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Oligopolist Speech and the Public Interest in Pharmaceutical Patent Law Reform
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 May 2018
Abstract
Understandings of the public interest underpin many law reform processes. The public interest is not a fully definable term and so reform bodies have to engage with a range of articulations of that interest. The negotiation of the different articulations, however, has not been explored empirically before. This article reports on a study of the claims to the public interest in a public Australian inquiry into potential abuses of the patent system by pharmaceutical companies. More specifically, submissions to the Pharmaceutical Patents Review are analysed and the results show “oligopolistic” tensions between competing views of the public interest—and with these views claiming primacy over more technical understandings of the issues. This lack of a single “public interest” allows dominant players to frame the debate to reflect their interests; and the tension between these players means that the debate, and the underlying problem, has not been subject to a resolution.
Résumé
Une certaine compréhension des questions d’intérêt public sous-tend de nombreux processus de réforme du droit. Toutefois, définir avec précision ce que constitue l’intérêt public est intrinsèquement ardu et les agents d’une réforme du droit doivent composer avec les diverses interprétations de ce concept. Par ailleurs, la négociation de différentes articulations n’a jamais été explorée de façon empirique. Le présent article porte sur une étude des demandes faites au nom de l’intérêt public dans le cadre d’une enquête publique menée en Australie sur les compagnies pharmaceutiques et les abus potentiels du système de brevets. Plus précisément, des demandes présentées au Conseil d’examen des brevets pharmaceutiques sont analysées et les résultats illustrent les tensions d’ordre oligopolistique émanant des vues divergentes des questions d’intérêt public, de même que des demandes de protection des renseignements quant aux articulations plus techniques de ces questions. Étant donné l’absence de définition de l’intérêt public, les parties intéressées peuvent faire valoir une définition correspondant à leurs intérêts. La tension qui existe entre les parties intéressées signifie que le débat ainsi que le problème sous-jacent n’ont toujours pas trouvé de solution.
Keywords
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Canadian Journal of Law and Society / La Revue Canadienne Droit et Société , Volume 33 , Issue 1 , April 2018 , pp. 1 - 20
- Copyright
- Copyright © Canadian Law and Society Association / Association Canadienne Droit et Société 2018
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