Appendix VII: Ukraine Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys – By Region Logit Analysis of Tax Compliance Attitudes (DV = Whether One Would Follow the Tax Laws Even If Personally Considered to Be Unfair) Coefficients and (Standard Errors)317318319320321322323324325
| Catholic Ukraine 2005 | Catholic Ukraine 2005 Sub. Effects | Non-Catholic Ukraine 2005 | Non-Catholic Ukraine 2005 Sub. Effects | West Ukraine 2005 | West Ukraine 2005 Sub. Effects | Far West 2005 | Far West 2005 Sub. Effects | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Deterrence | ||||||||
| Evasion OK if could get away with it | −0.54* (0.29) | −0.13** | −0.46*** (0.09) | −0.12*** | −0.38** (0.18) | −0.10** | −1.02*** (0.25) | −0.25*** |
| Quasi-voluntary | ||||||||
| Trusts president | −0.84 (0.76) | −0.16 | 0.05 (0.20) | 0.01 | −0.12 (0.43) | −0.03 | −1.82*** (0.60) | −0.41*** |
| Trusts parliament | 2.68*** (0.82) | 0.54*** | −0.27 (0.22) | −0.07* | 1.20** (0.47) | 0.29*** | 1.83*** (0.63) | 0.41*** |
| Trusts government | −1.43 (0.99) | −0.30* | 0.25 (0.26) | 0.06 | −0.39 (0.57) | −0.10 | −0.11 (0.78) | −0.03 |
| Many dishonest tax bureaucrats | 0.17 (0.59) | 0.05 | −0.52*** (0.17) | −0.13*** | −0.38 (0.33) | −0.09 | 0.29 (0.45) | 0.06 |
| Many people evade taxes | −0.57 (0.68) | −0.11 | 0.16 (0.17) | 0.04 | 0.55 (0.38) | 0.13* | 0.62 (0.52) | 0.15 |
| Contact | ||||||||
| Previous contact with tax bureaucrats | 0.40 (0.50) | 0.08 | −0.06 (0.11) | −0.01 | −0.05 (0.26) | −0.01 | 0.26 (0.38) | 0.06 |
| Socio-economic, additional effects | ||||||||
| Income | −1.30 (0.80) | −0.11* | 0.66*** (0.23) | 0.06*** | −0.20 (0.47) | −0.02 | −0.59 (0.61) | −0.06 |
| I file my income taxes myself | −0.70 (0.57) | −0.16 | −0.29* (0.15) | −0.07** | −0.28 (0.32) | −0.07 | −0.45 (0.42) | −0.10 |
| Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs) | ||||||||
| Male | −0.27 (0.26) | −0.06 | −0.09 (0.08) | −0.02 | −0.28* (0.16) | −0.07** | −0.29 (0.21) | −0.07* |
| Age | −0.01 (0.009) | −0.10* | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.03* | −0.003 (0.005) | −0.03 | −0.004 (0.007) | −0.03 |
| Education | −0.52 (0.68) | −0.11 | 0.36* (0.19) | 0.09*** | −0.17 (0.39) | −0.04 | −0.69 (0.51) | −0.16* |
| Constant | 2.59** (1.01) | – | −0.18 (0.25) | – | 0.14 (0.58) | – | 0.95 (0.77) | – |
| N | 279 | 279 | 2618 | 2618 | 643 | 643 | 417 | 417 |
| Missing observations | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace |
| % would obey | 47.37 | – | 34.57 | – | 36.43 | – | 37.18 | – |
*p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.
| Far West Catholic 2005 | Far West Catholic 2005 Sub. Effects | Far West Non-Catholic 2005 | Far West Non-Catholic 2005 Sub. Effects | Center 2005 | Center 2005 Sub. Effects | Kyiv & Kyiv Oblast 2005 | Kyiv & Kyiv Oblast 2005 Sub. Effects | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Deterrence | ||||||||
| Evasion OK if could get away with it | −1.33*** (0.39) | −0.32*** | −0.50 (0.36) | −0.11* | −0.63*** (0.14) | −0.16*** | −0.42 (0.34) | −0.09 |
| Quasi-voluntary | ||||||||
| Trusts president | −1.95** (0.98) | −0.39** | −1.89** (0.84) | −0.41*** | 0.28 (0.32) | 0.07 | 0.14 (0.71) | 0.04 |
| Trusts parliament | 2.54*** (0.97) | 0.53*** | 0.49 (0.93) | 0.12 | −0.19 (0.38) | −0.05 | −1.69* (0.88) | −0.36** |
| Trusts government | −0.40 (1.27) | −0.08 | 0.22 (1.09) | 0.03 | 0.60 (0.43) | 0.04 | 2.66** (1.07) | 0.48*** |
| Many dishonest tax bureaucrats | 1.03 (0.75) | 0.24 | −1.14* (0.65) | −0.27** | −0.09** (0.26) | −0.15*** | −0.32 (0.63) | −0.07 |
| Many people evade taxes | −0.46 (0.85) | −0.10 | 2.39*** (0.83) | 0.44*** | −0.12 (0.26) | −0.02 | −1.33** (0.65) | −0.23** |
| Prior contact | ||||||||
| Previous contact with tax bureaucrats | 0.63 (0.60) | 0.13 | 0.23 (0.57) | 0.06 | −0.12 (0.18) | −0.03 | 0.41 (0.49) | 0.07 |
| Socio-economic, additional effects | ||||||||
| Income | −0.61 (0.98) | −0.06 | −0.66 (0.88) | −0.05 | 0.98** (0.38) | 0.09*** | 1.43 (0.96) | 0.12* |
| I file my income taxes myself | −1.27* (0.72) | −0.28** | 0.17 (0.58) | 0.05 | −0.71*** (0.25) | −0.17*** | −1.45** (0.69) | −0.32** |
| Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs) | ||||||||
| Male | −0.31 (0.31) | −0.07 | −0.49 (0.32) | −0.11* | −0.008 (0.13) | −0.003 | 0.16 (0.31) | 0.03 |
| Age | −0.02 (0.01) | −0.13* | 0.007 (0.009) | 0.06 | 0.002 (0.004) | 0.02 | 0.002 (0.01) | 0.02 |
| Education | −1.08 (0.84) | −0.24* | −1.36* (0.75) | −0.30** | 0.36 (0.32) | 0.09 | 0.54 (0.72) | 0.11 |
| Constant | 2.32* (1.31) | – | 0.36 (1.07) | – | 0.10 (0.44) | – | 0.51 (1.12) | – |
| N | 206 | 206 | 209 | 209 | 993 | 993 | 235 | 235 |
| Missing observations | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace |
| % would obey | 44.57 | – | 29.60 | – | 36.39 | – | 46.87 | – |
*p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.
| East 2005 | East 2005 Sub. Effects | Donbas 2005 | Donbas 2005 Sub. Effects | South 2005 | South 2005 Sub. Effects | Crimea 2005 | Crimea 2005 Sub. Effects | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Deterrence | ||||||||
| Evasion OK if could get away with it | −0.41*** (0.16) | −0.10*** | −0.32 (0.26) | −0.08 | −0.68*** (0.26) | −0.16*** | −0.56 (0.47) | −0.13 |
| Quasi-voluntary | ||||||||
| Trusts president | 0.46 (0.39) | 0.11 | 1.67** (0.72) | 0.34** | 0.07 (0.65) | 0.01 | −1.57 (1.24) | −0.31 |
| Trusts parliament | −0.74* (0.40) | −0.18** | 1.28 (0.84) | 0.28* | −0.86 (0.65) | −0.19* | −1.37 (1.39) | −0.27 |
| Trusts government | −0.41 (0.47) | −0.10 | −4.57*** (0.98) | −0.76*** | 1.83** (0.84) | 0.41** | 2.53** (1.29) | 0.54** |
| Many dishonest tax bureaucrats | −0.24 (0.31) | −0.06 | −0.99** (0.48) | −0.24** | −0.13 (0.51) | −0.03 | −1.22 (1.02) | −0.28 |
| Many people evade taxes | 0.14 (0.32) | 0.04 | 0.14 (0.48) | 0.03 | 0.20 (0.60) | 0.05 | −0.19 (0.80) | −0.04 |
| Prior contact | ||||||||
| Previous contact with tax bureaucrats | −0.34 (0.23) | −0.09* | −0.84** (0.41) | −0.20** | 0.47 (0.32) | 0.12* | 0.16 (0.62) | 0.04 |
| Socio-economic, additional effects | ||||||||
| Income | 0.33 (0.41) | 0.03 | 0.48 (0.60) | 0.05 | 0.56 (0.71) | 0.05 | 1.03 (1.42) | 0.09 |
| I file my income taxes myself | −0.06 (0.29) | −0.01 | 0.60 (0.54) | 0.13 | 0.16 (0.49) | 0.04 | −0.11 (0.75) | −0.02 |
| Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs) | ||||||||
| Male | −0.08 (0.15) | −0.02 | 0.008 (0.22) | 0.05 | 0.18 (0.25) | 0.04 | −0.41 (0.41) | −0.10 |
| Age | 0.004 (0.005) | 0.04 | 0.02** (0.007) | 0.13** | 0.0006 (0.007) | 0.008 | 0.006 (0.01) | 0.05 |
| Education | 0.38 (0.36) | 0.09 | 0.85 (0.58) | 0.20* | 1.18** (0.58) | 0.28** | 0.41 (1.01) | 0.08 |
| Constant | 0.11 (0.43) | – | 0.11 (0.64) | – | −1.38* (0.78) | – | 0.08 (1.23) | – |
| N | 803 | 803 | 389 | 389 | 320 | 320 | 132 | 132 |
| Missing observations | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace |
| % would obey | 37.61 | – | 42.60 | – | 32.35 | – | 26.00 | – |
*p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.
| Catholic Ukraine 2010 | Catholic Ukraine 2010 Sub. Effects | Non-Catholic Ukraine 2010 | Non-Catholic Ukraine 2010 Sub. Effects | West Ukraine 2010 | West Ukraine 2010 Sub. Effects | Far West 2010 | Far West 2010 Sub. Effects | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Deterrence | ||||||||
| Evasion OK if could get away with it | −0.11 (0.28) | −0.02 | −0.12 (0.08) | −0.03* | 0.10 (0.17) | 0.02 | −0.22 (0.22) | −0.05 |
| Quasi-voluntary | ||||||||
| Trusts president | −1.29 (0.83) | −0.28* | 0.15 (0.22) | 0.04 | −0.47 (0.44) | −0.12 | −0.15 (0.58) | −0.04 |
| Trusts parliament | 1.33 (0.90) | 0.25* | 0.40 (0.25) | 0.10* | 1.27** (0.55) | 0.29** | 0.61 (0.72) | 0.13 |
| Trusts government | −0.51 (0.86) | −0.13 | 0.48* (0.27) | 0.12** | −0.15 (0.53) | −0.04 | 0.04 (0.69) | 0.01 |
| Many dishonest tax bureaucrats | 0.64 (0.53) | 0.15* | −0.58*** (0.15) | −0.14*** | −0.02 (0.33) | −0.005 | 0.15 (0.42) | 0.03 |
| Many people evade taxes | 0.17 (0.50) | 0.05 | 0.10 (0.15) | 0.03 | 0.06 (0.32) | 0.02 | 0.39 (0.41) | 0.09 |
| Prior contact | ||||||||
| Previous contact with tax bureaucrats | −0.36 (0.35) | −0.08 | −0.16 (0.11) | −0.04* | −0.68*** (0.21) | −0.17*** | −0.74*** (0.27) | −0.18*** |
| Socio-economic, additional effects | ||||||||
| Income | 1.49 (1.26) | 0.25 | 0.20 (0.34) | 0.05 | 0.85 (0.78) | 0.19 | 0.92 (0.92) | 0.16 |
| I file my income taxes myself | −0.08 (0.08) | −0.02 | −0.06** (0.03) | −0.01*** | −0.07* (0.04) | −0.02** | −0.04 (0.06) | −0.009 |
| Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs) | ||||||||
| Male | −0.06 (0.25) | −0.01 | −0.04 (0.08) | −0.01 | 0.18 (0.16) | 0.05 | −0.002 (0.20) | 0.0003 |
| Age | −0.004 (0.008) | −0.03 | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.01 | 0.003 (0.005) | 0.03 | −0.001 (0.006) | −0.01 |
| Education | −0.08 (0.64) | −0.02 | 0.12 (0.19) | 0.03 | −0.03 (0.40) | −0.01 | −0.13 (0.50) | −0.03 |
| Constant | 0.22 (0.75) | – | −0.11 (0.23) | – | −0.33 (0.47) | – | 0.02 (0.59) | – |
| N | 306 | 306 | 2924 | 2924 | 696 | 696 | 453 | 453 |
| Missing observations | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace |
| % would obey | 48.18 | – | 43.04 | – | 42.61 | – | 47.43 | – |
*p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.
| Far West Catholic 2010 | Far West Catholic 2010 Sub. Effects | Far West Non-Catholic 2010 | Far West Non-Catholic 2010 Sub. Effects | Center 2010 | Center 2010 Sub. Effects | Kyiv & Kyiv Oblast 2010 | Kyiv & Kyiv Oblast 2010 Sub. Effects | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Substantive Effects | ||||||||
| Deterrence | ||||||||
| Evasion OK if could get away with it | −0.42 (0.35) | −0.09 | −0.02 (0.31) | −0.005 | 0.62*** (0.13) | 0.15*** | 0.50* (0.28) | 0.12** |
| Quasi-voluntary | ||||||||
| Trusts president | −0.45 (1.24) | −0.09 | 0.61 (0.69) | 0.16 | 0.59 (0.40) | 0.14* | 0.16 (0.86) | 0.03 |
| Trusts parliament | 1.19 (1.14) | 0.21 | −0.79 (1.01) | −0.19 | −1.08** (0.47) | −0.26*** | −3.43*** (1.20) | −0.65*** |
| Trusts government | −0.71 (1.23) | −0.18 | 1.00 (0.91) | 0.23 | 0.84 (0.52) | 0.20* | 2.90** (1.29) | 0.52*** |
| Many dishonest tax bureaucrats | 0.59 (0.68) | 0.13 | −0.39 (0.56) | −0.09 | −0.89*** (0.26) | −0.22*** | −1.41*** (0.52) | −0.32*** |
| Many people evade taxes | 0.21 (0.65) | 0.06 | 0.62 (0.56) | 0.14 | −0.29 (0.24) | −0.07 | −0.44 (0.47) | −0.10 |
| Prior contact | ||||||||
| Previous contact with tax bureaucrats | −0.61 (0.41) | −0.14* | −0.83** (0.37) | −0.19** | 0.05 (0.19) | 0.01 | −0.17 (0.39) | −0.04 |
| Socio-economic, additional effects | ||||||||
| Income | 1.22 (1.54) | 0.17 | −0.47 (1.25) | −0.10 | 1.36** (0.58) | 0.30*** | 1.93* (1.06) | 0.38** |
| I file my income taxes myself | 0.04 (0.13) | 0.009 | −0.06 (0.08) | −0.01 | −0.12*** (0.05) | −0.03*** | −0.96** (0.47) | −0.23** |
| Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs) | ||||||||
| Male | −0.12 (0.30) | −0.02 | 0.17 (0.29) | 0.04 | −0.09 (0.12) | −0.02 | −0.45* (0.26) | −0.11** |
| Age | 0.001 (0.01) | 0.01 | −0.0007 (0.008) | −0.006 | 0.004 (0.004) | 0.04 | 0.003 (0.008) | 0.02 |
| Education | −0.23 (0.78) | −0.05 | −0.27 (0.70) | −0.07 | 0.42 (0.30) | 0.10* | −0.05 (0.61) | −0.02 |
| Constant | 0.28 (0.93) | – | −0.19 (0.80) | – | −0.28 (0.36) | – | 0.90 (0.80) | – |
| N | 224 | 224 | 229 | 229 | 1137 | 1137 | 300 | 300 |
| Missing observations | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace |
| % would obey | 52.69 | – | 41.89 | – | 43.96 | – | 49.71 | – |
*p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable is shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.
| East 2010 | East 2010 Sub. Effects | Donbas 2010 | Donbas 2010 Sub. Effects | South 2010 | South 2010 Sub. Effects | Crimea 20101 | Crimea 2010 Sub. Effects | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Deterrence | ||||||||
| Evasion OK if could get away with it | −0.41*** (0.15) | −0.10*** | −0.69*** (0.22) | −0.17*** | −1.38*** (0.26) | −0.31*** | −1.69*** (0.51) | −0.33*** |
| Quasi-voluntary | ||||||||
| Trusts president | −0.05 (0.40) | −0.01 | −0.50 (0.69) | −0.12 | −0.33 (0.74) | −0.06 | −9.14** (3.95) | −0.66*** |
| Trusts parliament | 1.09*** (0.41) | 0.26*** | 2.14*** (0.73) | 0.48*** | −0.54 (0.82) | −0.11 | 9.43*** (3.27) | 0.94*** |
| Trusts government | 0.47 (0.44) | 0.12 | 0.15 (0.85) | 0.04 | 1.85* (0.98) | 0.38** | 0.79 (3.06) | 0.22 |
| Many dishonest tax bureaucrats | −0.57* (0.30) | −0.14** | −0.27 (−0.44) | −0.07 | −0.48 (0.45) | −0.11 | 1.13 (0.87) | 0.18 |
| Many people evade taxes | 0.24 (0.32) | 0.06 | 0.04 (0.51) | 0.01 | 1.72*** (0.52) | 0.40*** | 0.40 (0.95) | 0.08 |
| Prior contact | ||||||||
| Previous contact with tax bureaucrats | 0.22 (0.22) | 0.05 | −0.28 (0.34) | −0.06 | −0.36 (0.38) | −0.09 | – | – |
| Socio-economic, additional effects | ||||||||
| Income | 0.60 (0.61) | 0.14 | 0.44 (0.84) | 0.09 | −2.38* (1.35) | −0.48** | −2.46 (2.52) | −0.44 |
| I file my income taxes myself | −0.06 (0.06) | −0.02 | −0.25* (0.13) | −0.06** | −0.13* (0.07) | −0.03** | 0.02 (0.11) | 0.004 |
| Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs) | ||||||||
| Male | −0.06 (0.14) | −0.01 | −0.02 (0.21) | −0.004 | 0.05 (0.25) | 0.01 | −0.59 (0.46) | −0.10 |
| Age | −0.008* (0.004) | −0.07** | −0.003 (0.006) | −0.03 | 0.008 (0.008) | 0.06 | 0.02 (0.01) | 0.09 |
| Education | −0.07 (0.37) | −0.02 | −0.26 (0.57) | −0.06 | −1.16* (0.62) | −0.25** | 2.51** (1.21) | 0.39** |
| Constant | −0.13 (0.45) | – | 0.02 (0.73) | – | 0.65 (0.77) | – | −0.82 (1.21) | – |
| N | 888 | 888 | 428 | 428 | 347 | 347 | 153 | 153 |
| Missing observations | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace |
| % would obey | 39.06 | – | 47.20 | – | 48.97 | – | 56.78 | – |
*p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.
1 In the Crimea 2010 regression, bureau contact dropped out in the original regression, as only 1 of 199 had such contact.
| Catholic Ukraine 2015 | Catholic Ukraine 2015 Sub. Effects | Non-Catholic Ukraine 2015 | Non-Catholic Ukraine 2015 Sub. Effects | West Ukraine 2015 | West Ukraine 2015 Sub. Effects | Far West 2015 | Far West 2015 Sub. Effects | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Deterrence | ||||||||
| Evasion OK if could get away with it | −0.07 (0.28) | −0.02 | −0.42*** (0.08) | −0.10*** | −0.32* (0.17) | −0.08** | 0.13 (0.21) | 0.03 |
| Quasi-voluntary | ||||||||
| Trusts president | −0.92 (0.65) | −0.23* | 0.96*** (0.21) | 0.22*** | 0.43 (0.39) | 0.10 | −0.93* (0.49) | −0.22** |
| Trusts parliament | 2.13** (0.99) | 0.41** | −0.66** (0.30) | −0.16** | −0.41 (0.61) | −0.10 | 0.41 (0.74) | 0.08 |
| Trusts government | −0.27 (0.94) | −0.07 | 0.27 (0.28) | 0.07 | 0.55 (0.60) | 0.13 | 1.15 (0.71) | 0.24* |
| Many dishonest tax bureaucrats | −0.75 (0.51) | −0.18* | −0.40*** (0.15) | −0.10*** | −0.35 (0.33) | −0.08 | −0.70* (0.39) | −0.17** |
| Many people evade taxes | 0.07 (0.52) | 0.02 | 0.75*** (0.16) | 0.18*** | 0.37 (0.33) | 0.09 | 0.68* (0.40) | 0.16* |
| Prior contact | ||||||||
| Previous contact with tax bureaucrats | 0.03 (0.33) | 0.006 | 0.05 (0.10) | 0.01 | 0.07 (0.22) | 0.01 | 0.04 (0.27) | 0.006 |
| Socio-economic, additional effects | ||||||||
| Income | 0.21 (0.98) | 0.05 | 0.45* (0.26) | 0.11** | 0.73 (0.60) | 0.16 | 0.17 (0.72) | 0.05 |
| I file my income taxes myself | 0.38 (0.50) | 0.08 | 0.06 (0.13) | 0.01 | 0.25 (0.28) | 0.06 | 0.46 (0.35) | 0.10 |
| Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs) | ||||||||
| Male | −0.19 (0.26) | −0.05 | −0.08 (0.08) | −0.02 | −0.25 (0.16) | −0.06* | −0.26 (0.19) | −0.06* |
| Age | 0.005 (0.008) | 0.04 | 0.005** (0.002) | 0.04** | 0.002 (0.005) | 0.02 | 0.0004 (0.006) | 0.002 |
| Education | 0.68 (0.64) | 0.16 | 0.05 (0.19) | 0.01 | 0.21 (0.40) | 0.05 | 0.06 (0.47) | 0.01 |
| Constant | −0.03 (0.77) | – | −0.44* (0.23) | – | −0.17 (0.48) | – | 0.15 (0.58) | – |
| N | 278 | 278 | 2882 | 2882 | 687 | 687 | 477 | 477 |
| Missing observations | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace |
| % would obey | 46.33 | – | 44.46 | – | 46.27 | – | 49.82 | – |
* ≤ 0.10, ** ≤ 0.05, *** ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the —-values for the substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.
| Far West Catholic 2015 | Far West Catholic 2015 Sub. Effects | Far West Non-Catholic 2015 | Far West Non-Catholic 2015 Sub. Effects | Center 2015 | Center 2015 Sub. Effects | Kyiv & Kyiv Oblast 2015 | Kyiv & Kyiv Oblast 2015 Sub. Effects | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Deterrence | ||||||||
| Evasion OK if could get away with it | 0.14 (0.34) | 0.03 | 0.23 (0.29) | 0.05 | −0.49*** (0.14) | −0.12*** | −0.99*** (0.26) | −0.24*** |
| Quasi-voluntary | ||||||||
| Trusts president | −1.55** (0.79) | −0.36** | −0.22 (0.68) | −0.06 | 0.78** (0.33) | 0.18** | 0.18 (0.66) | 0.04 |
| Trusts parliament | 2.33* (1.28) | 0.43** | −0.97 (1.06) | −0.22 | −0.99** (0.44) | −0.24** | −0.12 (0.91) | −0.04 |
| Trusts government | 0.02 (1.21) | 0.005 | 1.80* (1.01) | 0.33** | 0.05 (0.41) | 0.01 | 0.76 (0.79) | 0.17 |
| Many dishonest tax bureaucrats | −1.23* (0.65) | −0.28** | −0.25 (0.52) | −0.06 | −0.91*** (0.24) | −0.22*** | −1.23** (0.51) | −0.28*** |
| Many people evade taxes | 0.13 (0.63) | 0.03 | 1.41** (0.57) | 0.33*** | 0.94*** (0.24) | 0.23*** | 0.70 (0.49) | 0.17* |
| Prior contact | ||||||||
| Previous contact with tax bureaucrats | −0.67 (0.42) | −0.16* | 0.70* (0.42) | 0.15** | 0.16 (0.16) | 0.04 | 0.19 (0.31) | 0.05 |
| Socio-economic, additional effects | ||||||||
| Income | 0.64 (1.24) | 0.12 | −0.65 (0.95) | −0.15 | −0.06 (0.44) | −0.02 | −0.79 (0.74) | −0.18 |
| I file my income taxes myself | 1.67** (0.72) | 0.30** | −0.01 (0.44) | −0.006 | −0.19 (0.24) | −0.05 | −1.05* (0.59) | −0.25** |
| Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs) | ||||||||
| Male | −0.34 (0.31) | −0.08 | −0.22 (0.26) | −0.05 | 0.008 (0.13) | 0.0007 | 0.39 (0.24) | 0.09* |
| Age | 0.002 (0.01) | 0.02 | 0.004 (0.008) | 0.03 | 0.007* (0.004) | 0.06** | 0.008 (0.008) | 0.07 |
| Education | 0.36 (0.76) | 0.09 | −0.15 (0.65) | −0.03 | 0.16 (0.32) | 0.04 | −1.14** (0.58) | −0.26** |
| Constant | 0.55 (0.89) | – | −0.61 (0.82) | – | −0.12 (0.38) | – | 1.25* (0.73) | – |
| N | 210 | 210 | 267 | 267 | 1119 | 1119 | 335 | 335 |
| Missing observations | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace |
| % would obey | 48.37 | – | 50.95 | – | 45.86 | – | 44.44 | – |
*p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.
| East 2015 | East 2015 Sub. Effects | Unoccupied Donbas 2015 | Unoccupied Donbas 2015 Sub. Effects | South 2015 | South 2015 Sub. Effects | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Deterrence | ||||||
| Evasion OK if could get away with it | −0.38*** (0.14) | −0.09*** | 0.21 (0.30) | 0.05 | −0.25 (0.23) | −0.06 |
| Quasi-voluntary | ||||||
| Trusts president | 0.40 (0.40) | 0.09 | 0.12 (0.80) | 0.02 | 2.42*** (0.70) | 0.51*** |
| Trusts parliament | 0.27 (0.56) | 0.06 | 2.88** (1.30) | 0.47** | 0.10 (1.10) | 0.02 |
| Trusts government | 0.64 (0.51) | 0.14 | −0.87 (1.06) | −0.20 | −1.19 (1.09) | −0.27 |
| Many dishonest tax bureaucrats | 0.08 (0.25) | 0.02 | 0.30 (0.57) | 0.07 | −0.40 (0.47) | −0.10 |
| Many people evade taxes | 0.75*** (0.29) | 0.17*** | 1.23** (0.62) | 0.29** | −0.38 (0.54) | −0.09 |
| Prior contact | ||||||
| Previous contact with tax bureaucrats | −0.18 (0.18) | −0.04 | −0.17 (0.38) | −0.04 | 0.24 (0.28) | 0.06 |
| Socio-economic, additional effects | ||||||
| Income | 1.31*** (0.46) | 0.29*** | 2.19** (0.92) | 0.41** | −1.04 (0.69) | −0.25* |
| I file my income taxes myself | 0.04 (0.26) | 0.008 | −0.79 (0.51) | −0.19* | 0.43 (0.29) | 0.10* |
| Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs) | ||||||
| Male | −0.11 (0.14) | −0.03 | −0.36 (0.27) | −0.08* | −0.16 (0.22) | −0.04 |
| Age | 0.002 (0.004) | 0.02 | 0.003 (0.009) | 0.02 | 0.01* (0.008) | 0.13** |
| Education | 0.14 (0.34) | 0.04 | 0.74 (0.71) | 0.17 | −0.46 (0.52) | −0.11 |
| Constant | −0.88** (0.42) | – | −2.39** (0.94) | – | 0.09 (0.64) | – |
| N | 980 | 980 | 279 | 279 | 371 | 371 |
| Missing observations | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace | Mean replace |
| % would obey | 44.21 | – | 42.50 | – | 39.13 | – |
*p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.
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