We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 November 2018
The way in which Islamic courts and laws are developed and how religious legal apparatuses shape the relations between—and within—religious communities has been a common source of debate among scholars. This article analyzes the growing institutional power and authority of Islamic courts and judges in Malaysia since the late 1980s to contribute to this theoretical debate. Specifically, it compares two critical phases of institutional development of Islamic courts in Malaysia's largely secular judicial system: the first under the premiership of Mahathir Mohamad before the dismissal of his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim (1980–1998), and the second under the post-reformasi (reform) period (1999–present). Original data gathered at the Jabatan Kehakiman Syariah Malaysia (Department of Syariah Judiciary Malaysia) and other government and legal agencies, fieldwork, and semistructured interviews with Islamic and civil court officials both at the federal and state levels document the institutional expansion and administrative independence that the Islamic courts and judges have successively gained in relation to their civil counterparts. It is argued that the gradual bureaucratization of Islamic courts can best be explained with reference to the interests—and strategic coalitions—of political and religious elites within the majority community to sustain a dominant regime and majoritarian rule based on communal identity.
1 I use sharia to refer to Islamic law in a general sense of the term, and the Malaysian translation of the term, syariah, to refer specifically to the Islamic legal apparatus in the context of Malaysia.
2 Weber, Max, Economy and Society, vol. 2, ed. Roth, Guenther and Wittich, Claus (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), 956–1005Google Scholar.
3 Kikue Hamayotsu, “Demobilizing Islam: Institutionalized Religion and the Politics of Co-Optation in Malaysia” (PhD diss., Australian National University, 2006); Liow, Joseph Chinyong, Piety and Politics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Moustafa, Tamir, “Judging in God's Name: State Power, Secularism, and the Politics of Islamic Law in Malaysia,” Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 3, no. 1 (2014): 152–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Peletz, Michael G., Islamic Modern: Religious Courts and Cultural Politics in Malaysia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002)Google Scholar; Sloane-White, Patricia, Corporate Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 For example, Liddle, William R., “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation,” Journal of Asian Studies 55, no. 3 (1996): 613–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nasr, Islamic Leviathan.
5 Hefner, Robert W., ed. Shari'a Politics: Islamic Law and Society in the Modern World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011)Google Scholar; Salim, Arskal and Azra, Azyumardi, Shari'a and Politics in Modern Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6 Roff, William R., “Patterns of Islamization in Malaysia, 1890s–1990s: Exemplars, Institutions, and Vectors,” Journal of Islamic Studies 9, no. 2 (1998): 210–28, at 218CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
7 There are some important exceptions, though these ethnographic studies tend to be focused on interpretation and adaptation of religious laws in routine business of religious courts. For example, Bowen, John R., “Legal Reasoning and Public Discourse in Indonesian Islam,” in New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere, ed. Eickelman, Dale F. and Anderson, John W. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 80–105Google Scholar; Bowen, John R., Islam, Law, and Equality in Indonesia: An Anthropology of Public Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Peletz, Michael G., “Islam and the Cultural Politics of Legitimacy: Malaysia in the Aftermath of September 11,” in Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization, ed. Hefner, Robert W. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 140–72Google Scholar; Salim, Arskal, Contemporary Islamic Law in Indonesia: Shari'ah and Legal Pluralism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015)Google Scholar.
8 Neo, Jaclyn Ling-Chien, “Competing Imperatives: Conflicts and Convergences in State and Islam in Pluralist Malaysia,” Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 4, no. 1 (2015): 1–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Neo, Jaclyn Ling-Chien, “Malay Nationalism, Islamic Supremacy and the Constitutional Bargain in the Multi-Ethnic Composition of Malaysia,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 13, no. 1 (2006): 95–118Google Scholar; Shah, Dian Abdul Hamed, “Constitutional Arrangements on Religion and Religious Freedom in Malaysia and Indonesia: Furthering or Inhibiting Rights,” Indonesian Journal of International and Comparative Law 1, no. 1 (2014): 260–99Google Scholar; Shah, Dian Abdul Hamed and Sani, Mohd Azizuddin Mohd, “Freedom of Religion in Malaysia: A Tangled Web of Legal, Political, and Social Issues,” North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 36, no. 3 (2010): 647–88Google Scholar.
9 Moustafa, Tamir, “Islamic Law, Women's Rights, and Popular Legal Consciousness in Malaysia,” Law and Social Inquiry 38, no. 1 (2013): 168–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Neo, “Competing Imperatives”; Neo, “Malay Nationalism, Islamic Supremacy and the Constitutional Bargain”; Shah, “Constitutional Arrangements on Religion and Religious Freedom in Malaysia and Indonesia”; Shah and Sani, “Freedom of Religion in Malaysia.”
10 Eisenstadt, S. N., “Bureaucracy and Bureaucratization,” Current Sociology 7, no. 2 (1958): 99–124CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
11 Antoun, Richard T., “Fundamentalism, Bureaucratization, and the State's Co-optation of Religion: A Jordanian Case Study,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 38, no. 3 (2006): 369–93Google Scholar; Sezgin, Yüksel and Künkler, Mirjam, “Regulation of ‘Religion’ and the ‘Religious’”: The Politics of Judicialization and Bureaucratization in India and Indonesia,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 56, no. 2 (2014): 448–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Antoun, “Fundamentalism, Bureaucratization, and the State's Co-optation of Religion.”
12 Weber, Economy and Society, 956–1005.
13 Weber, 1006–69.
14 Eisenstadt, “Bureaucracy and Bureaucratization.”
15 Lev, Daniel S., Islamic Courts in Indonesia: A Study in the Political Bases of Legal Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972)Google Scholar.
16 The federation of Malaysia comprises thirteen states, including the eastern states of Sabah and Salawak, which joined the federation in 1963. In nine of these states, the monarch (sultan or Malay ruler) resides as the ceremonial head of state and guardian of the Malay culture and faith: Islam.
17 Federal Constitution of Malaysia (as of January 20, 2015).
18 The jurisdiction of sharia courts is especially limited in the field of criminal law. It has jurisdiction in respect of offenses as is conferred by federal law as suggested above. Until 1984, the Muslim Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965, had provided that such jurisdiction should not be exercised in respect of any offense punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or any fine exceeding 1,000 Malaysian ringgit (approximately USD 240), or with both. In 1984, the Act was amended and the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court was expanded to deal with cases punishable with imprisonment up to three years, or fines up to RM 5,000, or whipping up to six strokes, or the combination of all these. Ibrahim, Ahmad Mohamed, The Administration of Islamic Law in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia, 2000), 135–36Google Scholar. This amendment to increase punishable offenses was seen as a “small victory” for sharia courts, though the criminal jurisdiction of the sharia courts is still more limited than that of the First Class Magistrate in the civil system.
19 Ibrahim, 131–36.
20 Anwar Ibrahim was the key architect of the government's Islamization initiatives under Mahathir. In 1998, he was abruptly dismissed from the government and the UMNO and subsequently detained and charged for corruption and sodomy charges, setting off the political crisis and anti-regime movement. However, Mahathir (as well as the party regime) survived the crisis and resigned as the prime minister in 2003 in a peaceful succession process in the UMNO.
21 All the states passed the Administration of Islamic Law Act following the Federal Territories’ model, Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act of 1993, in order to provide standard administrative procedures that the sharia courts and officials must comply with. The law was intended to ensure administrative and procedural uniformity across the states, and clarity among the sharia and religious officials. Law of Malaysia Act 505, 1993, http://www2.esyariah.gov.my/esyariah/mal/portalv1/enakmen2011/Eng_act_lib.nsf/858a0729306dc24748257651000e16c5/50898866b7936120c82568a200176eb1?OpenDocument.
22 As mentioned earlier, criminal offenses are federal and hence a civil matter, while sharia courts have jurisdiction over minor religious and sexual offenses such as consumption of alcohol, zina (extramarital and premarital sex), and khalwat (close proximity of opposite sexes). This jurisdictional separation between secular and Islamic courts prevents the state governments from implementing hudud (Islamic criminal punishments), Islamic laws that the opposition Islamic party, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, is adamant to introduce to expand the sharia jurisdiction.
23 Comparison with the institutional development of Islamic courts in its neighboring country, Indonesia, is instructive. For the case of Indonesia, see for example, Cammack, Mark E., “Islamic Law in Indonesia's New Order,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 38, no. 1 (1989): 53–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cammack, Mark E. and Feener, R. Michael, “The Islamic Legal System in Indonesia,” Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 21, no. 1 (2012): 13–42Google Scholar; Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia.
24 Nasr, Islamic Leviathan.
25 See, for example, the essays in Fealy, Greg and White, Sally, eds., Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
26 For this proposition in the context of Indonesia, see Donald K. Emmerson, “Islam and Regime in Indonesia: Who's Coopting Whom?” (Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Atlanta, GA, September 1, 1989), photocopy provided to the author. This proposition is in line with the expansion of “patrimonial authority” characterized as particularistic personal and group interests permeating an organization, as mentioned above.
27 Liow, Joseph Chinyong, “Deconstructing Political Islam in Malaysia: UMNO's Response to PAS’ Religio-Political Dialectic,” Institute of Defence and Stragetic Studies (Working Papers Series, 2003), 45Google Scholar; Liow, Joseph Chinyong, “Exigency or Expediency? Contextualising Political Islam and the PAS challenge in Malaysian Politics,” Third World Quarterly 25, no. 2 (2004) 359–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Liow, Piety and Politics.
28 Mohamad, Maznah, “Making Majority, Undoing Family: Law, Religion and the Islamization of the State in Malaysia,” Economy and Society 39, no. 3 (2010), 360–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Moustafa, “Islamic Law, Women's Rights, and Popular Legal Consciousness in Malaysia”; Moustafa, Tamir, “Liberal Rights Versus Islamic Law? The Construction of a Binary in Malaysian Politics,” Law and Society Review 47, no. 4 (2013), 771–802CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Moustafa “Judging in God's Name”; see also Sezgin, Yüksel, Human Rights under State-Enforced Religious Family Laws in Israel, Egypt and India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
29 Hefner, Shari'a Politics.
30 Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia; Lev, Daniel S., “Colonial Law and the Genesis of the Indonesian State,” Indonesia, no. 40 (1985): 57–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
31 Hussin, Iza, “The Making of Islamic Law: Local Elites and Colonial Authority in British Malaya,” in Casting Faiths: Imperialism and the Transformation of Religion in East and Southeast Asia, ed. DuBois, Thomas David (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 155–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
32 Kheng, Cheah Boon, “The Erosion of Ideological Hegemony and Royal Power and the Rise of Postwar Malay Nationalism, 1945–46,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 19, no. 1 (1988): 1–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Roff, “Patterns of Islamization in Malaysia, 1890s–1990s”; Roff, William R., The Origins of Malay Nationalism, 2nd ed. (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1994)Google Scholar; Yegar, Moshe, Islam and Islamic Institutions in British Malaya: Policies and Implementation (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1979)Google Scholar.
33 Roff, William R., “The Origin and Early Years of the Majlis Ugama,” in Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State, ed. Roff, William R. (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974), 101–52Google Scholar; Yegar, Islam and Islamic Institutions in British Malaya; Milner, Anthony C., The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya: Contesting Nationalism and the Expansion of the Public Sphere (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)Google Scholar.
34 Milner, Anthony C., “Islam and Malay Kingship,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1 (1981): 46–70, at 60CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Yegar, Islam and Islamic Institutions in British Malaya, 126, 40–41.
35 Yegar, Islam and Islamic Institutions in British Malaya, 140–42, 152–53, 193–93.
36 Roff, “The Origin and Early Years of the Majlis Ugama”; Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, 73–74.
37 Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, 74.
38 Milner, The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya, 216–18.
39 Roff, “The Origins and Early Years of the Majlis Ugama,” 113.
40 Yegar, Islam and Islamic Institutions in British Malaya, 159–60.
41 For a discussion of the erosion of constitutional rights of religious freedom in recent years, see for example, Neo, “Competing Imperatives”; Shah and Sani, “Freedom of Religion in Malaysia.”
42 Fernando, Joseph M., “The Position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 37, no. 2 (2006): 249–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Means, Gordon P., “‘Special Rights’ as a Strategy for Development,” Comparative Politics 5, no. 1 (1972): 29–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
43 Cheah, “The Erosion of Ideological Hegemony and Royal Power and the Rise of Postwar Malay Nationalism, 1945–46.”
44 Funston, N. J., Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of the United Malays National Organization and Party Islam (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann, 1980), 145–47Google Scholar; Milner, Anthony C., “The Impact of the Turkish Revolution on Malaya,” Archipel 31, no. 1 (1986): 117–30, at 122–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
45 Sheikh Ghazali Abdul Rahman (former director-general of the JKSM), interview by the author, Kuala Lumpur, July 17, 2000.
46 Ibrahim, The Administration of Islamic Law in Malaysia, 131–36.
47 Liow, “Deconstructing Political Islam in Malaysia,” 1–24; Liow, “Exigency or Expediency?,” 359–69.
48 The constitutional amendments of 1983 and 1993 stripped Malay sultans of some of their royal prerogatives including legal immunity. The amendments were made in the context of deteriorating relations between the monarchies and government. See, for example, Rawlings, H. F., “The Malaysian Constitutional Crisis of 1983,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 35, no. 2 (1986): 237–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
49 Hamayotsu, Kikue, “Islam and Nation Building in Southeast Asia: Malaysia and Indonesia in Comparative Perspective,” Pacific Affairs 75, no. 3 (2002): 353–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
50 In 2015, a Muslim gymnast, Farah Ann Abdul Hadi, was criticized by Malaysian religious officials and Muslim organizations for wearing a “revealing” leotard and breaching Islamic dress codes at the Southeast Asia Games, where she won a total of six medals. See, for example, Telegraph, June 18, 2015, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-life/11683079/Muslim-gymnast-criticised-for-revealing-leotard-as-she-wins-gold.html.
51 The Selangor Religious Department issued a fatwa against the group in 2014 though the Sisters in Islam continue to be active today. The fatwa titled “Pemikiran Liberalisme dan Pluralisme Agama” [Liberalism and religious pluralism] declared the Sisters in Islam as subscribing to liberalism and religious pluralism, and therefore deviating from the teachings of Islam. An original copy of the fatwa is in the author's personal possession, obtained at the group's office. About the controversy related to the fatwa against the group, see, for example, Rashvinjeet S. Bedi, “Sisters in Islam File for Judicial Review on Fatwa,” Star, October 31, 2014 (https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2014/10/31/sisters-in-islam-files-for-judicial-review-on-fatwa/).
52 Hwang, In-Won, Personalized Politics: The Malaysian State under Mahathir (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Slater, Dan, “Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutionalization and the Personalization of Power in Malaysia,” Comparative Politics 36, no. 1 (2003): 81–101CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
53 Hamayotsu, Kikue, “Islamization, Patronage and Political Ascendancy: The Politics and Business of Islam in Malaysia,” in The State of Malaysia: Ethnicity, Equity and Reform, ed. Gomez, Edmund Terence (London: Routledge-Curzon, 2004), 229–52Google Scholar. On the other hand, the Islamic Banking Act and Takaful (Islamic insurance) Act were passed at the federal level in 1983 and 1994 respectively to facilitate the infrastructure of Islamic banking and financial markets, resulting in the successful expansion of vibrant Islamic corporate finance in the private sector for which Malaysia became internationally renowned. See Sloane-White, Corporate Islam.
54 Sheikh Ghazali, interview; Abdul Aziz Abdul Rahim (legal advisor of the JAKIM), interview by the author, Kuala Lumpur, March 24, 2001; Mahamad Arifin (lecturer, Faculty of Law, International Islamic University of Malaysia), interviews by the author, Kuala Lumpur, July 21, 2000, and January 13, 2001.
55 The International Islamic University of Malaysia was established in 1983 and is fully sponsored by the federal government. Professor Ahmad Ibrahim, chief architect of the sharia judicial reform, was appointed as the inaugural head of the university's Faculty of Law, introducing programs, training, and forums to elevate the quality and prestige of Islamic court and legal services. The university's programs and instruction are conducted in English, with faculty and students recruited from other Muslim countries, such as Pakistan.
56 Later, other law faculties of other national universities, such as the National University of Malaysia and the Science University of Malaysia, also introduced similar programs.
57 Kamariah (lawyer in private practice), interview by the author, Kuala Lumpur, April 10, 2002; Sa'adiah Din (lawyer in private practice), interview by the author, Kuala Lumpur, June 16, 2001; Salbiah Ahmad (lawyer in private practice), Petaling Jaya, Selangor, interview by the author, December 18, 2000.
58 Interviews with members of the civil judiciary. The interviews with the author were conducted in confidentiality, and the name of the interviewee is withheld by mutual consent, and dates and locations have also been withheld to maintain confidentiality.
59 Ibrahim, Ahmad, “The Amendment to Article 121 of the Federal Constitution: Its Effect on Administration of Islamic Law,” Malayan Law Journal 2 (1989): xvii–xxiiGoogle Scholar.
60 Ibrahim, xvii–xxii. The mufti's exclusive power to issue fatwas was also legally defined.
61 As is usually the case with fatwas elsewhere, the rulings issued by muftis are not legally binding and serve as recommendations only.
62 See, for example, the provisions of Section 52 (1) and Section 52 (2) of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 Act 505, for the power conferred on the Syariah Court of Appeal. Ibrahim, The Administration of Islamic Law in Malaysia, 140; Wu, Min Aun, The Malaysian Legal System, 2nd ed. (Selangor: Longman, 1999), 164Google Scholar.
63 E-Syariah Official Portal, “JKSM Profile,” accessed July 4, 2018, http://www.esyariah.gov.my/portal/page/portal/Portal%20E-Syariah%20BI/Portal%20E-Syariah%20Profil%20JKSM (in English; provides an overview of the JKSM profile).
64 Berita Mingguan, May 28, 2000; Utusan Malaysia, December 28, 1998.
65 Yusoff Ghazali (Public Service Department), interview by the author, Kuala Lumpur, September 5, 2000; Mohd Naim Mokhtar (JKSM), interview by the author, Putrajaya, June 13, 2013.
66 Interviews with Kelantan Syariah Court officials; interviews with JKSM officials. The interviews with the author were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual consent, and dates and location have also been withheld to maintain confidentiality.
67 JKSM officials, interview.
68 JKSM officials, interview. Interview with staff of the Kelantan Syariah Court. The interviews with the author were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual consent, and dates and location have also been withheld to maintain confidentiality.
69 Mohd Naim Mokhtar (chief justice of the Selangor Syariah Court), interview by the author, Shah Alam, June 30, 2015.
70 Interviews with members and staff of the Kelantan Syariah Court. The interviews with the author were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual consent, and dates and location have also been withheld to maintain confidentiality.
71 Ibrahim Lembut (chief justice, Federal Syariah Court of Malaysia, and director-general, JKSM), interview by the author, Putrajaya, June 13, 2013. Despite the government's policy and their good academic standing, very few female students are keen on becoming sharia judges, a concern of JKSM officials who would like to hire more female judges.
72 The ruling coalition led by the UMNO, Barisan Nasional (National Front), lost the Selangor state government in 2008.
73 Mokhtar, interview, June 13, 2013.
74 Lembut, interview; JKSM officials, interviews.
75 JKSM officials, interviews.
76 Daud Muhammad (chief justice, Kelantan Syariah Court), interview by the author, Kota Bharu, August 14, 2013.
77 Interview with member, Kelantan Syariah Court. The interview with the author was conducted in confidentiality, and the names of the interviewee is withheld by mutual consent, and date and location have also been withheld to maintain confidentiality.
78 Interview with former member of the federal judiciary. The interview with the author was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of the interviewee is withheld by mutual consent, and date and location have also been withheld to maintain confidentiality.
79 Interviews with former staff for the deputy prime minister; interview with legal advisor for federal government; interviews with Sisters in Islam. The interviews with the author were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual consent, and dates and locations have also been withheld to maintain confidentiality.
80 Malay Mail Online, November 19, 2014.
81 Pakistan has a federal sharia court. For the development of the Islamic legal system in Pakistan, see for example Mehdi, Rubya, The Islamization of the Law in Pakistan (London: Routledge, 2013)Google Scholar.
82 Interviews, JKSM officials and sharia judges.
83 Former member of the federal judiciary, interview.
84 Neo, “Competing Imperatives.”
85 “Hindu Groups Claim 7,000 People Wrongly Documented as Muslims,” Malaysian Insider, February 23, 2016.
86 A most recent prominent case illuminating this dynamic involves a Hindu woman, Indira Gandhi, in Ipoh, Perak. Indira challenged the conversion of her children and has taken her case to the federal court, after the court of appeal ruled on December 30, 2015, that the validity of conversion of the three children by their Muslim father could only be determined by the Syariah Court (Malay Mail Online, January 5, 2016).
87 Interview with official, Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia. The interview with the author was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of the interviewee is withheld by mutual consent, and date and location have also been withheld to maintain confidentiality.
88 Hamayotsu, Kikue, “Once a Muslim, Always a Muslim: The Politics of State Enforcement of Syariah in Contemporary Malaysia,” South East Asia Research 20, no. 3 (2012): 399–421CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
