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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
The speeches of Nicias and Alcibiades in the debate leading up to the launching of the Sicilian expedition (Thuc. 6.9–14, 6.20–3, 6.16–18) contain a significant number of words, phrases, and themes that recur in Thucydides' later chapters reporting the launching of the expedition and its ultimate fate in Sicily. The verbal and thematic echoes often consist of words of sight and hearing; among the recurring themes are rivalry and competition, the contrast between public and private expenditures, and the desire for acquisition and financial profit.
1 The frequent occurrence of the public-private contrast has also been noted by Kohl, W., Die Redetrias vor der sizilischen Expedition (Meisenheim am Glan, 1977), 101–3.Google Scholar
2 Macleod, C., ‘Rhetoric and history’, Collected Essays (Oxford, 1983)Google Scholar, 71 also points out the echo.
3 The theme of competition and rivalry is amplified by a large number of comparatives and superlatives or their equivalents in Nicias' and Thucydides' characterization of Alcibiades, and in Alcibiades' speech, which contain at least thirty-two such expressions. Cf. Kohl (n. 1), 102.
4 Macleod (n. 2), 72.
5 For the greed of the Athenians, see Finley, M. I., ‘The fifth-century Athenian Empire, a balance-sheet’, in P, Garnsey and Whittaker, C. (edd.), Imperialism in the Ancient World (Cambridge, 1978), 103Google Scholar; id., Ancient History: Evidence and Models (London, 1985), 77; Kagan, D., The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition (Ithaca, NY and London, 1981), 283Google Scholar; Hornblower, S., Thucydides (Baltimore, 1987), 173.Google Scholar
6 Thuc. 8.10.1. For regattas with triremes at the Isthmian games, see B. Jordan, The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1975), 154–5, 162.
7 LSJ S.V. ἐπιβοάω.
8 The contrasts ‘Hellenes-Athenians’ and ‘foreign-native’ are another link between Alcibiades’ speech and the departure scene; 6.16.2, 6.16.3~6.30.1, 6.31.4.
9 Avery, H. C., ‘Themes in Thucydides' account of the Sicilian expedition’, Hermes 101 (1973), 8–11.Google Scholar
10 That αύτόθεν means ‘from Athens itself (as opposed to ‘from the allies’ or elsewhere) is demonstrated by 6.25.2: τοξοτῶν τῶν αύτόθεν καì ἐκ Κρήτης 6.26.2: ἐκς τοὐς σνμμάϰονς ἒπεμπον καì αὐτόθεν καταλόγους ἐποιοῦγτο, 6.22: τòν Ѕὲ καì αὐτόθεν σῖτον = ‘actually from Attica itself’, so Dover in HCT ad loc. Cf. 6.22: ϰρήματα αὐτόθεν, and the scholiast (Hude) on 6.21.2: ἐκ τοε ήμετέρον τόπον.
11 J. Classen and J. Steup (Berlin, 1963) ad loc. translate these words ‘ein gewaltiges Unternehmen’, ‘an immense undertaking’, a meaning which they apparently infer from the seemingly stupendous might of the expedition. ἀξιόϰρεως basically means ‘counterbalancing a need’; here it echoes Nicias' word and has its regular meaning ‘adequate’.
12 The use of θάμβος is especially effective; used only here by Thucydides, it conveys in Homer the paralysis caused by amazement and surprise: II. 4.79, Od. 3.372.
13 Regenbogen, O., ‘Drei Thukydidesinterpretationen’, in Herter, H. (ed.), Thukydides (Darmstadt, 1968), 10–17Google Scholar, with a full analysis of the formal structure of the periods in 6.31.
14 Ibid., 12.
15 Perhaps because Alcibiades had alluded to his policy; so Dover (n. 10), 254–5.
16 Dover (n. 10), 296. Cf. Hornblower (n. 5), 66–77, who adds that Nicias also prevails in a way, because the Athenians voted to send a much larger force than they had envisaged. But it is worth pointing out that Nicias argues only for a large and adequate force, using no comparatives. In the absence of concrete numbers and comparisons it is impossible to say how large a force the Athenians envisaged; the 100 ships and 5,000 hoplites that Nicias proposed (6.25.3) evidently did not strike them as very large, for they approved them immediately (6.26.1).
17 LSJ s.v. δόξα III.
18 The utility to the state of victories in chariot races seems to have been a topic of discussion in the fourth century. The wealthy defendant in Lysias 19.63–4 pleads that his father's victories have brought honour to the state (not to his father or his other forebears, in contrast to Alcibiades). In the view of Xenophon (again in contrast to Alcibiades) the state is not honoured if one single person breeds and enters in the races more teams than the rest of the Hellenes; it is honoured if very many citizens of one state can do so, for this testifies to the state's prosperity (Hiero 11.5). According to Plutarch, Agesilaos persuaded his sister to enter a chariot race at Olympia, because he wanted to demonstrate that this sort of thing was no sign of excellence, but only of having money and being able to squander it (Moralia 212b).
19 Cf. Dover (n. 10), 248.
20 Macleod (n. 2), 73, who quotes the ‘tell-tale words’ δοκεi, δόξομεν, ύπονοεîται, ἐνόμισαν.
21 Cf. LSJ S.V. ἄπιστος, περιβόητος τόλμα.
22 Thuc. 1.37.4, 1.39.2, 3.38.4 3.82.2, 3.82.8, 4.86.6, 6.8.4, 8.66.1.
23 For the meaning of * see Classen and Steup (n. 11) ad loc. who follow the scholiast; Thuc. 1.38.6, 3.45.5; LSJ s.v. 1.2.
24 See, for example, Massie, R. K., Dreadnought (New York, 1992), 395–400Google Scholar on the magnificent appearance of the ships in the Victorian Royal Navy. In the years before the turn of the century captains were preoccupied with the spick-and-span smartness of their ships, with burnishing of guns and gleaming hinges. There was a cult of paint and brightwork; a commander's ship was to be as beautiful as his person. Ammunition was painted blue, gold, and white and then could not be got into the barrel. Handsome appearance was everything, gunnery and its practice were ignored. As a result, in the bombardment of Alexandria in 1881 the English ships fired 3,000 rounds at the Egyptian forts, but made only ten hits.
25 Cf. Hornblower (n. 5), 148: ‘the splendour and arrogance of Athenian resources at the beginning of Book 6 is brought out by vague superlatives rather than the precise enumeration of detail, which is Thucydides' more normal method’.
26 Thuc. 6.8.1; Dover (n. 10), 28, 293.
27 Jordan (n. 6), 41–6.
28 When the need arose, the Athenians could resort to conscription to provide naval crews; Thucydides has several instances of wholesale conscription, Jordan (n. 6), 225–6. Gabrielsen, V., Financing the Athenian Fleet (Baltimore, 1994), 106–8Google Scholar underestimates the frequency of conscription even though he lists a host of passages in a footnote (p. 248).
29 Dover (n. 10), 310 concludes from Thuc. 8.24.2 that the marines were normally thetes. But in that case Thucydides need not have specified that the marines on this occasion were thetes. There is other evidence in Thucydides and elsewhere showing that the marines were normally hoplites, e.g. Thuc. 3.95.2 ~ 3.98.4. Cf. Jordan (n. 6), 195–200.
30 For example by Kohl (n. 1), 102; Classen and Steup (n. 11), 48; Westlake, H. D., Inividuals in Thucydides (Cambridge, 1968), 221Google Scholar; Kagan (n. 5), 182. Dover (n. 10) recognizes Alcibiades' untruths for what they are, e.g. his calling Argos and Mantineia ‘the most powerful Peloponnesian states’ (248), his claim to successful diplomacy (249), his descriptions of the Spartans as discouraged after the battle of Mantineia, of the Sicilians as a ‘disorganized rabble’ (250), and of Athens and Sparta as enemies in the Persian wars (252–3), but minimizes some others; see the next note. Hornblower (n. 5), 57, 63, is more to the point; he speaks of Alcibiades' ‘tinsel phrases’, his ‘egoism and misleading optimism, and the speciousness and florid expression of his speech’.
31 Alcibiades also says that the Greek states raised adequate number of hoplites only during the Peloponnesian war, and then with difficulty (6.17.5). For Dover (n. 10), 252 this is no more than a rhetorical device, but the remark is so outrageously false that E. Schwartz, Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides (Hildesheim, 1960), 334–5 proposed drastic changes in the text.
32 Cf. Dover (n. 10), 254: Aicibiades' generalization ‘one defends oneself against a superior enemy by attacking him first’ is ‘not conspicuously true in Greek history’. This is yet another self-contradiction of Alcibiades: having labelled the Spartans as discouraged and hopeless and the Sicilians as disorganized and without hoplites he now says that they are stronger than Athens.
33 For example, Thuc. 1.10.
34 Cf. above n. 5.
35 Cf. Westlake (n. 30), 175–6.
36 Thuc. 6.21.1, 6.22, 6.23.1. Despite the very difficult parenthesis at 23.1, πλήν γε πρός τό μάχιμον αὐτῶν, τò όπλιτικόν,, which Steup in Classen and Steup (n. 11) has emended completely and in my view correctly, it is quite clear that Nicias has in mind very many Athenian hoplites. Cf. Dover (n. 10), 259: ‘a force raised at Athens, not merely a match for the enemy, but actually superior’, and 260: ‘Nikias’ most conspicuous fear is that the Athenians will not send enough hoplites'. Cf. also Dover's, comment in Thucydides Book VI (Oxford, 1965)Google Scholar, 35: ‘The Athenians have thought of the proposed force as a “match” for the enemy; Nikias reminds them that it is not a match in the arm that will be needed for the decisive fighting.’ The clearest interpretation of the passage is that in Classen and Steup ad loc: Nicias has been warning the Athenians in chapter 22 that Athens itself must supply most of what the expedition needs: the most troops, the most provisions, and the most money; the * points to a silent contrast, ‘for you must not count on others’. Kohl (n. 1), 159–66 surveys the numerous interpretations and emendations of the passage.
37 For example by Westlake (n. 30), 221; Kagan (n. 5), 190–1; Dover (n. 10), 256, 461; Hornblower (n. 5), 66–7.
38 Melos: Thuc. 3.91.1; Cythera: Thuc. 4.53.1, 4.54.1; Corinthia: Thuc. 4.42.1; Oropos: Thuc. 3.91.3; Mende and Skione: Thuc. 4.129.2.
39 Potidaea: Thuc. 2.70.2; Samos: Meiggs, R. and Lewis, D., A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions (Oxford, 1969)Google Scholar, no. 55. Syracuse: Thuc. 7.48.5–6, 7.49.1; cf. Avery (n. 9), 38; Gabrielsen (n. 28), 115.
40 Gomme, A. W., HCT, 195–6 and JHS 78 (1943), 72 wrote that this statement ‘is not borne out by Thucydides’ own narrative in Books VI and VII', because ‘the original expedition was splendidly adequate to its object’, and because ‘on each occasion that Nikias asked for them, supplies and reinforcements were sent, and in good measure’. But the first expedition, while splendid, was not adequate, as its numbers and failure show, while, as pointed out above, the support from Athens was minimal until the second expedition arrived.Google Scholar
41 εἲκοσι is the reading of the all manuscripts except one (H) which adds the words καì έκατόν. Valla, apparently following H, also has 120 talents. Editors print the reading of H, evidently because, like Dover (n. 10) ad loc, they think that ‘probability is in favour’ of 120. This may also have been the view of the scribe who first added *. Diodorus, 13.8.7, apparently also thought twenty talents too little, and so increased the sum to 140. For a brief history of the efforts to justify 120, see Classen and Steup (n. 11) ad loc.
42 Macleod, C., ‘Thucydides and tragedy’, Collected Essays (Oxford, 1983), 142–3.Google Scholar
43 Hope and hopelessness also form a considerable theme connecting all the chapters on the Sicilian expedition; Avery (n. 9), 1–5 building on Cornford, F. M., Thucydides Mythistoricus (London, 1907)Google Scholar, works out the connection; cf. also Macleod (n. 42), 150.
44 Cf. Avery (n. 9), 5.
45 λαμπρότης: Thuc. 2.64.5 (speech of Pericles); 4.62.2 (speech of Hermocrates); 6.16.5, 6.31.6, 7.69.2, 7.75.6 (Sicilian expedition). έλλαμπρύνομαι: 6.12.2; λαμπρύνομαι: 6.16.3 (Alcibiades).
46 The narrative of the fighting contains several indications that the expedition was not strong enough: Thuc. 6.86.3, 6.100.1–2, 7.4.4, 7.7.4, 7.11.3.
47 To cite an example from recent history, in the Battle of Midway the Japanese divided their huge battle fleet several ways and threw away their chance of victory: Morison, S. E., The Two-ocean War (Boston, 1963), 150–63.Google Scholar
