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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 May 2018
The theories of joint criminal enterprise and joint control over the crime have often been cited as the paramount example of fragmentation in the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court and the UN Tribunals. While the analyses on these two forms of co-perpetration have generally focused on contrasting the different definitional criteria that they rely on to distinguish between principals and accessories to a group crime, this article shifts the focus to one legal element that, although common for both theories, has actually caused a deeper dissonance in the topical case law of the international courts and tribunals: the ‘common plan’ requirement. It is argued that the varying interpretations of this element have given rise to three materially distinct constructions of co-perpetration responsibility in international criminal law. Several normative and practical concerns stemming from the adoption of broad definitions for the common plan element, and the related idea of ascribing responsibility for ‘excess’ crimes of the executed plan, are analyzed to emphasize the need for having a critical discussion on this element of co-perpetration.
Assistant Professor, Department of Criminal Law, Tilburg University [l.d.yanev@tilburguniversity.edu].
1 van Sliedregt, E. and Vasiliev, S., ‘Pluralism: A New Framework for International Criminal Justice’, in van Sliedregt, E. and Vasiliev, S. (eds.), Pluralism in International Criminal Law (2014) 3, at 4–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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3 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 29 January 2007, paras. 328–30. See also M. Cupido, Facts Matter: A Study into the Casuistry of Substantive International Criminal Law (2015), 69; Ohlin, J., ‘Co-Perpetration: German Dogmatik or German Invasion’, in Stahn, C. (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (2015) 517, at 519–20, 532Google Scholar; H. Olásolo, The Criminal Responsibility of Senior Political and Military Leaders as Principals to International Crimes (2009), at 30–3.
4 Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 3, para. 326. See also The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges against Dominic Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15-422-Red, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 March 2016, para. 38.
5 Ibid., paras. 327–30.
6 Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 3, paras. 330, 347. See also The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his conviction, ICC-01/04-01/06-3121-Red, Appeals Chamber, 1 December 2014, para. 469; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 30 September 2008, paras. 524–525; The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-02/06-309, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 9 June 2014, para. 104; The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2012, para. 292. See also G. Werle and F. Jessberger, Principles of International Criminal Law (2014), 205–6; N. Jain, Perpetrators and Accessories in International Criminal Law: Individual Modes of Responsibility for Collective Crimes (2014), 123; Olásolo, supra note 3, at 266; A. Cassese et al., Cassese's International Criminal Law (2013), 176; R. Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2014), 356.
7 In this sense, scholars have observed that the co-perpetrator under the control theory actually exercises a ‘negative control’ over the group crime. He cannot ensure its commission on his own – for that he is mutually dependent on the other co-perpetrators performing their essential contributions – but he has the ability to frustrate its commission. Olásolo, H. and Cepeda, A.P., ‘The Notion of Control of the Crime and Its Application by the ICTY in the Stakić Case’, (2004) 4 International Criminal Law Review 475, at 502CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ohlin, J., van Sliedregt, E. and Weigend, T., ‘Assessing the Control-Theory’, (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 725, at 727CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gil, A. Gil and Maculan, E., ‘Current Trends in the Definition of “Perpetrator” by the International Criminal Court: From the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges in the Lubanga Case to the Katanga Judgment’, (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International Law 349, at 357CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
8 Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 3, paras. 343–67; The Prosecutor v. Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 8 February 2010, paras. 160–1; The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Corrigendum of the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-02/05-03/09-121-Corr-Red, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 7 March 2011, paras. 128, 150; The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Trial Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para. 1018.
9 The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Judgement, IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber, 10 December 1998, para. 252; The Prosecutor v. Tadić, Judgement, IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, para. 229; The Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Judgement, IT-05-88-A, Appeal Chamber, 30 January 2015, para. 1369.
10 The Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević, Judgement, IT-98-32-A, Appeals Chamber, 25 February 2004, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 32. This is the underlying rationale of the subjective approach to criminal responsibility, pursuant to which ‘in order to be a perpetrator of any kind, it is necessary . . . to have the mind-set of a perpetrator (animus auctoris) or the will to commit the offense oneself. The characteristic of a mere accomplice, by contrast, is that person's will to support another (animus socii)’, Weigend, T., ‘Germany’, in Heller, K.J. and Dubber, M. (eds.), The Handbook of Comparative Criminal Law (2011) 252, at 265Google Scholar.
11 Tadić Appeal Judgement, supra note 9, paras. 195–207; The Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Judgement, IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber, 22 March 2006, para. 65; The Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Judgement, IT-95-11-A, Appeals Chamber, 8 October 2008, paras. 171–2; The Prosecutor v Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana, Judgement, ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A, Appeals Chamber, 13 December 2004, para. 463; The Prosecutor v. Simba, Judgement, ICTR- 01-76-A, Appeals Chamber, 27 November 2007, paras. 76–80; The Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi, Judgement, ICTR-01-64-A, Appeals Chamber, 7 July 2006, para. 158.
12 Tadić Appeal Judgement, supra note 9, para. 227; The Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Judgement, IT-99-36-A, Appeals Chamber, 3 April 2007, para. 430; The Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Judgement, ICTR-97-36A-A, Appeals Chamber, 28 September 2011, para. 160; Karemera and Ngirumpatse v. The Prosecutor, Judgement, ICTR-98-44-A, Appeals Chamber, 29 September 2014, para. 145.
13 Tadić Appeal Judgement, supra note 9, para. 228; The Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Judgement, IT-98-30/1-A, Appeals Chamber, 28 February 2005, para. 82; The Prosecutor v. Vlastimir Đorđević, Judgement, IT-05-87/1-A, Appeals Chamber, 27 January 2014, para. 468; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, supra note 9, para. 1369; Karemera and Ngirumpatse Appeal Judgement, supra note 12, para. 145.
18 The Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Decision on Prosecution's Motion Appealing Trial Chamber's Decision on JCE III Foreseeability, IT-95-5/18-AR72.4, Appeals Chamber, 25 June 2009, paras. 15–18; The Prosecutor v. Šainović et al., Judgement, IT-05-87-A, Appeals Chamber, 23 January 2014, para. 1557; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, supra note 9, para. 1432; The Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin, Judgement, IT-08-91-A, Appeals Chamber, 30 June 2016, paras. 627, 688.
19 Lubanga Appeal Judgement, supra note 6, para. 445.
20 E. van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law (2012), at 100, 144; Olásolo, supra note 3, at 169, 273–4, 286; Ambos, supra note 2, at 149, 174; Gil, A. Gil, ‘Mens Rea in Co-perpetration and Indirect Perpetration According to Article 30 of the Rome Statute. Arguments against Punishment for Excesses Committed by the Agent or the Co-perpetrator’, (2014) 14 International Criminal Law Review 82, at 91CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
21 Lubanga Appeal Judgement, supra note 6, para. 445.
22 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo et al., Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/05-01/13-1989-Red, Trial Chamber, 19 October 2016, para. 65.
23 The Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-02/11-02/11-186, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 11 December 2014, para. 134; Ongwen Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 4, para. 38; The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/12-01/15-84-Red, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 24 March 2016, para. 24.
24 Brđanin Appeal Judgement, supra note 12, para. 418.
25 Jackson, M., ‘The Attribution of Responsibility and Modes of Liability in International Criminal Law’, (2016) 29 Leiden Journal of International Law 879, at 884, 886–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
26 Van Sliedregt, supra note 20, at 66, 70. See also Jackson, supra note 25, at 886–7. In this line of reasoning, the ICTY Blagojević and Jokić Appeals Chamber rejected the view that an aider and abettor ‘is convicted of the crime itself, in the same way as the principal perpetrator who actually commits the crime’ and stressed that ‘Article 7(1) of the Statute deals not only with individual responsibility by way of direct or personal participation in the criminal act but also with individual participation by way of aiding and abetting in the criminal acts of others. Aiding and abetting generally involves a lesser degree of directness of participation in the commission of the crime than that required to establish primary liability for an offence’; The Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, Judgement, IT-02-60-A, Appeals Chamber, 9 May 2007, para. 192. See also The Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Judgement, IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Chamber, 4 March 2000, para. 170. Note, however, that while they do distinguish between principals and accessories to a crime, Anglo-American criminal justice systems do treat the accessories as principals to the crime, i.e., they punish the accessories of the crime in which they participated. G.P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (2000), 652–3; Stewart, J.G., ‘The End of “Modes of Liability” for International Crimes’, (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law 165, at 185–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
27 Fletcher, supra note 26, at 635–6; S. Finnin, Elements of Accessorial Modes of Liability: Article 25 (3)(b) and (c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2012), at 94. See also The Prosecutor v. Simić et al., Judgement, IT-95-9-T, Trial Chamber, 17 October 2003, para. 135; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG, Trial Chamber II, 7 March 2014, paras. 1383–5.
28 Tadić Appeal Judgement, supra note 9, para. 229(iv); The Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise, IT-99-37-AR72, Appeals Chamber, 21 May 2003, para. 20; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, supra note 13, paras. 87–92.
29 The Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Judgement, IT-98-30/1-T, Trial Chamber, 2 November 2001, paras. 285–6 (new paragraph omitted, emphasis added). See also Furundžija Trial Judgement, supra note 9, paras. 216, 252.
30 Brđanin Appeal Judgement, supra note 12, para. 430; Popović et al. Appeal Judgement, supra note 9, para. 1378; The Prosecutor v. Gotovina and Markać, Judgement, IT-06-90-A, Appeals Chamber, 16 November 2012, paras. 89, 149; Stanišić & Župljanin Appeal Judgment, supra note 18, para. 136; The Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Simatović, Judgement, IT-03-69-A, Appeals Chamber, 9 December 2015, paras. 45, 83.
32 See text accompanying note 8, supra. See also Bemba et al. Trial Judgement, supra note 22, para. 70; Banda and Jerbo Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 8, paras. 150, 159; Ntaganda Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 6, para. 121; The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-02/11-01/11-656-Red, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 12 June 2014, para. 238.
33 Stanišić & Župljanin Appeal Judgement, supra note 18, para. 65 (emphasis added).
34 Ibid., para. 69.
35 Tadić Appeal Judgement, supra note 9, para. 227 (emphasis added). See also Đorđević Appeal Judgement, supra note 13, paras. 116, 120; Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, supra note 18, para. 609; Stanišić & Župljanin Appeal Judgement, supra note 18, para. 67; Munyakazi Appeal Judgement, supra note 12, para. 160.
36 The Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Judgement, IT-00-39-A, Appeals Chamber, 17 March 2009, para. 188; Stanišić & Župljanin Appeal Judgement, supra note 18, para. 69; The Prosecutor v Šainović et al., Judgement IT-05-87-T, Trial Chamber, 26 February 2009, Vol.3, paras. 95–6; The Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Judgement, IT-98-32-T, Trial Chamber, 29 November 2002, para. 66. See also Olásolo, supra note 3, at 274–5; Milanović, M., ‘An Odd Couple: Domestic Crimes and International Responsibility in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’, (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1139, at 1146CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Meisenberg, S., ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise at the Special Court for Sierra Leone’, in Jalloh, C. (ed.), The Sierra Leone Special Court and its Legacy: The Impact for Africa and International Criminal Law (2014) 69, at 85Google Scholar; Jordash, W. and Van Tuyl, P., ‘Failure to Carry the Burden of Proof: How Joint Criminal Enterprise Lost Its Way at the Special Court for Sierra Leone’, (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 591, at 600–1CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wirth, S., ‘Co-perpetration in the Lubanga Trial Judgment’, (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 971, at 975CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
37 Vasiljević Trial Judgement, supra note 36, para. 66 (emphasis added). See also The Prosecutor v. Stakić, Judgement, IT-97-24-T, Trial Chamber, 31 July 2003, para. 435; The Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Judgement, IT-99-36-T, Trial Chamber, 1 September 2004, para. 262.
39 Prosecutor v Šainović et al., (Redacted) Third Amended Indictment, IT-05-87-PT, 21 June 2006, para. 19.
40 Ibid.
41 Šainović et al., Trial Judgement, supra note 36, Vol.1, para. 101 (emphasis added).
42 Ibid., Vol.3, para. 95 (emphasis added).
43 Ibid., para. 96.
44 Ibid., paras. 469, 784, 1133. Naturally, responsibility for such excess crimes that were not part of the JCE common plan could also have been examined under the other, accessorial modes of liability.
45 Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, supra note 18, para. 664.
46 G. Boas, N. Reid, and J. Bischoff, International Criminal Law Practitioner Library: Forms of Responsibility in International Criminal Law (2008), Vol. 1, at 42–3; Jordash and Van Tuyl, supra note 36, at 604–6; Meisenberg, supra note 36, at 88; C. Rose, ‘Troubled Indictments at the Special Court for Sierra Leone: The Pleading of Joint Criminal Enterprise and Sex-based Crimes’, (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 353, at 360.
47 Tadić Appeal Judgement, supra note 9, paras. 220, 228; Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, supra note 10, para. 101; Brđanin Appeal Judgement, supra note 12, para. 411; Šainović et al. Appeal Judgement, supra note 18, para. 1558; The Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Župljanin, Judgement, IT-08-91-T, Trial Chamber II, 27 March 2013, Vol.1, para. 106; Stanišić & Simatović Appeal Judgement, supra note 30, para. 77; The Prosecutor v. Karemera and Ngirumpatse, Judgement, ICTR-98-44-T, Trial Chamber, 2 February 2012, paras. 1462–4.
48 Cassese et al., supra note 6, at 170. See also H. Olásolo, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise and Its Extended Form: A Theory of Co-Perpetration Giving Rise to Principal Liability, a Notion of Accessorial Liability, or a Form of Partnership in Crime?’, (2009) 20 Criminal Law Forum 263, at 279; Boas et al., supra note 46, at 68–70; Meisenberg, supra note 36, at 88.
49 This was recently confirmed by the ICTR Appeals Chamber in the Ngirabatware case, where the judges held that the accused's acquittal on the charge of participating in a ‘basic’ JCE to commit extermination meant that he also had to be acquitted of the crime of rape that was charged under JCE III, as a natural and foreseeable consequence of the original common plan, i.e., failure to prove the accused's guilt for the ‘original’ crime under JCE I meant that the charge for the ‘excess’ crime under JCE III could no longer be sustained. Ngirabatware v. The Prosecutor, Judgment, MICT-12-29-A, Appeals Chamber, 18 December 2014, para. 251.
50 The Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Judgement, SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Chamber, 22 February 2008, paras. 72–5; The Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Judgement, SCSL-04-15-A, Appeals Chamber, 26 October 2009, paras. 474–5; The Prosecutor v. Taylor, Judgement, SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber, 18 May 2012, paras. 457–68; The Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Judgement, 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, paras. 504–17; Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan Trial Judgment, supra note 14, paras. 690–1.
52 The Prosecutor v. Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Khieu Samphan, Decision on the Applicability of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, Trial Chamber, 12 September 2011, para. 17 (emphasis added). See also Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan Trial Judgement, supra note 14, para. 696; Brima, Kamara and Kanu Appeal Judgement, supra note 50, para. 80; Sesay, Kallon and Gbao Appeal Judgement, supra note 50, para. 475.
54 The Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Amended Consolidated Indictment, SCSL-2004-16-PT, 13 May 2004, para. 33.
55 Ibid., para. 35 (emphasis added).
57 The Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Judgement, SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber, 20 June 2007, paras. 67–71.
58 Brima, Kamara and Kanu Appeal Judgement, supra note 50, para. 80.
59 Jain, supra note 6, at 67; Jordash and Van Tuyl, supra note 36, at 603, 607–8. A perfect example of this was Augustin Gbao's conviction in the RUF case, where the accused was found guilty under the ‘basic’ variant of JCE for crimes, which the judges expressly held that he did not share a direct intent to commit. Rather, his conviction was based on the finding that he shared the broader common objective to gain political control over Sierra Leone and ‘willingly took the risk that the crimes charged and proved . . . which he did not intend as a means of achieving the common purpose, might be committed by other members of the joint criminal enterprise or persons under their control’; The Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Judgement, SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber, 2 March 2009, paras. 2040, 2048, 2060. See also Jordash and Van Tuyl, supra note 36, at 606–9; Meisenberg, supra note 36, at 91–4.
60 Meisenberg, supra note 36, at 90.
62 Jordash and Van Tuyl, supra note 36, at 609.
64 Security Council Resolution 1973, UN Doc. S/RES/1973, 17 March 2011, para. 4.
65 F. Abrahams and S. Kwiram, Unacknowledged Deaths: Civilian Casualties in NATO's Air Campaign in Libya (2012), 1–75; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/68, 2 March 2012, paras. 122, 617–55; Stahn, C., ‘Libya, the International Criminal Court and Complementarity: A Test for “Shared Responsibility”’, (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 325, at 326, 332CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
66 Brima, Kamara and Kanu Trial Judgement, supra note 57, para. 72.
67 Stanišić & Simatović Appeal Judgement, supra note 30, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koffi Kumelio A. Afande, para. 13.
68 Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan Trial Judgement, supra note 14.
69 The Prosecutor v. Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Khieu Samphan, Closing Order, 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, 15 September 2010, para. 1524.
70 Chea, Sary, Thirith and Samphan JCE Decision, supra note 52, para. 8.
72 Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan Trial Judgement, supra note 14, para. 777-778.
73 The transfer of urban population to villages was also viewed as a way to neutralize a perceived threat from former government officials, intellectuals and the bourgeoisie, who were referred to as ‘the New People’. Ibid., paras. 782–8.
74 Ibid., para. 788.
75 Ibid., para. 805 (emphasis added).
76 Ibid., paras. 877, 996.
78 The Prosecutor v. Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Khieu Samphan, Decision on the Appeals against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE), 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, Pre-Trial Chamber, 20 May 2010, para. 83; Chea, Sary, Thirith and Samphan JCE Decision, supra note 52, paras. 30–5; Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan Trial Judgement, supra note 14, para. 691.
79 Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan Trial Judgement, supra note 14, para. 994 (emphasis added).
80 Based on his subsequent knowledge of the actual commission of the crimes and his continued participation in the enterprise, the judges then found that the accused developed a shared direct intent to commit them (Ibid., para. 995). However, the crucial moment here is that at the time of formulating the common plan, the accused was only aware of ‘the substantial likelihood that crimes would result from’ effecting the non-criminal common plan. The finding that he later developed a shared intent to commit these crimes through his knowing, continued participation in the enterprise can only be used to ascribe to him JCE I liability for the said crimes from that point onwards, i.e., from the moment when the evidence establishes that he came to directly intend their commission, and not for the period before that when he was merely aware of such a risk. On this point, see Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, supra note 36, para. 173.
82 Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 3, para. 344.
83 Ibid. (emphasis added).
85 Ohlin, supra note 2, at 331–2; Ambos, K., ‘The First Judgment of the International Criminal Court (Prosecutor v. Lubanga): A Comprehensive Analysis of the Legal Issues’, (2012) 12 International Criminal Law Review 115, at 140CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wirth, supra note 36, at 974–5; Olásolo, supra note 3, at 274.
86 Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 3, para. 363 (emphasis added).
87 Ibid. (emphasis added).
88 Ibid., para. 31 (emphasis added).
89 See Section 3.2, supra.
90 Banda and Jerbo Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 8, para. 129; The Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2012, para. 399; Ruto et al. Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 6, para. 301.
91 Lubanga Trial Judgement, supra note 8, para. 983.
92 Ibid., para. 984 (emphasis added).
93 Ibid., para. 1134.
94 Ibid., para. 1136 (emphasis added).
95 On the notion of dolus eventualis, see text accompanying notes 16–18, supra. See also, e.g., S. Finnin, Elements of Accessorial Modes of Liability: Article 25 (3)(b) and (c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2012), at 157–8; G. Werle and F. Jessberger, Principles of International Criminal Law (2014), at 180–1; Ambos, K., ‘General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome Statute’, (1999) 10 Criminal Law Forum 1, at 21–2CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
96 Lubanga Appeal Judgment, supra note 6, paras. 447, 451.
97 Ibid., para. 449.
98 Ambos, supra note 2, at 152; Cupido, M., ‘Pluralism in Theories of Liability: Joint Criminal Enterprise versus Joint Perpetration’, in van Sliedregt, E. and Vasiliev, S. (eds.), Pluralism in International Criminal Law (2014), at 144–5Google Scholar; Ohlin, supra note 2, at 332, 338; Gil Gil and Maculan, supra note 7, at 359–62; The Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment, ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG, Trial Chamber, 18 December 2012, Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, paras. 31–9.
105 This, of course, is not to say that the state leaders in the said NATO-led coalition could incur no criminal liability for the said crimes under another mode of liability: the point is that JCE responsibility is inapplicable in this scenario because there is no common plan that ‘aims at or involves’ the commission of a concrete crime.
109 This is because, as explained above, in a differentiated model of criminal participation, it is the ‘common plan’ that provides the doctrinal basis on which the criminal act of a fully responsible perpetrator (A) can be imputed on a person who otherwise contributed to the said act (B), so that B can also be held liable as a (joint) perpetrator, rather as an accessory, of A's crime. See text accompanying notes 20–7, supra.
111 The Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., Judgement, IT-04-84bis-T, Trial Chamber, 29 November 2012, para. 615; The Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Judgement, IT-05-88/2-T, Trial Chamber, 12 December 2012, para. 884; The Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Judgement, IT-03-66-T, Trial Chamber, 30 November 2005, para. 509. Since the dolus eventualis notion is excluded from the general mens rea standard established in Article 30 of the Rome Statute, the ICC has defined a different mental element for ‘direct’ perpetration, pursuant to which the perpetrator has to either directly intend the crime or be aware that it will result from his actions ‘in the ordinary course of events’ (oblique/indirect intent). See Bemba et al. Trial Judgement, supra note 22, paras. 58, 27–9.
113 The ad hoc Tribunals have held that, pursuant to customary international law, ‘[t]he word “committed” referred to in Article 7(1) [ICTY Statute] also includes a form of co-perpetration called Joint Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”)’. The Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Judgement, IT-05-88/2-T, Trial Chamber, 12 December 2012, para. 885. See also Milutinović et al. JCE Decision, supra note 28, para. 20; Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, supra note 10, para. 102; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, supra note 13, paras. 79-80; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, supra note 36, para. 662; Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, supra note 11, para. 462; Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, supra note 11, para. 158; The Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al., Judgement, ICTR-99-50-T, Trial Chamber, 30 September 2011, para. 1906; Karemera and Ngirumpatse Trial Judgement, supra note 47, para. 1433. See also van Sliedregt, supra note 20, at 77–9; Olásolo and Cepeda, supra note 7, at 476–7.
114 See Section 2 and Section 3.1, supra. See also Olásolo, supra note 3, at 286; van Sliedregt, supra note 20, at 100, 144.
116 The ECCC Trial Chamber confirmed most recently that, ‘[p]articipants in either of these forms of JCE [i.e., JCE I and JCE II] must be shown to share the required intent of the direct perpetrators, including the specific intent for the crime where required, as with persecution’; Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan Trial Judgement, supra note 14, para. 694. See also The Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Judgement, IT-97-25-T, Trial Chamber, 15 March 2002, para. 78; Vasiljević Trial Judgement, supra note 36, para. 64; The Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Judgement, IT-97-25-A, Appeals Chamber, 17 September 2003, para. 84; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, supra note 13, para.110; Milutinović et al. JCE Decision, supra note 28, Separate Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Challenge by Ojdanić to Jurisdiction Joint Criminal Enterprise, para. 8. See also Olásolo, supra note 3, at 171; A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2008), at 196; Stewart, supra note 26, at 172.
119 See Section 3.1, supra.
120 See Section 3.2, supra.
121 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Decision, STL-11-01/I/AC/R176bis, Appeals Chamber, 16 February 2011, para. 245.
123 See text accompanying notes 25–7, supra. Indeed, it is a basic feature of the unitary model of criminal liability to accept that each person who has a causal contribution to the commission of a crime (and satisfies its requisite mens rea) is a principal perpetrator of the crime, whose responsibility is independent from that of any other participants in the crime. In this sense, unlike the differentiated model, the unitary model does not distinguish between principals and accessories to a crime. J. Vogel, ‘How to Determine Individual Criminal Responsibility in Systemic Contexts: Twelve Models’, (2002) International Society of Social Defence and Humane Criminal Policy 151, at 152; Vest, H., ‘Problems of Participation - Unitarian, Differentiated Approach, or Something Else?’, (2014) 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice 295CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
124 See Section 3.3, supra (text accompanying notes 82–97).
125 Gil Gil and Maculan, supra note 7, at 360.
126 See note 67, supra.
127 Brima, Kamara and Kanu Trial Judgement, supra note 57, para. 72.
128 See Sections 3.2 and 3.3, supra.
130 Ambos, supra note 85, at 140.
