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Mental models and syllogisms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2011

P. N. Johnson-Laird  and
Ruth M. J. Byrne
P. N. Johnson-Laird
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544.
Ruth M. J. Byrne
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Trinity College, University of Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland, phil@clarity.princeton.edu
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Abstract

We resolve the two problems that Hardman raises. The first problem arises from a misunderstanding: the crucial distinction is between one-model and multiple-model problems. The second problem illuminates a deeper principle: conclusions depend on the procedures for interpreting models. We describe an algorithm that obviates the problem and empirical work that reveals a new view of syllogistic reasoning.

Information

Type
Author's Response
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 19 , Special Issue 3 , September 1996 , pp. 543 - 546
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

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References

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