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When Ethics Precedes Neuroscience
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2017
Severe head injury or brain injury presents clinical neuroscientists with a unique challenge. Based on an objective assessment of cognitive and neurological function, it is sometimes hard to recognize our patients as members of our moral community (actually or potentially) but we treat them as if that were is the case, and, therefore, as if they need rescuing. Thus their existences as enigmata—beings who may or may not reveal themselves to us through social and personal function realized in conversations and relationships—are in doubt. However, the objective mode of assessing individuals and their mental functions needs to be bracketed here, as we reconnect with them and offer them our help in the restorative journey that they need to take. The journey has many tortuous paths comprising it, not the least of which is the existential question of whether the damaged human being with whom we are engaged actually can be restored to a meaningful life. A negative answer to that question can bring the whole process to an abrupt end. Neuroscience cannot answer some of these questions, as they are ethical. Is this a life worth living and are our commitments going to go the distance that must be traversed here. Therefore, this is an area where ethics take priority over neuroscience, and it is on our ethical response that everything else hinges. Understanding the light this throws on the nature of a human being takes us to the heart of the value of every human being and the nexus of mutuality that is the moral community.
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