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Who Cooperates? Reciprocity and the Causal Effect of Expected Cooperation in Representative Samples

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2017

Michael M. Bechtel  and
Kenneth F. Scheve
Michael M. Bechtel
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Washington University in St.Louis, St.Louis, MO, USA, e-mail: mbechtel@wustl.edu Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economic Research, St.Gallen, Switzerland
Kenneth F. Scheve
Affiliation:
†Department of Political Science, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA, e-mail: scheve@stanford.edu
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Abstract

When do societies succeed in providing public goods? Previous research suggests that public goods contributions correlate with expectations about cooperation by others among students and other demographic subgroups. However, we lack knowledge about whether the effect of expected cooperation is causal and a general feature of populations. We fielded representative surveys (N = 8,500) in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States that included a public goods game and a novel between-subjects experiment. The experiment varied expectations about cooperation by others. We find that higher expected cooperation by others causes a significant increase in individual contributions. When classifying contribution schedules, we find that almost 50% of the population employs a conditionally cooperative strategy. These individuals are on average richer, younger, and more educated. Our results help explain the varying success of societal groups in overcoming cooperation problems and assist policymakers in the design of institutions meant to solve social dilemmas.

Keywords

Public goodssocial normsconditional cooperationreciprocitysurvey experimentrepresentative samples
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Experimental Political Science , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , Winter 2017 , pp. 206 - 228
Copyright
Copyright © The Experimental Research Section of the American Political Science Association 2017 

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