The essay evaluates the general problem that, while most modern republican constitutions follow the U.S. and French models in declaring religious freedom, absolute religious freedom is impossible and undesirable. How are religious freedoms constrained, and how much should they be? The essay evaluates the strategies by which limitations on freedoms of religion are constructed and imposed, especially the powerful isomorphism of law and science described by Boaventura de Sousa Santos. Taking the example of Afro-Brazilian religions in relation to the Brazilian state since 1890, post-emancipation, the essay argues that pseudo-scientific discourses of “public health” constrained the religious practice of former slaves, thus allowing the trompel'oeil of religious freedom to continue in the new republic, even as freedoms were in fact constrained by the state.

This article examines a criminal trial in Brazil that touched on the imagined role of religion in public life. The case involved a Protestant minister accused of religious discrimination and of vilipending an image of Nossa Senhora Aparecida, the patron saint of Brazil. The prosecution argued and the court concurred that the minister's iconoclastic verbal and physical gestures endangered the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. Yet the defense claimed that his actions, stemming from his religious convictions, expressed this same principle of freedom. Different visions of religious free-dom are at stake in the case as well as how such freedom relates to the rights and private lives of citizens. Placed in the history of church-state relations in Brazil, the case raises the problem of interpreting concepts of religious pluralism, religious freedom, and freedom of expression in Brazilian law.

By juxtaposing religious, legal, and victims'accounts of political violence, this essay identifies and critiques assumptions about agency, the individual, and the state that derive from liberal theory and that underlie U.S. asylum law. In the United States, asylum is available to aliens whose gooernments fail to protect them from persecution on the basis of their race, religion, political opinion, nationality, or social group membership. Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrants have challenged this definition of persecution with their two-decade-long struggle for asylum in the United States. During the 1980s, U.S. religious advocates and solidarity workers took legal action on behalf of what they characterized as victims of oppression in Central America. The asylum claims narrated by the beneficiaries of these legal efforts suggest that repessiwe pactices rendered entire populations politically suspect. To prevail in immigration court, however, victims had to prove that they were individually targeted because of being somehow “different” from the population at large. In other words, to obtain asylum, persecution victims had to explain how and why their actions had placed them at risk, even though persecution obscured the reasons that particular individuals were targeted and thus rendered all politically suspect.

Over cups of chai, a conversation between U.S. law professors and Tibetan exiles about the formation of a new democratic Tibetan government under the Dalai Lama goes awry. This article investigates why the misunderstandings occurred by presenting the context of the Tibetan and U. S. concepts of sacredness and secularity. The former Tibetan government and legal system are explained in some derail as well as the Tibetan wiew of the sacred and secular spheres in society. The deistic origins of the U.S. Constitution and the pervasive religious cosmology of the Framers are then described. These two similar positions are contrasted with the current modern and postmodern positions of an all-encompassing secular sphere that defines and contains religion. The author argues that “sacred” and “secular” have changed positions, with secularity now having an unmarked positive value and being viewed by U.S. law professors as a necessity for a democratic political and legal system. As the conversation with the Tibetans demonstrates, the richness and power of an integrated sacred perspective is difficult to comprehend from a hegemonic secular public space. Reformulating this “inarticulate debate” will be necessary for a coherent conversation to take place.

This article describes and compares English and Burmese approaches to the legal establishment of religion. Between 1886 and 1942 the two approaches crossbred to produce a body of case law known as Buddhist ecclesiastical law. However, after 1920 the colonial government radically changed its policy toward Buddhism. The repercussions of this change continue to affect Burma.