The Malvinas (Falklands) war of April-June 1982 has generated little attention among international scholars largely because neither its causes or consequences are. assumed to have great power significance.

The thesis of this article is that the timing of the Malvinas invasion, and the subsequent miscalculation that the United States would tacitly assist Argentina, were partly shaped by U. S. policies. Although the principal motive for the invasion was to vindicate a claim stretching back to the early 19th century (U.S. House 1982c: 50-51; Etchepareborda, 1983:48-58), the abruptness of Argentina's actions was conditioned by Reagan administration overtures towards a grand “anti-Communist” alliance (Maechling, 1982:75-82; Sunday Times, 1982: 63); an increase in the frequency and prestige of high-level contacts between the U.S. and Argentina between 1980-1982; the cultivation of official links between Galtieri and high-ranking U.S. national security officials (U.S. House, 1982d: 67; Hastings and Jenkins, 1983:46); the intense, personal diplomacy of former Secretary of State Haig during the conflict (Hastings and Jenkins, 1983: 104-113); and by covert efforts by Argentina to extend and strengthen U.S.-Argentine ties (Cardoso et al., 1983: 60-61).

Events Since 1979 have steadily softened the long-dominant tone of rivalry in Brazilian-Argentine relations; and the two countries have established mutual levels of confidence, and institutional mechanisms, sufficient to support increased degrees of cooperation. The mutual understanding, formally confirmed during a landmark visit, in May 1980, by Brazilian President Joâo Figueiredo to Argentine President Jorge Videla, in Buenos Aires, is attributable to the pragmatic perception, in both capitals, that accumulated, but unaddressed, small grievances could mount into major, unnecessary points of attrition capable of sapping more important efforts.

The Subject of military rule in Latin America has been a familiar topic of inquiry for many years, but its treatment has been quite selective. While there is voluminous literature on the causes of military coups, very little has been written on military withdrawal from power. Both the example of Brazil's “apertura” (political opening) and the Argentine case under review here are still too recent to expect to find a large quantity of critiques. Even historical experiences of military defeat have gotten poor coverage, such as the fall of the Peruvian regime from 1975-1980. This study will analyze causes of the breakdown of military rule in Argentina, concentrating on the two year period of 1980-1982.

Societies and regions affected by political turmoil are subject to intrusions by states which, either directly through surrogates, or in association with local anti-status-quo groups, seek to capitalize on internal vulnerabilities. Seldom do conflicts remain isolated from the external milieu, even if fundamental causes of political turmoil are local or domestic in character. In effect, protracted conflicts, such as those sweeping Central America since the late 1970s, offer opportunities for interventionist powers to project themselves into regions where, historically, a less aggressive posture was taken. With little doubt, the view that local actors can best determine the outcome of conflict situations, such as the one in Central America, is naive and fundamentally inaccurate, no more than a pious expression of neoisolationist sentiments directly at odds with reality.

This Essay examines Soviet uses of economic trade for political and diplomatic purposes in Latin America. Recent events in Central America and the Caribbean have generated a great number of analyses of Soviet goals and tactics in the Western Hemisphere (Duncan, 1984; Leiken, 1984; Rothenberg, 1984; Varas, 1984; Valenta, 1982). Direct Soviet military aid to Nicaragua, and to Grenada prior to the U.S. invasion in 1983, has suggested a more forward Soviet role in the region. On the other hand, Soviet arms shipments to Latin America, excepting those to Cuba, are a relatively recent response to revolutionary developments that may prove to be ephemeral, or which may encounter stiff U.S. resistance. Given geopolitical realities of the area, the Soviet military option certainly is less viable in Latin America than elsewhere in the developing world. In contrast, trade and aid – and Soviet aid is given chiefly in the form of trade credits – are a long-established, politically safe tactical alternative.

In 1976, Macmillan of Canada published the first recent book-length study of Canadian-Latin American relations, Gringos from the Far North: Essays in the History of Canadian-Latin American Relations, 1866-1968, by Professor J.C.M. Ogelsby of the University of Western Ontario (1976a). Ogelsby deals with interactions between the residents of Canada and those of the Latin American republics – diplomatic, trade, business and religious relations; he includes subjects such as the emigration of Canadian Mennonites to South America. Ogelsby, who consulted Canadian and Spanish-American archives and travelled to the scenes of many of the events he describes, sets a standard for others in the field.