see also Alvarez, José E., Tadić Revisited: The Ayyash Decisions of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 11 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 291 (2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵⁵ Turner, supra note 97, at 574–75 & n.211.

¹⁵⁶ ICTR RPE, supra note 23, Rule 15; ICTY RPE, supra note 23, Rule 15.

¹⁵⁷ ICTR RPE, supra note 23, Rule 101(B)(ii); ICTY RPE, supra note 23, Rule 101(B)(ii).

¹⁵⁸ E.g., Prosecutor v. Banović, Case No. IT-02-65/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, para. 61 (Oct. 28, 2003); Plavšić, supra note 83, para. 64 (holding that not cooperating with the prosecutor is not an aggravating factor). But see Blaškićc Trial Judgment, supra note 40, para. 774 (noting that the “Trial Chambers have, on several occasions, ruled that failure to co-operate constitutes an aggravating circumstance”).

¹⁵⁹ Combs, Copping a Plea, supra note 117, at 82.

¹⁶⁰ The unit of analysis is the individual defendant. The sources of the data are the websites of the Tribunals, http://www.ictr.org and http://www.ictr.org. The data for this study were collected from 2008 through spring 2014 by six research assistants. Data on each defendant were collected separately by two research assistants and then compared. Conflicts between the research assistants were resolved by the authors.

¹⁶¹ In coding the dependent variable, we differentiate ourselves from prior studies. Holá, Smeulers & Bijleveld, supra note 19, at 82– 89; Meernik, supra note 19; Meernik, King & Dancy, supra note 19. First, distributional problems exist in the data: sentence length is log-normally distributed, and the prior studies did not transform this variable to make it suitable for a subsequent least squares regression. This concern could be addressed by taking the log of the sentence length, which results in a relatively normal distribution. But that adjustment leads us to the second problem—life sentences. Prior studies have coded a life sentence by estimating the remaining mortality of the defendant. Holá, Smeulers & Bijleveld, supra note 19, at 89 n.53. We think that this result misses the import of a life sentence, which is categorically and symbolically different from other types of punishment. To resolve these problems, we created a four-category variable for sentence length, detailed in the text above.

¹⁶² Information for some variables is not readily available for all cases. For analytical purposes, we use the log of the measures of number of victims and incidents.

¹⁶³ In reporting our findings here and in Table 3 and in Table 4, individual percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number, so totals of the rounded figures may not be exactly 100 percent. We assume that this variable, level of authority, is nonmonotonic with respect to sentence length, signifying that the difference between low and mid levels of authority will not be equal to the difference between mid and high levels of responsibility. Consequently, our analysis uses indicator variables and not ordinal ones.

¹⁶⁴ Youth is measured by how much younger than fifty the accused was at the time of the incident; old age is measured by how much older than fifty the accused was at the time of the incident.

¹⁶⁵ We pursue this strategy in order to have a final regression model that includes only those variables that are demonstrably related to sentence length. We can then be confident that any differences between the direct relationship reported in Table A1 and the multivariate relationship in Table 2 are due to confounding between variables, not to lack of a relationship.

¹⁶⁶ In ruling out hypothesized factors based on the bivariate regression results, we used a cutoff of p > .15, a standard that errs on the side of retaining factors for testing in the multivariate regression.

¹⁶⁷ As noted in Table 2, we do not include the variable for Violations of the Laws of War in our analysis because it is highly correlated with Genocide (gamma=—.61, p ြ .01). Including two highly correlated variables in the same regression would lead to unreliable estimates.

¹⁶⁸ This finding holds true for each of those variables, even though most acts of sadism (8 of 11) were also found to be personally committed.

¹⁶⁹ See Table 1 (H18).

¹⁷⁰ Our findings differ from those of previous studies in several respects. For example, our study shows that no significant difference exists between ICTR and ICTY sentences after controlling for other factors; genocide is significantly related to sentence length, placing it highest in the hierarchy of crimes; the number of victims, the number of incidents, and the sadism with which crimes were committed are all significantly related to sentence length; and no significant relationship exists between sentence length and efforts by the perpetrator to promote peaceful resolution of the conflict. None of the previous empirical studies considered any of those relationships.

¹⁷¹ See generally Holmes, Oliver Wendell Jr., The Common Law (Little, Brown & Co. 1963) (1881)Google Scholar; see also American Legal Realism 3–4 (William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz & Thomas A. Reed eds., 1993).

¹⁷² Llewellyn, Karl N., Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 V and. L. Rev. 395, 401–06 (1950)Google Scholar.

¹⁷³ The absence of a significant difference between ICTR and ICTY sentencing practices may result from the existence of an international criminal legal culture shared by judges on both Tribunals and reinforced by the fact that the seven judges constituting the ICTY Appeals Chamber also constitute the ICTR Appeals Chamber.

¹⁷⁴ See, e.g., Rwanda Unhappy with Ruggiu Sentence, Hirondelle News Agency, June 1, 2000, at http://www.hirondellenews.com/ictr-rwanda/372-trials-ended/ruggiu-georges/17498-en-en-rwanda-unhappy-with-ruggiu-sentence65496549; Sentences, Survivors Fund (SURF): Supporting Survivors Of the Rwandan Genocide (Dec. 20, 2012), at http://survivors-fund.org.uk/news/what-we-do/sentences; see also Barbora Holá, Address at 14th Annual Conference of the European Society of Criminology, Prague: Vertical Inconsistency of International Sentencing—Case Study of ICTR (Int’lCriminal Tribunal for Rwanda) & Rwanda Ordinary Courts (Sept. 10, 2014); Price, Melynda J., Balancing Lives: Individual Accountability and the Death Penalty as Punishment for Genocide (Lessons from Rwanda), 21 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 563, 565 (2007)Google Scholar; Oko, Okechukwu, The Challenges of International Criminal Prosecutions in Africa, 31 FORDHAM Int’l L. J. 343, 385 (2008)Google Scholar; Sloane, supra note 41, at 719, 720.

¹⁷⁵ Our empirical finding of the significance of gravity and aggravation compared to the insignificance of mitigation is not explained by a difference in the consistency with which judges place weight on the factors in those two categories. Certain mitigating factors, such as local sentencing practice in the state where the crime occurred, cooperating with the prosecutor, pleading guilty, surrendering, expressing remorse, and assisting victims, are treated as important in doctrine across almost all Tribunal judgments, yet they bear no significant relationship to sentence length in fact. Moreover, those aggravating factors over which the Tribunals’ judges have expressed a difference of opinion— how much weight to give to rank and number of victims— bear a significant relationship to sentence length.

¹⁷⁶ See Llewellyn, supra note 172.

¹⁷⁷ See Sloane, supra note 6, at 42 & n.16; Alvarez, supra note 141, at 481–82 (suggesting that some objectives of international criminal law are in conflict with each other and that action by international tribunals and courts may undermine more effective justice and reconciliation that could take place in domestic processes).

¹⁷⁸ Nils Brunsson, The Organization of Hypocrisy: Talk, Decisions and Actions in Organizations 7, 168–69 (Nancy Adler trans., 1989); James G. March, A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen 197–98 (1994); Meyer, John W., Boli, John, Thomas, George M. & Ramirez, Francisco O., World Society and the Nation-State, 103 Am. J. Soc. 144 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Krasner, Stephen D., Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy 5–36 (1999)Google Scholar; Lipson, Michael, Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?, 13 Eur. J. Int’l Rel. 5 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Edelman, Lauren B., Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. Soc. 1531 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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¹⁸⁰ See part II supra.

¹⁸¹ On principal-agent theory in international organizations, see generally Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney eds., 2006).

¹⁸² Henham, supra note 8; see also Henham, Ralph, Some Issues for Sentencing in the International Criminal Court, 52 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 81 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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¹⁸⁴ See generally Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (1975).

¹⁸⁵ Daniel Kahneman distinguishes “System 1” modes of thought, which are instinctive and emotional, from “System 2” modes, which are more deliberative and more logical. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011).

¹⁸⁶ See Sloane, supra note 6, at 42; Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in Doing and Deserving: Essays in the theory of Responsibility 95, 98 (1970); see also Kahan, Dan M., What Do Alter native Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 593 (1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (“Punishment isnot just a way to make offenders suffer; it is a special social convention that signifies moral condemnation.”).

¹⁸⁷ The Appeals Chamber’s standard for reversing a sentence, as emphasized by Meron, grants considerable latitude to the Trial Chamber, enabling this expressive approach: a sentence must be fair, not clearly out of proportion with sentences given in similar situations, and not so short that it demonstrably shocks the conscience. Theodor Meron, Fairness in Sentencing (Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion, Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić), in The Making of International Criminal Justice, A View from the Bench: Selected Speeches 247 (2011).