Voters are increasingly turning away from governing parties in parliamentary elections, with junior parties in coalition governments often bearing the brunt of the electorate’s dissatisfaction. Can the design of legislative institutions help parties mitigate the electoral costs of governing? We suggest that in systems with strong legislative committees, junior coalition parties are better positioned to protect their party’s policy brand from being eroded, which in turn helps insulate them from the electoral costs of governing. Analyzing data on legislative committees and party-level electoral outcomes in 36 European and OECD countries from 1990 to 2019, we find that stronger parliamentary committee systems are associated with harsher electoral costs for the prime minister’s party but reduced electoral costs for junior coalition parties. Our findings suggest that the structure of legislative institutions in parliamentary systems can have significant electoral implications, including relatively positive outcomes for smaller governing parties.

Voters are frustrated by the influence of money in politics. They cannot be certain whether politicians follow the money or the will of the people. Disclosing side income may therefore serve as a means to increase trust in politicians. To investigate whether this mechanism works, we analyze data from a vignette survey experiment on parliamentarians’ side jobs with respondents from seven European countries (N $ \approx $ 14,100). Our results show that compared to parliamentarians who are unwilling to disclose their side income, transparent parliamentarians, even those with especially high extra-parliamentary earnings, are seen as more trustworthy and electable. We also find that voters rely on the combined information of the number and type of side jobs (companies versus public interest groups) when evaluating non-transparent parliamentarians. Furthermore, voters’ income, education level, and ideological leaning moderate their perceptions of (non-)transparent parliamentarians. Overall, our findings suggest that politicians’ disclosure of side income benefits representative democracy.

Minority governments are common across parliamentary systems, and a large body of literature has examined their stability and performance. Meanwhile, we know very little about how voters perceive this government type and whether they understand its political implications. We survey voters in Denmark, Germany, and Sweden, three European countries with varying degrees of exposure to minority governments, about their knowledge and perceptions of minority governments. We find that voters have knowledge levels comparable to those about the role of political parties, and that this is independent of the respective prevalence of minority governments in each country. Informed voters express stronger preferences for majority governments. However, minority governments are associated with specific positive representational traits, specifically with the impression that such governments listen more to the demands of all voters, and general perceptions are stronger for knowledgeable voters. The findings have implications for how elites can formulate arguments in favour or against minority governments that may resonate with voters.

Climate policy remains inadequate even among leaders like the European Union. This is largely due to opposition from fossil fuel producers and heavy industrial sectors that are existentially threatened by decarbonisation. The rise of green industrial policy promises to advance climate policy by reducing this opposition and mobilising corporate supporters. But can climate policy strategies actually shift the balance of interest group mobilisation among expected winners and losers simply by using different policy instruments? I theorise that policy strategies (de)mobilise corporate interests through regulatory targeting. Corporations directly targeted by a proposed policy are more likely to lobby because of policy-specific informational advantages and more certain and immediate impacts. Compared to traditional climate policies that impose direct costs on fossil fuels, green industrial policies should therefore demobilise high-carbon firms and mobilise their low-carbon counterparts. I collect and code novel data on all corporate responses to online consultations in European Union climate and energy policy from 2017 to 2022. Dyadic regression analyses confirm that low-carbon sectors lobby mostly on green industrial policies while high-carbon sectors mobilise more around traditional climate policies, and that stakeholders are more likely to lobby when directly targeted by policies. These results document that climate policies can indeed determine climate politics, a finding that has implications for other policy areas characterised by business conflict and for interest group scholarship more broadly.

A vast body of literature studies how national identities explain immigration attitudes. In Europe, however, migration policy is largely Europeanised, requiring a European perspective. This article distinguishes between civic and cultural European identities and theorises how the two identity types relate to characteristics of immigrants with respect to admission decisions. Among others, we introduce the novel hypothesis that value congruence among Europeans and immigrants matters. The analyses of observational data and conjoint experiments show that Europeans with a cultural identity hold more restrictive attitudes; civics particularly prioritise immigrants who share their own values, while culturals more strongly reject immigrants who are culturally distant (ie Afghans and Muslims). Despite these differences, the following finding stands out: The more distant immigrants are perceived, the less likely they are to be admitted by Europeans from both identity types, raising serious questions about the role of humanitarian reasons in immigration decisions.

We explore how honesty-humility and the other HEXACO personality traits relate to citizens’ nascent ambition and their recruitment to run for office. We extend previous work on virtue-related personality traits and political recruitment in two important ways: we go beyond North America and conduct a five-country cross-national study with nationally representative samples. More importantly, going beyond individual-level differences in nascent ambition, we also address how honesty-humility predicts the likelihood of being asked to and actually running for office. Based on data from Canada, Denmark, Israel, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, we demonstrate that citizens with lower levels of honesty-humility are more likely to have considered running, to deem themselves qualified to run, to have been asked to run, and to actually have run for a political office. From a ‘virtue ethics’ perspective, this is highly concerning: low honesty-humility predisposes individuals to engage in unethical behavior and decision-making. We discuss implications for the quality of political representation.

While scholars of deliberative democracy have long conceded that good deliberation requires careful facilitation, little attention has been paid to the effects of different facilitation methods. This paper has three aims. First, it establishes the importance of facilitation. Second, it argues that facilitation may not be enough to counteract the imbalances in power and influence within deliberation. As such, this paper introduces two games that can be utilized in concert with facilitation: deliberative worth exercises and simulated representation. The former pushes participants to remain aware of their behavior patterns within deliberation by asking them to choose the best deliberator at the end of each round of deliberation; the latter enables empathy and perspective-taking by partnering participants and asking them to represent one another’s viewpoints for a portion of deliberation as if they were their own. Third, using proof-of-concept experiments, this paper demonstrates the efficacy of these games.

For decades, party politics literature has argued that populist radical right (PRR) parties must distance themselves from their countries’ authoritarian pasts to achieve electoral relevance in a Sartorian sense. Yet, we now observe the growing success and influence of PRR parties that not only embrace nostalgia for this past but also maintain ties to it. The use of what we term ‘authoritarian nostalgia’ is not only becoming more widespread across politics but it has proven effective across diverse segments of the electorate. This study examines the extent to which (populist radical) right supporters approve of their countries’ authoritarian histories and view these past regimes favourably. Using original survey data fielded in Spain and Portugal and a novel set of survey items measuring authoritarian nostalgia, we find that supporters of VOX and Chega are more likely to express a broad sense of collective nostalgia, particularly through a longing for their country’s ‘old, glorious days’, but demonstrate strong nostalgia for Franco and Salazar’s authoritarian regimes more specifically. Furthermore, we observe similar affinities for the authoritarian past amongst traditional right-wing supporters, primarily among Partido Popular (PP) supporters in Spain, with weaker evidence for PPD/PSD supporters in Portugal. Our findings suggest that, rather than hindering electoral performance, authoritarian nostalgia can, in fact, stimulate (populist radical) right-wing electorates.

What determines the outcomes of negotiations is a central question in political science, and such negotiations are crucial in coalition systems where political parties distribute policy payoffs during coalition negotiations. In this paper, we argue that due to the combination of the non-separability of most public policies and the shared responsibility for policy outcomes under coalition governments, which policies a party manages to get included in a coalition agreement will reflect these policies’ popularity among the other governing coalition parties, rather than policy payoffs being driven by proportionality or relative salience. Using a unique dataset containing novel data on the budgetary impact of every measure proposed in election manifestos and coalition agreements over five government formations, we can directly observe the policy payoffs extracted by each party for participating in government, using a measure that is directly comparable across parties, policy areas, and time. The results have substantial implications for our understanding of the formation process and functioning of coalition governments.

This study explores whether ideological polarization increases political engagement and trust, both of which are central elements of civic culture. Polarization can clarify political positions and thereby simplify the formation of opinions, increase the stakes of elections, and offer more options to citizens. To estimate the impact of polarization from a causal perspective, we exploit variation within individuals over time using individual-level data from the Swiss Household Panel spanning from 1999 – 2023, amounting to 178,251 observations from 28,187 persons. Ideological polarization at the individual level is measured by a process of increasing extremity of the self-position on the left-right scale. In addition, we test how polarization of cohabiting household members has spillover effects on political engagement and trust. For political engagement, we adopt a comprehensive approach, focusing on interest in politics, participation in popular votes, party identification, and frequency of political discussions as dependent variables. Political trust is measured as confidence in the federal council. To analyze the data, we primarily use fixed effects models, complemented by a pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model, and cross-lagged models to address reverse causality. Results show that ideological polarization does promote engagement but has a weak negative impact on political trust. This effect remains significant when controlling for affective polarization. Additionally, there is an overall increase in political engagement and a decrease in political trust if partners living in the same household become more extreme in their ideological preferences.

Against the backdrop of debates about migrant integration in Western countries, this article examines the extent to which liberal democratic values differ between migrants and non-migrants in Europe and whether potential differences can be explained by socialisation in different political contexts. We measure specific values of liberal democracies using data from the European Social Survey, covering a large number of countries, and from the German Integration Barometer, covering a representative sample of migrants from different countries of origin. This allows us to investigate how structural political socialisation and indoctrination in more or less democratic regimes affect the democratic values of migrants and to what extent possible differences in values diminish when migrants from non-democratic countries settle in democratic countries. The analyses show that all three – non-migrants, migrants from more democratic countries, and migrants from less democratic countries – have high levels of liberal democratic values. At this elevated level, we additionally observe that longer periods of socialisation in less democratic countries of origin reduce, and longer periods in more democratic countries of destination increase, migrants’ support for liberal democratic values. Thus, we find support for socialisation and adaptation processes among immigrants in Europe, but these effects are relatively small.

The radical right succeeds when minorities challenge the societal standing of majorities. In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), research often focuses on the political gains of ethnic minorities. We build on this work by differentiating among (1) types of representation; (2) minority mobilization versus ally advocacy; and (3) politically mobilized versus socially marginalized ethnic minorities. First, we introduce a novel measure of representation based on the power, influence, and prestige afforded to ethnic minorities at the executive (cabinet) level. Second, we evaluate whether legislative descriptive representation, ethnic minority party coalition participation, and ethnic minority cabinet-level prestige are associated with radical-right aggregate electoral success and individual-level radical-right vote choice. Cabinet-level prestige consistently predicts radical-right success; descriptive representation and coalition participation have less robust associations. Third, experiments in Romania and Slovakia highlight the mechanism, underscoring that representation – namely the substantive representation of politically mobilized minorities – causes resentment among ethnic majorities. In sum, majority-minority relations continue to structure CEE electoral politics, and the politicization of minority gains remains a viable strategy for mobilizing radical-right support.

Research indicates a lack of presence of lower socioeconomic status (SES) individuals in parliament, hindering their representation due to a lack of shared experiences between low SES citizens and representatives. Theorists argue that understanding low SES experiences depends not only on representatives’ own SES but also on those closest to them. However, little is known about whether elected representatives count lower SES citizens in their intimate network. Surveying 1,185 representatives across 13 Western countries, we examine the educational attainment and social class of their parents, partner, and two closest friends. In none of these countries do representatives’ ties mirror the share of lower SES citizens in the population. The results are only slightly better when we examine how many representatives have at least a single lower SES tie. We also find evidence for homophily. High SES representatives tend to associate with high SES individuals, and they tend to do that much more than high SES citizens associate with other high SES citizens. This shows that representatives who could benefit most from lower SES perspectives in their personal networks often lack them.

Expectations about election outcomes shape voter behavior, yet little research has examined how expectations regarding the post-election formateur influence voting decisions. This study examines the conditions under which voters engage in formateur optimization – strategically supporting parties with a realistic chance of forming the government rather than their most preferred party. We argue that while formateur uncertainty plays a key role, its effect depends on voters’ preferences regarding their most preferred party and their preferred formateur. Using modules 1–5 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and German pre-election surveys (1998–2021), we find that formateur optimization is more likely in tightly contested elections. However, our results also show that voters’ preferences moderate the effect of formateur uncertainty: formateur optimization remains low even under high uncertainty when voters strongly favor a non-formateur party over the formateur’s party. Furthermore, we find that voters who expect their preferred formateur candidate to lose behave similarly to those uncertain about the outcome – and still engage in formateur optimization. These findings highlight the interplay between expectations and preferences in shaping voting decisions in coalition systems, offering new insights into voter calculations in multiparty democracies.

Rising inequalities have been described as fertile ground for populist parties across the world. In this article, we investigate the role that inequality perception plays in strengthening populist attitudes and increasing support for populist parties. Using data from the International Social Survey Programme, we find that those who perceive greater inequality in society are more likely to support populist parties. To explore the causal relationship, we also conduct a survey experiment in Denmark, Germany, and Italy, randomly exposing participants to factual information about the wealth distribution. The results show that the perception of inequality can increase populist attitudes, but does not immediately affect the likelihood of voting for populist parties in this context. The findings speak to current debates on how inequalities and their perception became a pre-condition for the rise of populist parties all over Europe.

Combining key elements of classical and constructivist approaches to representation, this article suggests a novel reconceptualisation of political representation. Developed through participatory agency research with people in socio-economically difficult situations and anchored in people’s lived experiences and sense-making processes, the representative relationship is redefined as a pragmatic and solution-oriented partnership between representatives and the represented. Expanding the classical Pitkinian model, it enables representatives to be better informed about how to address peoples’ concerns. In doing so, it advances the notion of dynamic political representation, where the represented are not passive principals but active partners in decision-making. While we uphold the classical principle of acting in the interests of the represented, we reconceptualise these interests as dynamic and continuously evolving – a perspective consistent with constructivist thought. This research aligns with scholarly calls to rethink representation and revise the roles of the representatives and the represented, fostering meaningful and effective engagement. Our empirical findings highlight the urgency of reform for people in socio-economically difficult situations and underscores the broader relevance of these insights, in a context of increasing legitimacy deficits and rising discontent with current modes of representation in contemporary democracies.

While political opposition to economic globalisation has increased, several governments have adopted stricter unilateral interventions in global supply chains in the name of sustainability, despite their potentially significant economic costs. We argue that these policy choices are partly driven by politicians’ incentives to align with domestic public opinion. In particular, new information disclosure rules enable governments to implement market access restrictions compliant with binding trade liberalisation commitments while (a priori) obscuring their costs to voters. We assess the latter argument with original survey data and experiments with representative samples from the twelve major OECD importing economies (N = 24,000). Indeed, citizens expect substantive benefits while discounting costs from these new regulations, resulting in majority support for rather stringent standards. We further observe that these relationships are muted in countries with high trade exposure. These findings suggest that governments may strategically implement unilateral policies with high-cost obfuscation to garner domestic voter support, driving regulatory proliferation in international economic relations.

Traditional sexualities are in decline. Across the world, individuals in liberal democracies are increasingly identifying with sexual identities that challenge the heteronormative status quo. Today, an average of one in five young people identify with a sexually inclusive identity. How do members of the sexual majority group in liberal democracies respond to this change? Women are far more likely to express public support for sexual minorities, but does this public support translate into private behaviour? Do women accommodate potential partners with gender-inclusive dating preferences more than men? Relying on three novel pre-registered experiments – a double-list experiment, a visual conjoint, and a vignette study – I demonstrate that: i) the sexual majority group penalises sexually inclusive individuals on the dating market, and ii) women in the sexual majority group are far more likely to reject gender-inclusive and sexually inclusive partners compared to men. Empirically, I show that the sizeable difference in the penalty exhibited against sexually inclusive men, an empirical expectation equally anticipated by men and women, can be explained by women perceiving sexually inclusive men as deviating from traditional gender norms. These findings reveal a critical disconnect between public support for LGBTQ+ inclusion and actual behaviour in intimate contexts. They highlight how entrenched expectations of gender-congruent behaviour continue to shape interpersonal dynamics, even in ostensibly liberal societies. As a result, sexually inclusive men face distinct and intensified pressures to conform, which may help explain patterns of identity suppression among young men.

This study examines the role of political campaigns in reducing voter susceptibility to framing effects. The case chosen is the 2022 EU defence opt-out referendum in Denmark. Using a novel survey experiment design that exposed voters to arguments at the start and the end of the campaign, we were able to directly test the impact of a real-world campaign on voter susceptibility to frames. The findings reveal a notable reduction in framing effects. Initially, loss-related framed arguments swayed voters, but this impact waned at the campaign’s end. Our analysis suggests that the campaign provided voters with information and arguments that made them less susceptible to framing effects and instead empowered voters to make informed decisions on the referendum based on their own attitudes towards the EU. In the conclusions, we encourage further research on susceptibility to elite messages in real-world settings.

Two interrelated trends have narrowed the class backgrounds of policymakers over the past decades: a decreasing share of working-class MPs and a parallel rise of highly educated ‘career politicians’ with little occupational experience outside politics. Although these trends risk aggravating representational inequality, we know little about their causes. Focusing on parties as the main gatekeepers to parliament, we analyse how the class background of political candidates influences the chances of being nominated in electorally safer positions. Based on original data on MPs’ backgrounds and the German GLES Candidate Study, we show that candidates with a working-class background have lower chances to be placed in safe positions, especially in center-right parties. Careerists, in contrast, enjoy systematic advantages in the nomination process, at least in left-wing parties. Lacking individual resources is thus not the only obstacle to working-class representation, but political parties are important actors in shaping the class composition of parliaments.