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PROPERLY BASIC THEISTIC BELIEF: A SESAME STREET OBJECTION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 October 2017

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Abstract

Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga wants everyone to agree that while sceptics will always be with us, no one is irrational in accepting what only the stubborn sceptic denies. Plantinga claims no one should be considered irrational for accepting what the religious sceptic denies either. Rather, the claim goes, belief in God should be as uncontroversial as any other properly basic belief sensible people happily hold without absolute proof sufficient to silence the sceptic. The legitimacy of placing theistic belief alongside other properly basic beliefs is challenged by the Sesame Street Objection: ‘one of these things is not like the others’.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2017 

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