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Legislatures and Policy Uncertainty: Evidence from East Central Europe*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2010

RADOSLAW ZUBEK  and
CHRISTIAN STECKER
RADOSLAW ZUBEK
Affiliation:
University of Oxford, Hertford College, Oxford OX1 3BW, email: radoslaw.zubek@politics.ox.ac.uk
CHRISTIAN STECKER
Affiliation:
University of Potsdam, August-Bebel-Straße 89, 14482 Potsdam, Germany, email: stecker@uni-potsdam.de
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Abstract

Relying on social choice theory, this paper argues that uncertainty regarding future public policies is likely to be related to party institutionalization and legislative organization. The argument is evaluated using survey data from businesses in eight EU member states in East Central Europe. It finds that firms report lower concern over policy uncertainty in systems with higher party institutionalization. There is also some evidence, although less robust, that restrictive parliamentary agenda control leads to lower perceptions of policy uncertainty and this effect mediates the influence of party institutionalization. These results tend to hold if one controls for the effect of other national and firm-level factors.

Keywords

Legislative rulesagenda controlpartiespolicy uncertaintybusiness interests
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Public Policy , Volume 30 , Special Issue 1: Performing to Type? Institutional Performance in New EU Member States , April 2010 , pp. 63 - 80
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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