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China's “Responsible Protection” Concept: Reinterpreting the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2015

Andrew GARWOOD-GOWERS
Andrew GARWOOD-GOWERS*
Affiliation:
Queensland University of Technology, Australiaa.garwood-gowers@qut.edu.au
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Abstract

This paper assesses the extent to which the recently formulated Chinese concept of “Responsible Protection” (RP) offers a valuable contribution to the normative debate over R2P's third pillar following the controversy over military intervention in Libya. While RP draws heavily on previous proposals including the 2001 ICISS report and Brazil's “Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP), by amalgamating and repackaging these earlier ideas in a more restrictive form the initiative represents a new and distinctive interpretation of R2P. However, some aspects of RP are framed too narrowly to provide workable guidelines for determining the permissibility of military intervention for humanitarian purposes, and should be clarified and refined. Nevertheless, the Chinese proposal remains significant because it offers important insights into Beijing's current stance on R2P. More broadly, China's RP and Brazil's RwP initiatives illustrate the growing willingness of rising, non-Western powers to assert their own normative preferences on sovereignty, intervention, and global governance.

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Articles
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Asian Journal of International Law , Volume 6 , Issue 1 , January 2016 , pp. 89 - 118
Copyright
Copyright © Asian Journal of International Law 2015 

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Footnotes

*

Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology, Australia. I am grateful for valuable comments from Sarah Teitt, Luke Glanville, Ramesh Thakur, Adrian Gallagher, Kingsley Edney, and Jason Ralph, and from the anonymous referees. Part of the research for this paper was completed during a period as a Visiting Scholar at the College of Law at the Australian National University. The paper was completed on 27 August 2014.

References

1. Resolution 1973 (2011), UN Doc. S/RES/1973 (2011).

2. On the scope of the mandate in Resolution 1973, see ULFSTEIN, Geir and CHRISTIANSEN, Hege Føsund, “The Legality of the NATO Bombing in Libya” (2013) 62 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 159CrossRefGoogle Scholar; PAYANDEH, Mehrdad, “The United Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime Change in Libya” (2012) 52 Virginia Journal of International Law 355Google Scholar; YEE, Sienho, “Editorial Comments: The Dynamic Interplay Between the Interpreters of Security Council Resolutions” (2012) 11 Chinese Journal of International Law 613CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3. I have analyzed the UNSC deadlock over Syria in previous works. See GARWOOD-GOWERS, Andrew, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Arab Spring: Libya as the Exception, Syria as the Norm?” (2013) 36 University of New South Wales Law Journal 594Google Scholar; GARWOOD-GOWERS, Andrew, “The BRICS and the Responsibility to Protect in Libya and Syria” in Rowena MAGUIRE, Bridget LEWIS, and Charles SAMPFORD, eds., Shifting Global Powers and International Law: Challenges and Opportunities (Oxford: Routledge, 2013), 81Google Scholar. See also ZIFCAK, Spencer, “The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria” (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law 59Google Scholar; GIFKINS, Jess, “The UN Security Council Divided: Syria in Crisis” (2012) 4 Global Responsibility to Protect 377CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Peter FERDINAND, “The Positions of Russia and China at the UN Security Council in the Light of Recent Crises”, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, European Parliament, Briefing Paper, 1 March 2013.

4. See e.g. Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Belgrade, “A Leading Official of the Foreign Ministry Makes Remarks to Further Elaborate on China's Position on the Political Resolution of the Syrian Issue” (4 March 2012), online: <www.chinaembassy.bg/eng/dtxw/t910765.htm>.

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6. See e.g. 6627th Meeting of the United Nations Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.6627 (2011) at 5.

7. See e.g. Report of the Secretary General on the Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response, UN Doc. A/66/874 (2012) [Timely and Decisive Response]. For an overview of the annual informal interactive dialogue on R2P on 5 September 2012, see International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, “UN General Assembly Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response” (5 September 2012), online: International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect <www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcstopics/4331-un-general-assembly-dialogue-on-the-report-of-the-secretary-general-on-the-responsibility-to-protect-timely-and-decisive-response>. For scholarly debate, see e.g. THAKUR, Ramesh, “R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers” (2013) 36 Washington Quarterly 61CrossRefGoogle Scholar; BELLAMY, Alex J., “From Tripoli to Damascus? Lesson Learning and the Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect” (2014) 51 International Politics 23CrossRefGoogle Scholar; NEWMAN, Edward, “R2P: Implications for World Order” (2013) 5 Global Responsibility to Protect 235CrossRefGoogle Scholar; WELSH, Jennifer, “Norm Contestation and the Responsibility to Protect” (2013) 5 Global Responsibility to Protect 365CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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9. The term “semi-official” is used because China has not yet formally adopted the RP concept. However, as explained in Section II.A, there are indications that RP has received some degree of official endorsement and can, therefore, be considered to accurately represent the current Chinese position on R2P.

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18. ICISS, supra note 12 at 11 [2.4].

19. Ibid., at xi.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., at xii.

22. Ibid., at 32 [4.16].

23. Ibid., at xii–xiii.

24. See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background-Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” (December 2001), online: ICISS <http://web.idrc.ca/openebooks/963-1/S>, at 392 [ICISS Supplement]. In ICISS roundtable discussions in June 2001, China asserted that “[i]t is clear that certain Western powers have played with noble principles to serve their own hegemonic interests”: ICISS Supplement at 392.

25. On the legal definitions of the four mass atrocity crimes, see SCHEFFER, David, “Atrocity Crimes Framing the Responsibility to Protect” (2009) 40 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 111Google Scholar.

26. It is not entirely clear whether “manifestly failing” was intended to be a more onerous threshold than “unwilling or unable”, although on the face of it, it appears to be a higher standard. To date, the only scholarly account to consider this issue in detail is GALLAGHER, Adrian, “Syria and the Indicators of a ‘Manifest Failing’” (2014) 18 International Journal of Human Rights 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

27. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, GA Res. 60/1, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 (2005) at paras. 138 and 139 [World Summit Outcome Document]. For discussion of R2P's evolution, see PRANTL, Jochen and NAKANO, Ryoko, “Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and Japan Implement the Responsibility to Protect” (2011) 25 International Relations 204 at 209Google Scholar.

28. World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 27 at paras. 138–9; Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/63/677 (2009) [Implementing the R2P].

29. Ibid., at para. 139.

30. See art. 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945) 1 U.N.T.S. 16 (entered into force 24 October 1945) at 26.

31. On R2P's legal status, see e.g. BELLAMY, Alex J. and REIKE, Ruben, “The Responsibility to Protect and International Law” (2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect 267CrossRefGoogle Scholar; STAHN, Carsten, “Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?” (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 99Google Scholar; PAYANDEH, Mehrdad, “With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of the Responsibility to Protect Within the Process of International Lawmaking” (2010) 35 Yale Journal of International Law 469Google Scholar.

32. Welsh, , supra note 7 at 373Google Scholar.

33. Ibid., at 387.

34. WEISS, Thomas G., “R2P After 9/11 and the World Summit” (2006) 24 Wisconsin International Law Journal 741 at 750Google Scholar.

35. CHESTERMAN, Simon, “‘Leading from Behind’: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and Human Intervention After Libya” (2011) 25 Ethics and International Affairs 279 at 280Google Scholar.

36. Security Council Resolution 1674, UN Doc. S/RES/1674 (2006) [SC Res. 1674].

37. Security Council Resolution 1706, UN Doc. S/RES/1706 (2006) [SC Res. 1706].

38. On the Kenyan situation, see Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “The Responsibility to Protect and Kenya: Past Successes and Current Challenges’’ (August 2010), online: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect <www.globalr2p.org/publications/52>.

39. Security Council Resolution 1894, UN Doc. S/RES/1894 (2009).

40. Implementing the R2P, supra note 28.

41. For criticism of the Secretary-General's diplomatic strategy, see WELSH, Jennifer, “Civilian Protection in Libya: Putting Coercion and Controversy Back into RtoP” (2011) 25 Ethics and International Affairs 255 at 261Google Scholar.

42. On R2P's indeterminacy, see Stahn, , supra note 31Google Scholar; REINHOLD, Theresa, “The Responsibility to Protect-Much Ado About Nothing?” (2010) 36 Review of International Studies 55CrossRefGoogle Scholar; FOCARELLI, Carlo, “The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and Humanitarian Intervention: Too Many Ambiguities for a Working Doctrine” (2008) 13 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 191CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

43. For a range of perspectives on the Libyan intervention, see, for example, Garwood-Gowers, supra note 3; BELLAMY, Alex J. and WILLIAMS, Paul D., “The New Politics of Protection? Cote d'Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect” (2011) 87 International Affairs 825CrossRefGoogle Scholar; THAKUR, Ramesh, “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: Between Opportunistic Humanitarianism and Value-Free Pragmatism” (2011) 7 Security Challenges 13Google Scholar; HEHIR, Aidan, “The Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect” (2013) 38 International Security 137CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

44. On the fragmentation of the BRICS bloc over Syria, see Garwood-Gowers, , supra note 3Google Scholar.

45. See RwP Concept Note, supra note 8. For discussion of RwP, see Thorsten BENNER, “Brazil as a Norm Entrepreneur: The ‘Responsibility While Protecting’ Initiative”, GPPi Working Paper, March 2013; KENKEL, Kai Michael, “Brazil and R2P: Does Taking Responsibility Mean Using Force?” (2012) 4 Global Responsibility to Protect 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar; PATTISON, James, “The Ethics of ‘Responsibility While Protecting’: Brazil, the Responsibility To Protect, and Guidelines for Humanitarian Intervention”, Human Rights and Welfare Working Paper 71 (2013)Google Scholar, online: <www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/workingpapers/2013/71-pattison-2013.pdf>; ALMEIDA, Paula WOJCIKIEWICZ, “Brazilian View Of Responsibility To Protect: From ‘Non-Indifference’ To ‘Responsibility While Protecting’” (2014) 6 Global Responsibility to Protect 29CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

46. Brazil's failure to continue to promote RwP has been criticized. See, for example, Benner, , supra note 45Google Scholar at 8–9.

47. Global Responsibility to Protect, “Statement from the People's Republic of China-Unofficial Transcript from Webcast” (11 September 2013), online: Global Responsibility to Protect <www.globalr2p.org/resources/471>.

48. Shogo SUZUKI, “Asian Perspectives on Humanitarian Interventions: The Case of China”, Paper presented at Norms and Practices of Humanitarian Interventions: Operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect, University of Konstanz, Germany, June 2012, at 3.

49. CLAES, Jonas, “Protecting Civilians from Mass Atrocities: Meeting the Challenge of R2P Rejectionism” (2012) 4 Global Responsibility to Protect 67 at 71Google Scholar.

50. QUINTON-BROWN, Patrick, “Mapping Dissent: The Responsibility to Protect and Its State Critics” (2013) 5 Global Responsibility to Protect 260 at 264Google Scholar.

51. Ibid.

52. For more detailed consideration of China's earlier relationship with R2P, see GARWOOD-GOWERS, Andrew, “China and the Responsibility to Protect: The Implications of the Libyan Intervention” (2012) 2 Asian Journal of International Law 375CrossRefGoogle Scholar; DAVIS, Jonathan E., “From Ideology to Pragmatism: China's Position on Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era” (2011) 44 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 217Google Scholar; Tiewa, LIU, “China and Responsibility to Protect: Maintenance and Change of Its Policy for Intervention” (2012) 25 Pacific Review 153CrossRefGoogle Scholar; TEITT, Sarah, “The Responsibility to Protect and China's Peacekeeping Policy” (2011) 18 International Peacekeeping 298CrossRefGoogle Scholar; FOOT, Rosemary, “The Responsibility to Protect and Its Evolution: Beijing's Influence on Norm Creation in Humanitarian Areas” (2011) 6 St Antony's International Review 47Google Scholar. For a recent analysis of the domestic debate in China over R2P, see Tiewa, LIU and Haibin, ZHANG, “Debates in China About the Responsibility to Protect as a Developing International Norm: A General Assessment” (2014) 14 Conflict, Security & Development 403Google Scholar.

53. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are enshrined in the preamble to the Chinese Constitution. See Constitution of the People's Republic of China, online: <http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution /node_2825.htm>. For a historical account of sovereignty in ancient China, see GLANVILLE, Luke, “Retaining the Mandate of Heaven: Sovereign Accountability in Ancient China” (2010) 39 Millennium-Journal of International Studies 323CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

54. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, “Position Paper of the People's Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms” (7 June 2005), online: Ministry of Foreign Affairs <www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t199318.htm>.

55. SC Res. 1706, supra note 37.

56. On Myanmar, see UN Doc. S/PV.5619 (2007). On Zimbabwe, see UN Doc. S/PV.5933 (2008).

57. Teitt, , supra note 52 at 309Google Scholar.

58. UN Doc. S/PV.6498 (2011) at 10 [UN Doc. 6498].

59. In explaining its reasons for abstaining, China stressed that it “attaches great importance to the relevant position by the 22-member Arab League ... [and] to the position of African countries and the African Union”: ibid., at 10. I have explored China's reasons for abstaining on Resolution 1973 in greater detail, see supra note 52. On the importance of regional support, see GLANVILLE, Luke, “Intervention in Libya: From Sovereign Consent to Regional Consent” (2013) 14 International Studies Perspectives 325CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

60. UN Doc. S/PV.6531 (2011) at 20.

61. For the four draft resolutions, see Draft Resolution-France, Germany, Portugal and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UN Doc. S/2011/612 (2011); Draft Resolution-Bahrain, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America, UN Doc. S/2012/77 (2012); Draft Resolution-France, Germany, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America, UN Doc. S/2012/538 (2012); Draft Resolution-Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America, UN Doc. S/2014/348 (2014).

62. See GA Res. 66/253, UN Doc. A/RES/66/253 (2012); GA Res. 66/253B, UN Doc. A/RES/66/253 B (2012).

63. Supra note 6 at 5.

64. Ibid.

65. On the UN Observer Mission, see Security Council Resolution 2042, UN Doc. S/RES/2042 (2012); Security Council Resolution 2043, UN Doc. S/RES/2043 (2012); Security Council Resolution 2059, UN Doc. S/RES/2059 (2012). On Syria's chemical weapons, see Security Council Resolution 2118, UN Doc. S/RES/2118 (2013). On humanitarian aid access, see Security Council Resolution 2139, UN Doc. S/RES/2139 (2014), and Security Council Resolution 2165, UN Doc. S/RES/2165 (2014).

66. SWAINE, Michael, “Chinese Views of the Syrian Conflict” (2012) 39 China Leadership Monitor 1 at 10Google Scholar.

67. On the role of think tanks in formulating official Chinese foreign policy, see Silvia MENEGAZZI, “China Reinterprets the Liberal Peace”, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Working Paper, December 2012; Pascal ABB, “China's Foreign Policy Think Tanks: Changing Roles and Structural Conditions”, Institute of Asian Studies, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Working Paper, January 2013; LI, Cheng, “China's New Think Tanks: Where Officials, Entrepreneurs and Scholars Interact” (2009) 29 China Leadership Monitor 1Google Scholar.

68. Abb, supra note 67 at 15.

69. See e.g. a speech given at CIIS by Le Yucheng, Assistant Foreign Minister, on 10 April 2012, reported in: “China Saying ‘No’ on Syria Issue is Responsible Move: FM Official” Xinhua (10 April 2012), online: Xinhuanet <www.news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-04/10/c_131518137.htm>. See also Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), “China's Strategic Vision and Regional Security in the Asia-Pacific-Remarks by H.E. Ambassador Tong Xiaoling at the 26th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur” (28 May 2012), online: ISIS <www.isis.org.my/files/2012/26APR/PS2_Tong_Xiaoling.pdf> at 7.

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71. Ibid., at 13.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., at 6.

74. Ibid., at 7.

75. Ibid., at 10.

76. Ibid., at 7.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid., at 10.

79. Ibid., at 9.

80. Ibid., at 11.

81. ICISS, supra note 12 at xii; emphasis added.

82. Suzuki, , supra note 48 at 13Google Scholar.

83. On the issues of regime change and assistance to rebels in Libya, see HENDERSON, Christian, “The Provision of Arms and ‘Non-lethal’ Assistance to Governmental and Opposition Forces” (2013) 36 University of New South Wales Law Journal 642Google Scholar; BREAKEY, Hugh, “The Responsibility to Protect: Game Change and Regime Change” in Angus FRANCIS, Vesselin POPOVSKI, and Charles SAMPFORD, eds., Norms of Protection: Responsibility to Protect, Protection of Civilians and Their Interaction (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2012)Google Scholar, 11. On the legality of external assistance to parties to the Syrian conflict, see RUYS, Tom, “Of Arms, Funding and ‘Non-lethal Assistance’-Issues Surrounding Third-State Intervention in the Syrian Civil War” (2014) 13 Chinese Journal of International Law 13CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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85. ICISS, supra note 12 at 37.

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87. See Table 1. Note, however, that Brazil appears to have retreated from recognizing the Uniting for Peace resolution exception and is now wedded to the WSOD version of R2P, which anchors coercive responses firmly within the exclusive control of UNSC. Therefore, there may now be no difference between the Brazilian and Chinese positions on this issue. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement by H.E. Dilma Rousseff, President of Brazil, At the Opening of the General Debate of the 67th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York” (25 September 2012), online: <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/discursos-artigos-entrevistas-e-outras-comunicacoes/presidente-da-republica-federativa-do-brasil/statement-by-h.-e.-dilma-rousseff-president-of-the-federative-republic-of-brazil-at-the-opening-of-the-general-debate-of-the-67th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-25-september-2012>.

88. Ruan, supra note 11 at 11–12.

89. Pattison, supra note 45 at 14.

90. Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations, “Statement by Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Informal Discussion on ‘Responsibility While Protecting’” (21 February 2012), online: <http://www.un.int /brazil/speech/12d-agp-RESPONSIBILITY-WHILE-PROTECTING.html>. For discussion of the response to Brazil's RwP concept, see Benner, , supra note 45Google Scholar.

91. ICISS, supra note 12 at xii; emphasis added.

92. Note that Bellamy argues that the notion of proportionality is “impossible to calculate with any degree of precision prior to the use of force (and difficult and subjective even afterwards when all the data is in)”. See Alex J. BELLAMY, “Protecting Responsibly: the UN Security Council and the Use of Force for Human Protection Purposes”, Centre for International Governance and Justice, Canberra, Working Paper No. 7.1 (2013), 17.

93. Ruan, , supra note 11 at 12Google Scholar.

94. ICISS, supra note 12 at xii; emphasis added.

95. Ruan, , supra note 11 at 12Google Scholar.

96. Ibid.

97. For an account of a moral (as opposed to legal) duty to rebuild, see PATTISON, James, “Jus Post Bellum and the Responsibility to Rebuild” British Journal of Political Science (19 November 2013)Google Scholar, online: <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9076501&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0007123413000331>.

98. The reconstruction aspect of RP was not discussed at any length at the CIIS conference in Beijing in October 2013, suggesting that there is greater emphasis on promoting the decision-making guidelines and accountability elements of RP.

99. Ruan, , supra note 11 at 12Google Scholar.

100. See Yee, , supra note 2Google Scholar.

101. RwP Concept Note, supra note 8 at 4.

102. Ibid.; emphasis added.

103. For more detailed recent consideration of these issues in the context of Brazil's RwP proposal, see Bellamy, supra note 92 at 20–3; Pattison, supra note 45 at 17–24.

104. United Nations, “Opening Statement of Dr Edward C. Luck, Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect, Informal Discussion on the ‘Responsibility While Protecting’ Initiative Organized by the Permanent Mission of Brazil” (21 February 2012), online: UN <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/EL's%2021%20February%20statement%20-%20Eng lish.pdf>.

105. Bellamy, supra note 92 at 21–2.

106. Ibid., at 22.

107. Ibid., at 22–3.

108. A recent illustration of the complexity of UNSC negotiations is the significant length of time it took to reach consensus on the relatively uncontroversial issue of humanitarian aid access in Syria in February 2014. See Security Council Resolution 2139, UN Doc. S/RES/2139 (2014).

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110. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN Doc. A/59/565 (2004) at 56–7.

111. In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, UN Doc. A/59/2005 (2005) at 33.

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114. Pattison, , supra note 45 at 38Google Scholar. Pattison goes on to argue that, contrary to the prevailing interpretation of R2P, criteria are already an informal part of the current R2P concept.

115. WHEELER, Nicholas, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 33Google Scholar.

116. Evans, , supra note 13Google Scholar. Note that Evans raises but then rejects this possible characterization of RP.

117. I am grateful to Sarah Teitt for highlighting this point.

118. See discussion in Benner, supra note 45 at 4–5.

119. Timely and Decisive Response, supra note 7 at 13–15.

120. Writing in 2012 (prior to RP's conception), Liu concluded that the Chinese position was that international action is permissible only with the consent of the host state. See Liu, supra note 52 at 160.

121. This concern was discussed in Yevgeny PRIMAKOV, “UN Process, Not Humanitarian Intervention, Is World's Best Hope” New Perspectives Quarterly (2 September 2004), online: New Perspectives Quarterly <www.digitalnpq.org/global_services/global%20viewpoint/02-09-04primakov.html>.

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123. For more on China's view of its role in the world, see Alastair Iain JOHNSTON, “How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?” (2013) 37 International Security 7; Yeophantong, supra note 5.

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126. Ibid., at 12.

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130. See e.g. BLACK, Lindsay and HWANG, Yih-Jye, “China and Japan's Quest for Great Power Status: Norm Entrepreneurship in Anti-Piracy Responses” (2012) 26 International Relations 431CrossRefGoogle Scholar; NOESSELT, Nele, “China and Brazil in Global Norm Building: International Law and the International Criminal Court” (2013) 18 Political Papers 701Google Scholar.

131. Ruan, , supra note 11 at 13Google Scholar.

132. Benner, , supra note 45 at 6Google Scholar.

133. As discussed, some of the negative reaction was also due to conceptual problems within RwP.

134. For a similar call for respectful dialogue between Western and non-Western powers, see Thakur, , supra note 7 at 72–73Google Scholar.

135. For more on legitimacy and R2P after Libya, see RALPH, Jason and GALLAGHER, Adrian, “Legitimacy Faultlines in International Society: The Responsibility to Protect and Prosecute After Libya” Review of International Studies (October 2014)Google Scholar, online: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0260210514000242>. See also ARCHARYA, Amitav, “The R2P and Norm Diffusion: Towards a Framework of Norm Circulation” (2013) 5 Global Responsibility to Protect 466CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

136. BURKE-WHITE, William W., “Power Shifts in International Law: Structural Realignment and Substantive Pluralism” Social Science Research Network (January 2014)Google Scholar, online: SSRN <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139 /ssrn.2378912>.

137. Ibid., at 5.

138. Ibid., at 6.

139. Ibid., at 51.

140. Ruan, , supra note 11 at 12Google Scholar.

141. This is not to say that all of the BRICS currently hold identical positions on R2P; they were, after all, unable to maintain a unified position on proposed civilian protection measures against Syria.

142. This possibility is recognized by Burke-White, supra note 136 at 51.

143. Burke-White, ibid., suggests that “distinct versions of sovereignty and R2P will be championed by competing hubs and applied differently within their respective subsystems”.

144. The next annual diplomatic meeting of the BRICS is due to be held in Russia in July 2015.